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Abstract
This paper contributes to ongoing debates about theory application in technology 
enhanced learning (TEL) research. Such debates routinely highlight that the use of 
theory in the TEL field is problematic, and suggest that the issue is of fundamental 
importance to the development of the field. Yet different accounts within these 
debates are oriented towards ostensibly disparate issues and often, in themselves, 
have a somewhat fragmentary nature. This paper, therefore, seeks to synthesise 
and systematise a wide range of the arguments that are evident in the literature. A 
preliminary analysis highlights that the debates are occurring against a particular 
backdrop: a desire to newly re-constitute TEL as a bona fide scholarly discipline.
Four key points of dispute are subsequently identified, which, it is argued, should 
understood against that backdrop. Those key points of dispute, whose analysis 
constitutes the core of the paper, are concerned, respectively with the continued im-
plications of a theoretical ‘canon’ whose pre-eminence in the field is long-established; 
the problematic relations between the field’s ‘empirical’ and ‘theoretical’ discourses, 
which are positioned as often occurring in parallel; a need to better recognise the 
varied functions that different theories might play, whether in research projects or 
across larger research agendas; and the extent to which the TEL field should be 
theoretically aligned with other academic fields of enquiry or seek to position itself 
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as, in some way, ‘exceptional’. Those four points of dispute 
are each disaggregated, within the analysis, into a range of 
distinct stances, and the relations between the stances and 
the points of dispute themselves are discussed. The paper 
concludes by considering the implications of the analysis, 
both for those TEL researchers wishing to engage with 
theory, and those scholars for whom theory application in 
the field is a distinct research object. 
1. Introduction
The present paper contributes to an ongoing scholarly 
debate about theory application in technology enhanced 
learning research (e.g., Bulfin, Henderson & Johnson, 
2013; Antonenko, 2015; Jameson, 2019; West, Ertmer & 
McKenney, 2020). That issue deserves further consideration 
because the use of theory across much of the technology 
enhanced learning field remains much criticised—in my 
view deservedly—despite the existence, over some time, of 
a strident strand of scholarship advocating the importance 
of more extensive theoretical engagement (e.g., Issroff & 
Scanlon, 2002; de Laat & Lally, 2004; Bennett & Oliver, 
2011; Jones & Czerniewicz, 2011; Crook & Sutherland, 
2017; Hew et al., 2019).
The departure points for the present paper are:
1. a contention that scholarship advocating for better 
theory application in technology enhanced learning 
(whatever ‘better’ is taken to mean) is somewhat 
fragmented, notwithstanding the existence of several 
journal special issues devoted to the topic1, and
2. a feeling—substantiated, as elaborated below, by 
previous research (e.g., West, 2016; Hew et al., 
2019)—that the use of theory in the field’s empirical 
work is developing at a regrettably slow pace.
Indeed, those two departure points might well be 
related: with the format of theoretical discussion hampering 
its influence on those researchers who assume their research 
priorities have a purely empirical focus.
My response, in this paper, involves scrutinising the 
scholarship on theory application in technology enhanced 
learning research, and attempting to synthesise and sys-
tematise those debates that are occurring. I do not wish 
1  Those include a special issue of Research in Learning Technology in 
2011, a special section in the British Journal of Educational Technology 
in 2019, and a special issue of Educational Technology Research and 
Development in 2020, as well as the present inaugural issue of Studies 
in Technology Enhanced Learning.
to exaggerate the potential for such a synthesis to effect 
change in the field overnight; there are, as discussed below, 
many reasons for poor theoretical engagement other than 
fragmentary discussion of the issue. Yet there are compelling 
reasons to think that putting forward a paper of this kind 
might, over time, contribute not only to scholarly discussion, 
but also to research practice in the field. On the one hand, 
it is worth noting that, among researchers who work on 
technology enhanced learning, those who attempt to make 
deliberate use of theory in their work are disproportionately 
“in non-promoted positions and early stages of their careers” 
(Bulfin, Henderson & Johnson, 2013, p. 338). Yet, converse-
ly, it is a commonplace observation that actually using theory 
poses very considerable difficulties, with those difficulties 
experienced most acutely by novice researchers (e.g., 
Antonenko, 2015, pp. 53-54). It is reasonably common, 
when discussing theory in the field, to highlight a need for 
more theoretical grounding to be provided in training and 
development programmes (e.g., Drumm, 2019, p. 4; Hew et 
al., 2019, pp. 967-968). The intended outcomes of doing so, 
presumably, would include nurturing the latent enthusiasm 
of ‘novice researchers’ about theoretical issues, and then 
helping them overcome the more common difficulties they 
experience in applying theories in their own work.
Against this backdrop, I suggest that a paper like the one 
I present here might be of interest to two core audiences. 
Firstly, there is a potential audience among those scholars 
interested in the topic of theory in technology enhanced 
learning research. The fact that, below, I survey a range of 
published papers that discuss that issue suggests, in itself, 
that a number of researchers in the field wish to produce 
and develop a body of knowledge on the topic. Such scholars 
might benefit from a new synthesis: one that renders 
differences between different contributions more explicit, 
and positions those differences within wider discussions 
about the development of the field. Secondly, there is also 
a potential audience among those relatively inexperienced 
researchers who, as mentioned above, do wish to use theory 
to investigate phenomena associated with technology 
enhanced learning but find doing so difficult. Conceivably, 
a synthesis of the kind I strive to provide below—accessible 
but not oversimplified, emphasising a few core issues but 
not implying tidy consensus—might provide such developing 
researchers with a useful resource for reflecting on how 
they might approach the thorny issue of theory application. 
Plausibly, the paper might also serve as a useful artefact 
within training and development programmes—where it 
might be used, in line with what is being advocated in the 
literature, to draw attention to theoretical debates.
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I elaborate my subsequent analysis in a way reminiscent 
of Andrews’ (2010) observation that mapping academic 
debates necessitates appreciating, in turn, both the broader 
‘territory’ that bounds a given discussion and the ‘points of 
dispute’ within it. I thus structure my exposition into two 
broad phases.
The first, which sketches the territory, addresses that 
range of analyses that document (and suggest reasons for) a 
drastically attenuated use of theory in technology enhanced 
learning research, as well as those papers putting forward 
arguments for better theory application in future. While, 
prima facie, the issues covered might appear disparate, I 
shall argue that there is a common thread: a desire to escape 
the field’s historically constituted identity as a quasi-aca-
demic service industry, and to use theory as a vehicle for 
re-constituting it, instead, as a bona fide field of academic 
scholarship.
The second broad topic emphasises a set of more 
granular, yet recurrent, issues: ones, importantly, where 
authors advocate discernibly different positions. In keeping, 
once again, with Andrews’ schema, these are presented as 
points of dispute, notwithstanding that their exposition in 
the underlying papers, with few exceptions, is framed in 
ways that avoid direct altercation. I identify and examine 
four core disputes: issues discussed by multiple authors 
who adopt different positions. These, in turn, are canon 
disputes, concerning the scale and historicity of what are 
taken as ‘theories’ in the field; interchange disputes, which 
problematise relationships between theoretical and empirical 
discourses; functions disputes, where different roles that 
theory might play in the future are advocated (and theoret-
ical forms are sometimes disaggregated in relation to those 
roles); and exceptionalism disputes, over the extent to which 
the field should borrow concepts from elsewhere or develop 
its own “theories of technology enhanced learning”. Each 
of these disputes is a crucial issue which, I suggest, we—re-
searchers, research groups, scholarly communities, the field 
as a whole—need to grapple with, if those stated aspirations 
about re-constituting technology enhanced learning as a 
scholarly research endeavour, examined in the preceding 
phase of argument, are to have any hope of being realised.
I conclude the paper by briefly discussing some moments 
of commonality and difference between the four points of 
dispute. Throughout my exposition of those commonalities 
and differences, I shall reprise my account of how the state 
of the field (the “territory” of the argument, as described 
in section 3) is represented in this body of knowledge, and 
consider the implications of my analysis for its further de-
velopment. I also provide some reflective comments, whose 
aim is to draw out some of the ramifications of my analysis, 
for researchers who wish to engage more extensively with 
theory. The latter narrative perhaps most directly addresses 
the potential readership I invoked above as ‘developing 
researchers’, while the former is aimed more equally at both 
that audience and those scholars already interested in theory 
advocacy within the field. 
Before presenting the analysis, however, it is first 
necessary to reflect on how it was produced, and how those 
methods of production relate to my particular reasons for 
writing the paper.
2. Methodological considerations
The present paper is a narrative literature review; it 
attempts, as discussed more extensively by Hartley (2008), 
to “integrate and synthesise work” and to “plot the develop-
ment of a line of reasoning” (p. 87).
I have long found Hartley’s (2008) account useful: 
because it encourages a way of thinking about literature 
reviews that places the attendant practices along a spectrum, 
rather than into rigid categories. Furthermore, rather than 
abstractly placing types of literature review into normative 
hierarchies (where, for example, ‘systematic reviews’ might 
be positioned as the most ‘rigorous’), Hartley also encourag-
es academic writers to think their underlying purposes, and 
how conducting and presenting a literature review relates to 
those purposes (pp. 87-91). 
I have already set out, above, that one important goal 
for writing the present paper was to synthesise and system-
atise those debates occurring in scholarship about theory 
application in technology enhanced learning research. That 
goal emerged, over time, as a consequence of my struggle 
to grapple with such debates when attempting to pursue 
another line of work2. Given that the present paper might, 
2  I had originally planned to write a paper for the present special issue 
arguing that activity theory could make a distinct contribution to the 
emerging technology enhanced learning research field, at a ‘research 
agenda’ level of generality. Yet, in struggling to do so, I came to believe 
that the underlying terrain of debates about the position of theory 
in the field had been insufficiently mapped; that absence, in turn, 
seemed to constrain the potency of the argument I was constructing, 
which sought to build on those debates. This ‘argumentational 
struggle’ is the proximate origin of the first of the two departure points 
stated at the outset of the paper (namely, that the scholarship in this 
area has a fragmentary quality). At the time of writing, the original 
piece remains half-finished; my intention is to contribute it to a future 
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as mentioned above, be used as an artefact within training 
and development courses, and given my experience that 
the readings set in such courses can sometimes influence 
students there in unintended ways, I wish to place a special 
emphasis, in the present section, on the fact that my re-
search design was strongly oriented towards that particular 
goal.
My search strategy, for the present work, was organic 
and iterative; I started by reading key papers and then 
‘snowballed’ outwards from those readings. I was already 
familiar with several previous works that discussed the 
‘theory’ issue. Those included a seminal article by Bennett 
and Oliver (2011), which—though it usually seems best 
remembered for its castigation of a generalised lack of 
theoretical engagement—in substantive terms, sets out three 
case studies of how theory has been used in the field; three 
adjacent chapters within a monograph by Jones (2015), 
which emphasise the need to employ a wider range of 
theoretical underpinnings, so as to better appreciate the 
position of learning within a digitalised and rapidly changing 
society; and a chapter, in a primer on the field, by Crook and 
Sutherland (2017), which charts a range of tensions existing 
between, on the one hand, a desire to recognise and respect 
a greater diversity of theoretical frameworks and, on the 
other, a need to retain a principled understanding of human 
learning. My starting point was to re-visit those works, and 
then to scrutinise both the papers they cited and—via online 
means—those papers that later cited them. I also familiar-
ised myself with a range of prior special issues on the topic 
(see, once again, the first footnote), and similarly ‘snow-
balled’ out from the initial papers I read there. In choosing 
to adopt this organic, iterative approach, I make no negative 
judgements about research designs that involve mechanised 
searching of databases and journal indices; indeed, I have 
made use of such strategies before (e.g., Luckin, Bligh, 
Manches, Ainsworth, Crook & Noss, 2012; Bligh & Flood, 
2017). But, on this occasion, I used an organic approach 
because my priorities were to compare and synthesise 
a number of key arguments, rather than to examine the 
relative prominence of, or evidence for, particular viewpoints 
or assertions. Papers with the latter goals would necessarily 
deploy a different search method. 
I also made a scoping decision that will have conse-
quences for the remainder of the article; namely, I prioritised 
papers that describe or examine ‘theory/ies’ in the field in a 
relatively general sense. The corollary of that decision is that 
special issue of this same journal, already planned for the coming 
period, whose working title is Activity theory in technology enhanced 
learning research.
my subsequent analysis will downplay the contributions of 
those papers that discuss one particular theory. Once again, 
I do not wish to disparage work that emphasises definite 
theories, and indeed in my own prior work I have myself 
tended to discuss theory in more particular ways (e.g., Bligh 
& Flood, 2015; Bligh & Crook, 2017). However, my goal for 
the present paper was to systematise work that emphasised 
theory application, and the problems attendant on that 
application, as opposed to the partisanship and advocacy, 
whether more or less explicit, that usually accompanies 
discussion of particular theories.
Another scoping decision taken was that I would not, for 
the purposes of the present work, distinguish between the 
different terms used to describe the wider field of study. It is 
common, quite understandably, for novice researchers to be 
confused by the disparate nomenclature that confronts them 
in journals and conferences on ostensibly similar topics: 
educational technology, learning technology, e-learning, 
technology enhanced learning, digital education, networked 
learning, computer assisted learning, computer-supported 
collaborative learning, etc. Indeed, many established 
researchers persist in feeling some uncertainty about these 
distinctions; they may often, despite the many attempts by 
various devotees to construct and defend particular defini-
tions, invoke mostly hazy and overlapping impressions. It is 
certainly important that readers understand that, rather than 
being mere synonyms, these terms have emerged historically 
within particular academic disciplines, geographical regions, 
policy contexts, and research funding landscapes; they thus 
come loaded with particular meanings, many of which are 
transparently problematic. One discussion of that issue 
that I find very useful, notwithstanding that I do not share 
its proud partisanship for the term ‘networked learning’, is 
provided by Jones (2015, pp. 3-12). Yet it is also important 
to realise that there are no eternal boundaries between these 
terms, with even advocates changing and updating their 
positions over time. In short, I felt that ruling papers out 
of scope on the grounds that they do not use a particular 
formulation to name their field would, for the purposes 
of the present review, be inappropriate. That decision was 
reinforced by the fact that, with the partial exception of the 
work by Jones (ibid.), none of the papers I reviewed em-
phasised the importance of their field terminology for their 
argument about theory. In the end, I chose to use the term 
technology enhanced learning, and the acronym ‘TEL’, below, 
as a general descriptor, despite the fact that the source 
materials I draw on often use different labels3. Conversely, I 
3  For the purposes of disclosure, and since I often field questions on 
this topic from PhD students, it may be worth admitting that I have 
never found a label for the field that I particularly like. I tend to use 
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wished to restrict my scope to the TEL field itself (howsoever 
named), and to avoid forms of mission creep that might lead 
me to reproduce more established arguments from the wider 
social sciences. That was especially important since it rapidly 
became obvious, during my reading, that the relationships 
between TEL and other scholarly fields was precisely one of 
the issues being problematised in the source material4.
My analysis, as I alluded to briefly in the Introduction, 
focussed on drawing out points from the different papers in 
two very different ways. Inspired by the work of Andrews 
(2010), whose book examines the issue of academic argu-
mentation, I strove to emphasise both the ‘territory’ that 
bounds the discussion of theory in technology enhanced 
learning research and the ‘points of dispute’ within it.
The first layer of my analysis, then, involved examining 
“technology enhanced learning” reflexively, since it matches the term 
used in my current institutional environment, and also because I 
was previously involved in the EU STELLAR project which, as Jones 
notes, was committed to further developing the term. (“Technology 
Enhanced Learning” is a term which has, historically, been most associ-
ated with the European Union policy landscape). I do not myself sub-
scribe to the notion that concepts should be understood by unpacking 
the dictionary definitions of any words that happen to be concatenated 
together in their label (i.e., for me, ‘technology enhanced learning’ ≠ 
‘technology’ + ‘enhanced’ + ‘learning’). Nonetheless, since I have seen 
the associated word games played several times, I’m happy to say that 
I have long preferred the term “education” to the narrower “learning”, 
and that I agree that “enhanced” verges on being an empty signifier. 
My core commitment in any debate about preferred terms, however, 
is to avoid setting up a fundamental dichotomy between the use of 
digital and non-digital artefacts (and thus, in turn, to avoid a range of 
concomitant dichotomies, such as that between ‘online’ and ‘offline’ 
learning). The word “technology”, as Jones discusses, can readily be 
understood by researchers to encompass both its apparently digital 
and non-digital variants, which for me is its most appealing advan-
tage. For these reasons I am extremely sceptical about using the word 
“digital” in any field formulation.
4  It is also important because, as will be discussed below, TEL re-
searchers across the globe are located, via employment and funding 
relationships, and by their professional histories, in a range of 
disciplinary ‘homes’, some of which (such as engineering, computer 
science and healthcare) do not ostensibly fall within the ‘social 
sciences’ as that term is usually understood. Many are also located in 
institutional service units (‘Information Technology’, ‘Library Services’, 
etc.), where they produce research papers either in their own time, or 
as the vagaries of their employment contracts allow. Those relation-
ships between the international and disciplinary locations of the field 
(among others) have, I think, important implications that would be a 
worthy topic for future research.
the ‘territory’ of the discussion. A summary of that analysis is 
presented in section 3. Establishing that ‘territory’ is impor-
tant because, as Andrews (2010) highlights, and as I antici-
pated above when discussing my scoping decisions, forms of 
argumentation are deeply entwined into particular bodies of 
knowledge. While there are certainly some relevant ‘generic’ 
issues concerning how academic argumentation is undertak-
en, contemporary scholarship on the topic also emphasises 
substantial disparity; disciplinary and cultural differences 
are typically taken as the most obvious variables, but in fact 
the variegation of academic argument is substantially more 
contingent than such reduced proxies might suggest. The 
important point, for present purposes, is that understanding 
an argument necessitates understanding what is taken to 
be the terrain within the argument itself, and establishing 
the wider objectives of those involved, rather than just 
cataloguing the directly evident points of dispute. Andrews 
(2010) discusses, for example, several instances of narrow 
analysis, concluding that “oversimplification of a problem 
can lead to superficial and unsatisfactory solutions” (p. 82). 
Hence, while there is a temptation, when writing a literature 
review paper, to dispense only fleetingly with wider concerns 
that are mentioned but not actively disputed in the source 
material, I shall not do so here; in particular, once again, 
because concerns about the wider field and its (insecure) 
relationships with surrounding disciplines and professional 
groups are deeply implicated in the theoretical debates I 
wish to synthesise.
Emphasising this first layer of analysis highlights that my 
reading was inflected by a strong conviction, substantiated 
in the source material, that what is taken to be at stake when 
discussing ‘theory’ in technology enhanced learning research 
is actually rather grander than might be apparent from a 
direct discussion of ‘theory’ itself. My description of the ter-
ritory, in turn, is an attempt to capture some of those wider 
implications and use them to situate the more particular 
points that are subsequently made. Yet it should also be em-
phasised that this was an analytical strategy targeted at the 
papers I was reading, not a move to expand the scope of the 
literature review. Thus, where I subsequently discuss broader 
‘territorial’ issues, such as the developing identity of the 
research field, my analysis will primarily reflect how those 
issues are set out in papers concerned with theory application. 
To the extent that those later papers represent broader issues 
in partisan or one-sided ways, there is a definite danger that 
my analysis might replicate those limitations. 
Having queried those broader dynamics, the second layer 
of my analysis involved turning to focus on a range of more 
particular issues—‘points of dispute’, in Andrews’ parlance. A 
summary of that analysis is provided in section 4. Analysing 
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points of dispute involved identifying the more particular 
issues concerning theory being discussed (the ‘points of 
dispute’ themselves), and then examining, in relation to 
those points, the differences (rarely: explicit differences of 
opinion; more commonly: differences of emphasis) evident 
in the source materials. The latter differences were gradually 
consolidated into different ‘stances’ or ‘positions’. By com-
parison with the preceding section, the material in section 4 
and its sub-sections will perhaps have a more conventional 
appearance for a work of literature review—in form, if not in 
length. A range of points of dispute will be identified, about 
which there is no definite agreement in the literature; the 
more prominent disparate stances will be delineated and, 
where possible, contextualised within the wider territory 
of the field; the ways in which those debates might inform 
subsequent work will be considered; and some critique will 
be offered.
For both ‘layers’ of my analysis, I used a relatively 
inductive technique. Doing so involved drawing out themes 
by examining points of commonality and difference in 
the content of the source materials, rather than applying 
previously determined categories. That decision, once again, 
should not be taken as disparaging of those more deductive 
forms of analysis that do apply more fixed coding frames, 
and indeed I have previously made use of such approaches 
myself (e.g., Luckin, Bligh, Manches, Ainsworth, Crook 
& Noss, 2012; Bligh, 2014). Yet, in this case, my goal to 
synthesise and systematise the underlying materials invited 
a relatively inductive approach. I emphasise ‘relatively’ 
inductive, however, because, in striving to present a critical 
account, I necessarily sought to apply normative judgment, 
especially where (as discussed above) I strived to position 
different stances in relation to each other as ‘points of 
dispute’. It would be disingenuous to pretend that such 
normative judgements arose entirely from within the source 
materials, and that I successfully ‘bracketed’ away all my 
preconceptions. Furthermore, given that the terminology 
used in the source materials is highly heterogeneous, I 
should emphasise that, for better or worse, the names given 
to the analytical categories are largely my own.
3. Theory and the territory of the technology 
enhanced learning research field
How are the points of dispute identified? This is a matter 
of knowing the territory of the discipline, or at least 
of the topic. Once that territory is traversed via wide 
reading, reflection, discussion and exploration […] the 
points of dispute tend to emerge. (Andrews, 2010, p. 82)
In one way, the starting point for examining this 
‘territory’ is obvious, and can be simply stated: there is an 
ongoing sense that technology enhanced learning is an 
atheoretical, or sometimes even anti-theoretical, research 
field (Jones & Czerniewicz, 2011). Statements to that effect 
litter the source materials for this review. While, as discussed 
below, not everyone involved views this state of affairs as 
a problem, it has become increasingly commonplace to see 
the field described, even within its own journals, as either 
making poor use of theory or neglecting it entirely (Bennett 
& Oliver, 2011; Gunn & Steel, 2012). Furthermore, that situ-
ation has persisted for some time, despite tenacious attempts 
at critique from a layer of critical scholars; though there is, 
as elaborated below, at least the possibility of change on the 
horizon.
Often, historical or structural explanations are offered 
for this atheoretical state of affairs. Examples of historical 
narratives are provided by Bennett and Oliver (2011), 
who locate educational technology research in the US as 
emerging out of pragmatic instructional design efforts, for 
industrial and military purposes, from the 1960s onwards 
(pp. 180-181), and by Issroff and Scanlon (2002), whose 
sense is that the field takes pride in its history as an “applied 
educational science” (p. 2); in the latter case, “applied” is 
partially taken, of course, as an antonym of “theoretical”. 
What seems occluded in this literature is any sense that the 
history of research into technology enhanced learning across 
the globe might be heterogeneous; that the history of the US 
case, for example, might not reflect how scholarship on the 
topic was established elsewhere. That blind spot doubtless 
has implications for that sense of ‘pride’ that seen as emerg-
ing from the field’s “applied” history, but this issue is left 
unproblematised in the source material. Nevertheless, while 
such pride is certainly a historical accretion, one currently 
(as elaborated below) a target for protest, it should not be 
imagined merely as a fading vestige, as the following claim 
for exceptionalism, in a piece published in a top-ranking TEL 
journal, demonstrates:
The field of learning design and technology is unique 
among academic disciplines for various reasons. First, 
our field aims to accomplish both research and practical 
goals. In short, our discipline exists equally in both 
the worlds of design and practice, and in research and 
scholarship. […] In addition, our field is a meta disci-
pline, where the tendrils of our craft are intertwined with 
nearly every other field of study. Because each discipline 
and each topic must be taught somehow, educational 
technologists exist at the crossroads to assist in designing 
the learning environments, instructional strategies, and
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technologies for teaching and learning. (West, Ertmer, & 
McKenney, 2020, p. 593)
West, Ertmer and McKenney’s statement is interesting, 
not merely for its sense of swagger, but also because it draws 
attention to the circumstances, both practical and scholarly, 
in which technology enhanced learning research operates: 
namely, at an intersection of both research and practice, 
and across a wide variety of research fields. West et al.’s is 
a positive, celebratory statement; even the word “assist”, 
which certainly hints at a role subordinate to others, is not 
explicitly presented in a cautionary way. Other authors also 
note such positional complexity, yet, by comparison with the 
work of West et al., many examples of what we might term 
a ‘structural’ narrative portray a less cheerful vista. Drumm 
(2019), for example, also starts out by emphasising that 
the TEL field operates at a crossroads of research, policy 
and practice; yet, in Drumm’s account, it gradually becomes 
apparent that TEL practitioners are often, relative to those 
others operating at the intersection, in service-oriented, 
powerless or junior positions. For Drumm that relative 
powerlessness, in turn, comes with a variety of consequenc-
es—the most pertinent, for the present argument, being 
concerned with how TEL issues are conceptualised:
It may be the case that academic developers and learning 
technologists, themselves inhabiting precarious and 
powerless positions (Clegg 2009) and operating with 
limited resources, use clichés and simplified maxims to 
help educators ‘across the line’ when supporting their use 
of technology. (p. 11)
Drumm’s point here is to set up an argument about 
the predominance of what they call “folk pedagogies and 
pseudo-theories” (p. 1) in discussions of TEL; examples 
provided include ‘digital nativism’ and ‘learning styles’ (my 
own priorities for such a list would certainly encompass 
the concept of ‘best practice’). However, in setting up that 
argument, Drumm’s article also highlights how the institu-
tional positioning of TEL practitioners can serve to attenuate 
their use of theory. In short, the suspicion is that, having 
acclimatised to those simplified vocabularies that facilitate 
working with more powerful collaborators, relatively pow-
erless TEL practitioners then face enticement to internalise 
those vocabularies. Similar points are also made by Jones 
and Czerniewicz (2011), who note that “learning technol-
ogy” is struggling to stabilise as a profession, and argue, in 
turn, that the development of “abstract knowledge” and a 
“codified body of principles”, based on research, is essential 
if such professional stabilisation is to be achieved.
To what extent, we might ask, is this line of argument 
relevant to a discussion of theory in TEL research? Surely, 
just because TEL practitioners (whoever they are) are being 
painted into a difficult corner, there is no reason for scholar-
ship in the field to be so conceptually constrained? Unfortu-
nately, such an abstract line of reasoning fails to recall the 
history and structure of the TEL field as an “applied educa-
tional science” (once again: Issroff and Scanlon, 2002, p. 2). 
Other accounts highlight that, indeed, there is an analogous 
tendency for TEL research to tail policy and technology 
development; and, furthermore, that the moral imperative 
to do so partially stems precisely from an unwillingness to 
valorise any scholarship not demonstrably undertaken in 
the service of practice. In other words, part of the sense of 
pride felt by the TEL field derives precisely from the fact that 
its scholars are immediately entangled with practice. The 
corollary is that TEL scholarship does not so easily escape 
whatever constraints are placed on TEL practitioners (it 
is worth noting that some ‘practitioners’ and ‘researchers’ 
might, of course, be the same people—though, as elaborated 
below, even entirely ‘academically-employed’ scholars can 
face a degree of power imbalance within host disciplines, 
which is somewhat analogous to that encountered by TEL 
practitioners, at their own collaborative intersections). 
Bennett and Oliver (2011) draw attention to some of these 
issues in the following way:
This continued focus on practical ‘use-inspired’ design 
research is promoted as ‘socially responsible’ (Reeves, 
Herrington, and Oliver 2005), to be valued above and 
pursued in preference to other forms of research. This 
view, advocating the type of learning technology research 
that should be done, limits possibilities for advancing the 
field. (p. 181, emphasis in original)
The TEL research field in general, and TEL researchers in 
particular, thus seem subject to the promulgation of anti-the-
oretical opinions both because of its history and because of 
the normative consequences of its self-conceived entangle-
ment with practice. There is a dominant ideology—ideolog-
ical in the sense that it disguises and naturalises the power 
relations in which TEL research and practice operates—that 
purely theoretical work is, because it does not directly serve 
the needs of given stakeholders, morally irresponsible. The 
notion that TEL researchers might consume valuable time 
talking to fellow researchers, or scholars working in other 
proximate domains, is subtly disparaged; as, indeed, is the 
notion that research studies might be oriented to ends other 
than practical improvements in the study context (however 
defined). That theoretical and applied knowledge are usually 
positioned in opposition within this moral economy means 
that developing theory can be easily become understood as 
irresponsible. Furthermore, such morality is deeply embed-
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ded at the field’s points of production and reproduction; 
journal editors, for example, often seem to prefer “purely 
empirical” studies, while many academic programmes asso-
ciated with TEL topics retain a largely atheoretical character 
(Gunn & Steel, 2012, p. 2).
What should be abundantly clear, then, is that the lack 
of emphasis on theory in TEL is no mere oversight: instead, 
it emerges from the field’s history and remains continually 
reinforced by the dominant nexus of research practices. 
One downside of the regime outlined above is that 
scholarship in TEL has long struggled to gain legitimacy or 
recognition within academic circles. That is important to 
those researching the area because the field is disciplinarily 
siloed (Sutherland, Eagle & Joubert, 2012). There are, in 
other words, relatively few dedicated TEL departments of ac-
ademic scholarship within universities. Instead, TEL research 
is hosted within a range of more established departments, 
whose disciplinary identities vary widely between different 
institutions and national settings (the more common ones 
are oriented towards educational research, psychology, 
computer science, management and organisational studies, 
healthcare, and engineering). Researchers from such 
backgrounds are socialised and structurally incorporated 
into their home disciplines, and to some extent talk past 
each other at international conferences where their different 
backgrounds invite them to pursue different priorities; for 
this reason, Sutherland, Eagle and Joubert’s work considers 
what might be involved in constructing a conceptual agenda 
that could serve as a boundary object between such silos. 
Yet, for present purposes, it is important to grasp that TEL 
is rarely fully accepted within those disciplines associated 
with its host departments—here it gets disparaged in favour 
of more obviously ‘scientific’ endeavours, there scolded for a 
perceived lack of critical scholarship.
Overall, technology enhanced learning research is often 
seen, by its academic neighbours and critical scholars in the 
field alike, as pragmatic to the point of intellectual myopia: 
at best fixated on “best practice” (Drumm, 2019); and at 
worst descending into polemic driven by “hype” (Crook & 
Sutherland, 2017). And analyses of published studies in the 
field suggest that such perceptions are not without founda-
tion, as evidenced by the findings such as those of Gunn and 
Steel (2012):
[…] our analysis of articles published in two leading 
journals found the same situation as earlier studies of 
a similar nature; well-grounded designs and systematic 
evaluation approaches reported side by side with poorly 
conceived or poorly applied methodologies, limited 
reference to theory, weak results, incomplete descrip-
tions, uneven presentation of data and overblown and 
unsupported claims of impact and importance. While this 
is an extreme statement in relation to most of the articles 
we reviewed, the incidence remain unacceptably high 
and is, therefore, detrimental to advancing the field of 
research in learning technology. (p. 11)
Not a mature field in its own right, nor respected by its 
neighbouring disciplines, TEL is vulnerable to being carica-
tured as a running dog operating at the whim of neoliberal 
policymakers, technology companies and dubious ‘thought 
leaders’. The optics are bad, the status quo looks increasingly 
untenable in the long term—and, as we shall now consider, 
the field’s longstanding ideological morality tales are being 
challenged as never before.
One source of such challenge seems to emerge from 
within the field itself; indeed, there seems something of a 
generational divide opening up, with theory one of the key 
fault lines. Bulfin, Henderson and Johnson’s (2013) survey 
of research scholars, for example, reports that finding views 
positive about the deliberate use of theory in research is 
“more likely with respondents in non-promoted positions 
and early stages of their careers, and those in the ‘social 
sciences and humanities’” (p. 338). Yet, in the field more 
broadly, their survey finds widespread scepticism persisting: 
one transcript excerpt, tellingly, documents a respondent 
worrying that “over-theoretical” research is resulting in 
“gaps between academic researchers and practitioners” (p. 
341). That latter view, of course, is a classic statement of the 
predominant ideology. Presumably, our worried correspond-
ent is not one of those in a “non-promoted” position.
Moving forward from such bases, the source material 
projects the impression that a contest is underway; one in 
which the stakes are nothing less than the future trajectory 
and identity of the research field, and in which ‘theory’ 
is a core site of struggle. Arguments for ameliorating the 
use of theory in TEL research are often, more particularly, 
built around two linked propositions: (1) that technology 
enhanced learning research needs to mature as a discipline, 
and (2) that deeper theoretical engagement is crucial to that 
enterprise (cf. Hew et al., 2019).
The relationship between these two propositions is 
more fluid than it might appear. That forging a disciplinary 
identity is taken as the reason that theoretical engagement 
is worthwhile, of course, is a reasonably obvious reading. 
But there are other implications. One is that ‘maturing’ 
as a discipline requires a willingness to focus some of our 
attention ‘inward’ on scholarship, if necessary to the detri-
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ment of a focus on servicing the needs of policymaker and 
practitioner stakeholders in the short-term—emboldened 
by a newfound belief that developing the field might accrue 
benefits over the longer run. How that focus on scholarship 
might be accomplished is subject to considerable dispute (as 
elaborated in the analysis provided, below, in this paper), 
yet some points of commonality can certainly be detected. In 
particular, it seems important that emphasising scholarship 
should not mean becoming insular and simply disparaging 
practice, but should instead mean more explicitly:
1. viewing both ‘scholarship’ and ‘practice’ as capital-p 
Practices, each legitimate in their own right;
2. problematising the relationships between them; and
3. understanding that those undertaking the practices 
of scholarship are indeed allowed to have their own 
agendas.
Another implication is a requirement for rethinking 
relationships between TEL and its neighbouring academic 
disciplines. As highlighted above, many TEL researchers 
are ‘interdisciplinarians’ surviving tenuously in disciplinary 
institutional environments; and indeed, notwithstanding its 
decades-long existence, TEL research is, in many ways, in in-
tellectual thrall to its antecedent disciplines (de Laat & Lally, 
2004). There is a resultant sense of eclectic borrowing that 
can easily be detected in peer-reviewed scholarship; Hew 
at al. (2019), for example, recently conducted a relevant 
content analysis of published literature, which highlighted:
We note that of the 183 theories, only 35 (approximately 
19%) can be considered specific to educational tech-
nology, such as TPACK. […] One possible explanation 
is that educational technology is an eclectic field (Ely, 
1983) that borrows heavily from other disciplines such 
as sociology, psychology and computer and information 
sciences (Jones & Czerniewicz, 2011). Consequently, to 
the extent that researchers of educational technology 
apply theoretical perspectives, these theories are likely to 
be drawn from other disciplines. […] [T]he sheer range 
of theories from various disciplinary sources presents 
a formidable challenge for any researcher attempting 
to outline a coherent theoretical stance on educational 
technology as a whole… (p. 967)
In Hew et al.’s statement we can detect the outlines of 
what, below, I shall unpack further and refer to as exception-
alism disputes (section 4.4). Yet, for present purposes, notice 
the connotations of the latter sentences of the quotation: 
Hew et al. are not suggesting simply that ‘borrowing’ from 
other fields is intrinsically bad, but rather that the range and 
extent of disparate theories that are getting borrowed is un-
dermining the ability of those in the field to adopt particular 
stances. Not everyone, of course, will immediately agree that 
this situation presents a problem: the word “eclectic” is often 
used approvingly in TEL circles, especially where it sets up 
some instance of methodological “bricolage”. Yet such rhe-
torical moves can be used in ways that unhelpfully conflate 
two different issues. Such discussions of bricolage often refer 
to the choices of individual practitioners or the formulation 
of particular projects, whereas if we focus our attention 
instead at the level of the field then it perhaps becomes more 
obvious that the practice of bricolage (the act of construction 
from diverse sources) is exactly what is being stunted. In 
other words, for better or worse, in theoretical terms the 
field looks eclectic and not coherent; a consequence, one 
might suspect, of the fact that the field is only just starting to 
overcome its ideologically-derived sense of guilt at focussing 
on theory at all.
As de Laat and Lally (2004) put it, “as a research com-
munity, we are still in the process of coming together [and] 
still emerging from the fields that informed the genesis of 
our interests” (p. 13). On the theoretical front, at least, 
progress has been disconcertingly slow in the years interven-
ing since de Laat and Lally made that statement, but at least 
serious attention is being drawn to the issue, as evidenced 
by Special Issues devoted to the topic, including the present 
volume. The somewhat anguished nature of those debates 
largely, in my view, emerges out of the history and structure 
I have sketched here.
What I have tried to convey in the account is, I acknowl-
edge, complicated and slippery. But I think it is an important 
starting point, for contributions to volumes like the current 
special issue, to acknowledge the tectonic plates that have 
been moving (slowly) for some time, and which are oper-
ating to some extent underneath those more direct debates 
about theory that are evident at the present moment. When 
we debate the issue of ‘theory’ in technology enhanced 
learning research, it seems, we do not merely debate arcane 
philosophical issues, but actually engage in contesting the 
future of the research field. Scholars of TEL face something 
of a fork in the road. Will we steer towards continuity with 
past ideologies, or break away towards a more independent-
ly principled scholarly vision? And, if we opt for the latter, 
will that principled vision veer towards the permanently 
eclectic or the pursuit of coherent stances? It is unclear what 
effect the continued interventions of critical scholars, or the 
career maturation of those early career enthusiasts uncov-
ered by Bulfin, Henderson and Johnson’s (2013) survey, 
will have on the ongoing development of the field. But it is 
certainly the case, in my view, that the different points of 
dispute I elaborate below are best understood as threads 
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interwoven into the wider fabric outlined above.
4. Points of dispute concerning theory in tech-
nology enhanced learning
Points of dispute are like knots in wood, or bruises, or 
blockages in transport systems. They are points at which 
there is some problem, some seizure in the general flow 
of things. […] Once the point of dispute is identified the 
problem can be clarified. Clarification is an important 
part of this stage, because it helps the solving of a 
problem if the problem can be accurately defined and 
‘contained’. (Andrews, 2010, p. 82)   
Having discussed those broader dynamics which, in my 
view, provide the impetus for discussions of theory in TEL 
research, I now turn to focus on a range of more particular 
issues—the points of dispute, in Andrews’ parlance, within 
those discussions. To reiterate what I said earlier, in this 
section a range of points of dispute will be identified, about 
which there is no definite agreement in the literature, an 
attempt will be made to ‘contain’ them, and prominent yet 
disparate stances will be delineated in relation to those 
points of dispute. 
For the sake of brevity, and also to facilitate easy refer-
ence in the remainder of the paper, I have given my own 
names to the points of dispute I identify:
• canon disputes: which concern the scale and historici-
ty of what are taken as ‘theories’ in the field;
• interchange disputes: which concern the extent to 
which the field’s theoretical and empirical discourses 
inform each other; 
• functions disputes: which concern how theories might 
assist the field to further develop in future; and 
• exceptionalism disputes: which concern the extent 
to which TEL research might be based on theories 
imported from other fields of scholarship.
I shall now discuss each of these disputes in turn.
4.1  Canon disputes
By canon disputes, I refer to discussions about what 
are taken as ‘theories’ (plural) when the issue of ‘theory’ 
(usually in the singular) is discussed in the field. In TEL, 
unlike in many social sciences research fields (cf. Maxwell & 
Mittapalli, 2008), such debates have not primarily taken the 
form of paradigm contests between those, on the one hand, 
who advocate logical-positivist definitions of theory (i.e, 
that theories are attempts, driven by particular regularity 
assumptions about the world, to make predictions about the 
future via mathematical representations) and those, on the 
other, who advocate more encompassing notions (i.e., that 
theories are constellations of concepts, used within particu-
lar knowledge domains for a variety of purposes). Instead, 
what constitutes ‘theories’ (plural) in the TEL field has 
usually been established by example and precedent; contem-
porary dissent, correspondingly, focusses on establishing that 
both the examples used and the structure in which they are 
presented have problematic implications. 
For a considerable time, discussion of theory in the 
TEL scholarship has been predictably framed by tracing an 
“accepted canon” (Jones, 2015, p. 49) of “grand theories” 
(Crook & Sutherland, 2017, p. 12), and it is within the 
emerging debates centred on this canon that I differentiate 
a range of distinct positions that will be elaborated in this 
section. In this oft encountered narrative, the research 
field has engaged in a slow march across decades: setting 
off from ‘behaviourism’, proceeding gradually through 
‘cognitivism’ and ‘constructivism’, before arriving at ‘social 
constructivism’. Though minor variations in the account are 
occasionally found, often driven by the particular agenda of 
the author—especially where ‘constructionism’ and ‘sociocul-
tural theories’ are introduced (as variations of, respectively, 
constructivism and social constructivism)—the family 
resemblance is easily discerned. The key point, for present 
purposes, is that this overarching narrative encounters 
increasing contestation.
In what follows, I shall demarcate six positions, evident 
in the source materials, that dispute aspects of this theoret-
ical canon in different ways. I shall refer to these stances, 
in turn, using the labels theoretical advance, theoretical 
co-existence, canon integration, canon disaggregation, canon 
juxtaposition, and canon expansion.
4.1.1  Theoretical advance
One stance sometimes taken invokes the importance of 
the canon as a frame for understanding and justifying what 
we might term theoretical advance. Harasim (2012), for 
example—who goes on to present an orthodox overview of 
the canon itself (pp. 9-12)—adopts such a position in the 
following statement:
Understanding the historical shifts in learning and tech-
nology as well as the advances in learning theory during 
the 20th century provides a valuable framework and 
context for identifying new theories of learning related to 
online technologies and social communication. (p. 3)
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By contrast with the other stances that I shall outline in 
this section, Harasim’s position is, at least on epistemological 
grounds (i.e., as a basis to generate knowledge about TEL), 
the least directly critical of the canon itself. Harasim’s 
argument suggests an acceptance, instead, that the different 
theoretical categories were dominant in particular historical 
periods because they successfully highlighted the ontological 
reality of how learning was undertaken in those periods:
The historical context helps us to understand how 
education was perceived, shaped and practiced at 
different stages of human development. […] We can also 
see 20th-century learning theories as part of a continuum 
and as a context for learning theory and practice for the 
21st century. (p. 3)
For Harasim, the canon, therefore, adequately describes 
successive forms of “20th century learning”; critique, rather 
than being directed at the theories themselves, emphasises 
instead the ontological claim that such “20th century learn-
ing” has now been superseded. In other words, Harasim sug-
gests that the categories (‘behaviourism’, etc.) describe how 
learning used to actually happen, but argues the necessity of 
realising that learning does not happen like that any more. 
Harasim juxtaposes, instead, a new ontology—“21st century 
learning”—which, they suggest, arises as a consequence of a 
“historical shift”, predicated on the internet revolution and 
new economic imperatives for knowledge creation. On that 
basis, Harasim argues the need for a new theory—named 
Online Collaborative Learning (OCL)—commensurate with 
that new reality: 
OCL responds to 21st-century Knowledge Age require-
ments and provides a theoretical framework to guide the 
transformations in instructional design. (p. 81)
The suggestion of a close mapping between the reality of 
learning and our theorisation of it, which underpins Har-
asim’s account, resonates closely with a form of argumen-
tation, sometimes called “paradigm shift rhetoric”, which is 
prevalent across the field and used in relation to a range of 
different scholarly debates (cf. Lee, 2018). Such rhetoric of-
ten serves to project normative accounts within the field; Lee 
notices how, for example, such accounts typically use global, 
societal trends as a basis for building dichotomies between 
‘old’ and ‘new’ approaches to learning, which, in turn, are 
deployed to legitimise particular practices at the expense of 
others. The consequences, especially when such understand-
ings get entwined into policy and manifest via accountability 
mechanisms, can verge on the authoritarian—especially, 
in Lee’s examples, from the perspective of those teachers 
being held ‘accountable’. Such arguments about the use of 
paradigm shift rhetoric across the field overlap considerably 
with theoretical advance positions in relation to the accepted 
canon; indeed, the latter might plausibly be understood as a 
particular instantiation of the former. Interestingly, the work 
of Lee (2018), which discusses the broader issue, uses a 
different text by Harasim to furnish one central case study of 
such rhetoric, raising the possibility that particular authors 
repeatedly deploy narrative forms of this type. Harasim’s 
stance, tellingly, does not so much involve interrogating 
the canon as wielding it as a means for legitimation; once 
it has served this purpose, and once a new theory has been 
established in its stead, the canon gets, to a large extent, 
discarded. What is important, for present purposes, is that in 
such positions the canon is a not positioned as a matter for 
active consideration by empirical researchers at the present 
juncture. Arguably, it remains visible, instead, as a catechism 
recited in honour of our scholarly ancestors.
4.1.2  Theoretical co-existence
Another position taken in relation to the standard canon 
of grand theories is almost diametrically opposite to that of 
theoretical advance: instead, it emphasises what we might 
call theoretical co-existence. At the heart of such positions is 
a critique of what Crook and Sutherland (2017) characterise 
as “an evolutionary trajectory” being expressed within the 
canon:
At the heart of this overview is an evolutionary trajectory 
that passes from a focus on responses and stimuli (be-
haviourism), to a focus on the mind (cognitive science), 
to a focus on the individual as a constructive agent of 
learning (constructivism), to a recognition of the social 
and intersubjective nature of learning, to a focus on the 
role of culture and technological tools as constituting 
learning (sociocultural theory). (pp. 22-23).
That trajectory, of course, will seem somewhat familiar 
from our discussion of the preceding position. Yet here 
there are two key differences: (1) the canon trajectory is 
positioned epistemologically (notice the repeated use of the 
formulation “to a focus on”), i.e., as a matter of research 
knowledge rather than underlying reality; and (2) the 
writers’ priority in noticing the trajectory is one of problema-
tisation, rather than reinforcement.
The position of theoretical co-existence involves, above all, 
rejecting any notion that later categories in this trajectory 
have rendered earlier ones obsolete—or, indeed, that any of 
the named categories ought to be considered obsolete at all. 
Though the canon is positioned in the realm of epistemology, 
however, one means for making this point does invoke the 
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reality of the field: these critics emphasise that all of these 
categories continue to influence contemporary practice and 
scholarship even down to the present, and in doing so notice 
that the canon’s neatly linear periodisation is fanciful (Jones, 
2015; Crook & Sutherland, 2017). What seems common 
to such a position of theoretical co-existence, thereafter, is 
that researchers are invited to recognise the advantages of 
more consciously validating that continuing influence—and, 
having done so, of striving to explore and exploit the 
different assumptions about learning that predominate in 
both scholarship and practice.
A more open question remains, however, about how we 
might grapple with those relationships between theoretical 
categories that such theoretical co-existence implies. The 
metaphor of ‘competition’, in particular, is one problematic 
feature of such discussions. Whereas Jones (2015), for 
example, states that “the different perspectives it [the 
canon] identifies are in many ways still in competition” (p. 
49, emphases added), Crook and Sutherland (2007) caution 
that “[t]his structure [the canon again] risks implying that 
they are in some sort of simple competition” (p. 12, em-
phasis added). While, prima facie, these statements seem at 
odds, I remain unconvinced that they indicate a significant 
divergence. Instead, the difference once again implicates a 
distinction between reality and knowledge; as the surround-
ing text in each case makes clear, Jones’ statement addresses 
the reality of a field in which disparate ideas continue to 
circulate, while that of Crook and Sutherland concerns how 
researchers might intellectually engage with the canon and 
relate it to their own scholarship.
It remains the case, however, that those aspects of this 
theoretical co-existence position that declare a cautionary 
critique of orthodoxy are substantially more developed 
than any accompanying suggestions about overcoming or 
supplanting the predominant narrative. In other words, 
adopting a position of theoretical co-existence often does 
not in itself necessarily lead to agreement on prescribing 
how scholars might handle that co-existence, though 
such prescriptions might well be suggested where authors 
combine arguments for theoretical co-existence with one or 
more supplementary positions. Indeed, the works of both 
Jones (2015) and Crook and Sutherland (2017) do each 
subsequently combine their position of theoretical co-exist-
ence with an additional, subsequent argument, which I shall 
turn to discuss later. 
4.1.3  Canon integration
Before doing so, it will be advantageous first to elaborate 
a position that reacts to theoretical co-existence and which 
attempts to provide a direct solution to the attendant sense 
of theoretical ‘competition’ (a much more direct solution 
than is proposed either by Jones, or by Crook and Suther-
land, which is why I consider it at this point). That position 
might be called canon integration, with a prominent example 
provided by the work of Mayes and de Freitas (2013). On 
the basis that previously stark differences in conceptions 
of learning are by now largely overcome—“never before”, 
they write, “has there been such agreement about the 
psychological fundamentals” (p. 19)—Mayes and de Freitas 
wish to update the established grand narrative so that it 
instead emphasises “a set of quite compatible explanations 
for a large range of different phenomena” (ibid.). Their 
alternative grand narrative coheres, in a way that declares 
the influence of prior work in the field of learning sciences 
by James Greeno, around three labels: named the ‘associa-
tionist’, ‘cognitive’, and ‘situative’. The labels themselves, of 
course, still describe very broad categories.
Mayes and de Freitas’ key claim is that, rather than 
portraying rival narratives, their labels now describe differ-
ent “levels” of analysis; moreover, they suggest that “[t]here 
will be few current examples of approaches that derive from 
taking just one level of analysis and neglecting the others” 
(p. 25). The intention behind this position, very clearly, is 
to synthesise a set of prior historical debates now regarded 
as resolved—thereby, perhaps, moving from a (relatively 
singular) accepted canon of grand theories to a (yet more 
singular) grand theory. Tellingly, such a position involves a 
rhetorical downgrading of the ‘associationist’, ‘cognitive’, 
and ‘situative’ levels; Mayes and de Freitas suggest that, 
since their three categories are intended to be used together, 
they might be better regarded as “perspectives” rather than 
theories (ibid.). In this way, Mayes’ and de Freitas’ variant 
of the canon integration position involves proposing a single 
theory in which the core concepts—at least four: association-
ist, cognitive, situative, and level—are integrative of the prior 
canon. In stark contrast to theoretical advance positions, it is 
abundantly clear from Mayes and de Freitas’ text (such as 
where the concepts are deployed in relation to a discussion 
of a concrete example which is, unfortunately, too lengthy to 
excerpt; pp. 26-27) that this newly integrated variant of the 
canon is meant to ‘carry forward’ prior positions into current 
work and render them as active positions for researchers 
to compare and contrast. This integrated canon, in other 
words, is to be used, in its entirety, in relation to particular 
empirical projects.
4.1.4  Canon disaggregation
Another prominent position takes a very different 
approach in relation both to the canon and the attendant 
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theoretical co-existence—one hinging not so much on integra-
tion as its opposite: what we might call canon disaggregation. 
Here is where we shall return to the work of Jones, and of 
Crook and Sutherland. Underpinning canon disaggregation 
positions are attempts to show that the standard canon 
projects categories that are, whether in whole or in part, er-
roneous. Arguments of this nature, then, proceed from very 
different perspectives on the historical progression evoked 
by the accepted canon: with the categories positioned as 
a post-hoc attempt to tidy up and rationalise what, in fact, 
were and remain disparate and messy intellectual debates. 
As Jones (2015) notes:
This disagreement points to a major problem with simpli-
fied accounts of learning theory which […] do not accord 
with the history of ideas, they exclude significant trends 
in educational theory and muddle together approaches 
with quite different ways of seeing the world and quite 
different practical implications. (pp. 54-55)
One relatively straightforward instance of canon disaggre-
gation is provided by Jones (ibid.), soon after the preceding 
statement. The argument is, fairly straightforwardly, an 
attempt to undermine one of the core categories of the 
accepted canon, unpacking the use of ‘constructivism’ along 
geographical lines as a means to do so:
The kind of constructivism that has been most influential 
has been social in character and there is a slight differ-
ence in the ways that constructivism has developed in  
the United States and Europe. European approaches to 
learning theory are happier to speak and write in terms 
of sociocultural theory and about situated learning 
whereas approaches from the Unites States are more 
likely to use the term constructivism to cover similar 
issues. (p. 55)
Crook and Sutherland (2017), similarly, emphasise the 
importance of such distinctions, and in doing so they select a 
similar target. With regard to much constructivist theorising, 
for example, they note that:
Certainly, the learner became more typically cast as an 
(active) interrogator of the world. But that world is too 
often itself a rather static (passive) place: a place of 
fixed or unresponsive learning materials: for example, 
textbooks and worksheets […] (p. 15)
Whereas Crook and Sutherland later discuss sociocultural 
thinking, by contrast, in the following way:
Sociocultural theory addresses more than the interper-
sonal […] Within sociocultural thinking the individual 
and the world are considered to be inextricably linked 
from the outset, such that the external environment is 
not simply viewed as a “context” to the human mind 
but intrinsic to the way in which mentality is actually 
constituted. Moreover, the culture inherited by learners is 
seen as having both people and tools as central constit-
uents. The formative place of cultural history is thereby 
acknowledged in terms of how it specifies a heritage of 
spaces, rituals, practices, institutions and technologies 
(which, of course, includes digital technologies) that 
mediate the experience of learning. (pp. 16-17)
Such points serve, of course, an explanatory purpose in 
themselves: addressing, for example, why work of commen-
surable motivation which pledges allegiance to ostensibly 
similar categories within the accepted canon can exhibit 
markedly different trends across the globe5, by suggesting 
that they are not, in fact, drawing inspiration from the same 
categories at all. Yet authors adopting this canon disaggrega-
tion position use it, in fact, for more definite purposes; as a 
basis for considering how researchers might better engage 
with such a disaggregated canon. Grasping that is important 
because an acceptance of canon disaggregation could, in the 
abstract, be wielded in support of a wide range of positions 
that are not actually being advocated. Perhaps, a devil’s 
advocate might suggest, this disaggregative perspective is 
simply an argument for more precise definitions? In turn, 
perhaps what is required is a greater standardisation of 
definitions for each of the rival perspectives encompassed 
therein, and/or the elaboration of an expanded canon, so 
that it encompasses a greater number of named categories?
In fact, however, the canon disaggregation perspective is 
usually deployed to highlight some fundamental limitations 
of broad categorical thinking in general; critique of the 
contingent categories that happen to dominate the current 
canon narrative are merely a means to that end. In other 
words, critiques of particular categories—such as those 
discussed above—are meant to be taken as mere examples. 
The end argument of the canon disaggregation position, 
then, is that the generative capacity of theoretical think-
ing—for example, what was described above as exploring 
5  An obvious example might be that of research on mobile learning: 
where “social constructivist” work in the US usually focusses on the 
principled design of interactive learning materials that are delivered 
via mobile devices, and the evaluation of their use by learners; while 
“sociocultural” work in Europe typically emphasises understanding the 
practices of mobile learners.
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and exploiting the different assumptions about learning 
made in scholarship and practice—can be compromised, 
if the theoretical categories used to resource that thinking 
are too broad. Crook and Sutherland (2017), who make 
such an argument very explicitly, are keen to caution their 
readers against two dangers: firstly, singular narratives 
that “are not respecting the diversity of current theoretical 
thinking” (p. 19) and, secondly (and as already mentioned 
above), the view that the grand theories themselves are in 
a state of “simple competition” (p. 12). How, then, to avoid 
careering from one danger to the other? What is required, 
Crook and Sutherland suggest, is a conceptual step interme-
diate between high theorising and empirical investigation: 
recognising that the grand theories are “generative of other 
perspectives” that are “narrower in the span of their con-
cerns” (p. 12). We are still being invited, in this critique, to 
explore and exploit different assumptions, but, among other 
things, it is being suggested that, rather than contemplating 
the agreement or otherwise of different broad theoretical 
categories, we need to think concretely about how given 
theories are actually used to interrogate given subject mat-
ters in different ways, and then to examine the more specific 
perspectives being developed as a consequence. This, in 
other words, is an argument that the distinctions within and 
between theoretical categories need to be mapped according 
to their application across the field.
4.1.5  Canon juxtaposition
Next, I turn to discuss two further positions that require 
elaboration, which each proceed from a common observa-
tion: namely, that the standard canon prioritises a particular 
phenomenon (learning) from a particular perspective (disci-
plinary psychology from a largely ‘Western’ perspective), to 
the detriment of other phenomena and perspectives that are 
entirely worthy of being (to continue the metaphor) ‘canon-
ised’. The following statement by Passey (2019) makes clear 
the nature of the problem that the two subsequent positions 
address:
The field of TEL has expanded well beyond an area 
focusing on learning per se. It now encompasses areas 
(ecologies of technologies) that take theoretical under-
pinning needs beyond the concerns of learning. (p. 981)
The fact that the two are described as different positions 
reflects an important disparity in how scholars respond to 
such observations: with one stance involving what I shall 
label canon juxtaposition, while another suggests what might 
be called canon expansion.
The work of Scardamalia and Bereiter (e.g., 2006; 2014) 
is often cited, in discussion of canon issues, as emblematic 
of an increasing dissatisfaction with a focus on ‘learning’. 
And, indeed, in their seminal 2006 chapter, Scardamalia and 
Bereiter proceed from an elaboration of “the significance and 
diversity of ideas that have come to prominence since the 
1960s” (p. 97) in a way that seems purposefully to inter-
sperse elements of the standard TEL canon into a list whose 
membership also encompasses a range of other issues: such 
as “Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, sociology of science, the 
‘Science Wars’ […], explanatory coherence, the ‘rhetorical 
turn’ […], memetics, connectionism, emergence and self-or-
ganization” (ibid.). In a move that ostensibly resonates with 
the arguments of Harasim (see above), Scardamalia and 
Bereiter argue that “[o]urs is a knowledge-creating civiliza-
tion” (ibid.). Yet, unlike Harasim, their suggestion turns out 
to involve retaining the standard canon, while recognising 
that, since it refers only to learning, we need to place that 
canon alongside a new one: the suggested name for which 
is “the new ‘knowledge of knowledge’” (ibid.). In this piece I 
shall refer to Scardamalia and Bereiter’s stance, therefore, as 
canon juxtaposition6. 
Scardamalia and Bereiter (2014), in a later piece, further 
make the distinction at the heart of their position explicit:
To demarcate this space in education we have distin-
guished between learning, conceived of as a change in 
mental state, and knowledge building, conceived of as 
the out-in-the-world production of designs, theories, 
problem solutions, hypotheses, proofs and the like. The 
two may go on in parallel, and are expected to do so in 
education, but from a design standpoint they represent 
different problem spaces. (p. 397) 
The canon juxtaposition stance, therefore, involves 
“distinguishing between” the standard canon and other 
concerns positioned as complementary; doing so, important-
ly, positions the canon itself as concerned with legitimate 
but particular issues. Scardamalia and Bereiter’s (2006, 
2014) work, in particular, is a good example of this stance 
because the complementary narrative (the “knowledge of 
knowledge”) is presented in a mature state of development 
(indeed, that work has been widely influential across the 
field). Conversely, my intention in invoking it is not to 
endorse the particular position that ‘knowledge’ is the most 
6  My reading of their actual, explicit statements that concern the topic 
of the canon tempted me to apply the label “canon parallelism”, but 
Scardamalia and Bereiter’s subsequent discussion of their own re-
search priorities makes abundantly clear that the relationships between 
what they conceive as two spheres are of fundamental importance to 
their position.
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important definite aspect missing from the standard canon 
narrative7—equally valid arguments, doubtless, could be 
made in support of juxtaposing the standard narrative 
against other concerns. For present purposes, however, we 
do need to take seriously the more general point: that an 
emphasis on ‘learning’ as a ‘psychological’ phenomenon is 
being increasingly challenged across the field.
4.1.6  Canon expansion
Another position reacts to this challenge in a different 
way, which I shall term canon expansion. Underpinning such 
a position is a desire to reconceptualise the very issue of 
‘learning’ so that it encompasses concerns raised within bod-
ies of knowledge whose representation, in the canon as it is 
presently constituted, is found wanting. That desire, in turn, 
leads those who adopt this position to attempt to broaden 
and re-shape the canon. Murphy & Rodríguez-Manzanares 
(2014), for example, start to project such a position by 
noticing how one prominent theory, in particular, is difficult 
to position within the canon:
Activity Theory has been referred to as a “sociocultural 
framework” (Waycott, 20115, p. 120) and a “power-
ful sociocultural lens” (Jonassen & Rohrer-Murphy, 
1999, p. 2). It has been described as “a sub-theory” of 
sociocultural theory (Lantolf & Beckett, 2009, p. 460). 
Stetsenko described it as belonging to a “vast family” 
(p. 70) of sociocultural theories that depart “from the 
individualist and mentalist notions of … development” 
(p. 70). Activity Theory presents commonalities with 
other sociocultural approaches and theories focusing on 
human development, but it also distinguishes itself from 
them […] (p. 23)
Thus far, in that it seeks to problematise a single canon 
category, this position has some commonality with that of 
canon disaggregation, which has already been considered 
above. Yet Murphy and Rodríguez-Manzanares go on to 
make clear that their stance also involves troubling other 
categories as well. To do so, they invoke the work of Enge-
ström (2005), whose argument regrets that some aspects of 
activity theory (such as its sign-mediated understanding of 
reality) are sometimes understood as a form of constructiv-
ism, while others (such as its focus on how subjects create 
reality) get positioned as a form of constructionism (p. 160). 
For Engeström, such interpretations constitute basic misun-
7   The contention that learning and knowledge are separate problem 
spaces, to be clear, does not accord very closely with my own views, 
even if we accept the caveat that this is done merely to accommodate 
a “design standpoint”.
derstandings arising where scholars attempt to fit the theory 
into a conceptual terrain which is, while familiar, inappro-
priate to the task. Engeström argues, instead, that activity 
theory developed from within an entirely different trajectory 
of theoretical debate and contestation: where, looking 
back, the key difference at each stage was an absence of the 
“methodological individualism” which, notwithstanding any 
claims to the contrary by its proponents, dominates Western 
conceptualisations of learning (p. 161).
What a position of canon expansion suggests is needed, 
consequently, is a thoroughgoing reconceptualisation of 
those debates that the standard canon seeks to summarise. 
In turn, that reconceptualisation, it is suggested, needs to 
take a form that allows the key differences to be drawn out 
in a way that problematises more broadly the object of the 
canon: learning itself8. In line with my exposition of the 
other, preceding stances, I do not wish to give the impression 
that activity theory constitutes the only challenge to the 
standard canon that is worthy of canon expansion9; on the 
contrary, there are doubtless many other intellectual trajec-
tories that could be taken as the basis for such a position. Yet 
two aspects of Murphy and Rodríguez-Manzanares’ account 
render it a useful example for present purposes. The first is 
that activity theory places heavy emphasis on understanding 
how concepts have arisen, as attempts to mediate contra-
dictions in prior practices, within historically and culturally 
situated practices; which means that (unlike for theoretical 
advance positions) activity theory advocates like Murphy 
anfd Rodríguez-Manzanares are unwilling, as a point of 
principle, to consider earlier debates closed once their own 
position has been stated. The second is that activity theory 
does not concede either that learning is a separate sphere 
from other aspects of practice, nor that ‘psychological’ un-
derstandings of it should necessarily be privileged; meaning 
that (unlike for canon juxtaposition stances) the notion that 
the existing canon might best be understood in relation to 
a separate body of knowledge positioned as external seems, 
8  If this distinction seems difficult to grasp, then it may be helpful to 
conceive the standard canon as a series of positions oriented towards 
a gradual elaboration of the phenomenon of individual humans 
learning. Where those positions vary is in elaborating “what we 
have to take into account when considering” or “how we might best 
understand” that core phenomenon. Whereas this position argues that 
other intellectual trajectories, which were not oriented towards the 
phenomenon of individual humans learning in the first place, might 
still be understood validly as oriented towards learning if the latter is 
interpreted less narrowly.
9  Yet, given my publicly visible scholarly record, it would be absurd to 
pretend that this stance does not accord fairly closely with my own 
views.
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from this vantage point, inadequate. 
4.1.7  Synopsis of canon disputes
A synopsis of canon disputes is provided in Figure 1. The 
largest node, “canon disputes”, is, of course, located central-
ly—as the locus for these disputes. As the question posed 
in that node indicates, the disputes considered in section 
4.1 have a strong flavour of historicity; they directly invoke 
how theory has been discussed and positioned in the field 
in the past. In most cases, invoking such past discussions is 
motivated by a desire to problematise them in some way. As 
Figure 1. Synopsis of canon disputes
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I noted in the introduction to this section, contemporary 
dissent problematises both the examples used and the struc-
ture in which they have been presented. That such effort has 
been devoted to such problematisation it, itself, an indicator 
of the considerable hold that theoretical “canon” continues 
to exert over work in the field.
The structure of the diagram positions the other nodes 
in relation to that central locus, with each representing a 
distinct stance that responds to the ‘central’ question. The 
peripheral nodes provide, in turn, a short summary of the 
positions outlined previously across this section: respectively, 
those of theoretical advance (section 4.1.1), theoretical 
co-existence (4.1.2), canon integration (4.1.3), canon disag-
gregation (4.1.4), canon juxtaposition (4.1.5), and canon 
expansion (4.1.6). Each peripheral node provides a short 
summary of the position, with those summaries simplified 
considerably by comparison with how they are discussed 
in the respective section, above. The reader is directed to 
the respective section for a more nuanced analysis of the 
respective position.
What the diagram highlights, in a way that can get 
obscured when considering the detail, is the extant relation-
ships between the various positions. Of course, each relates 
to the central locus of “canon disputes”; and that each 
has been represented using a separate node is intended to 
convey their distinctiveness. Yet the diagram also highlights 
other important relationships between these stances. The 
theoretical co-existence position, for instance, is built on, 
quite directly, by those putting forward canon integration 
and canon disaggregation stances. In other words, for a 
given author to advocate one of those latter positions, they 
must not only address the canon disputes but also establish 
a stance of theoretical co-existence as a precursor. Theoretical 
co-existence is thus positioned, in Figure 1, as mediating be-
tween the core locus and each of those positions. Conversely, 
the canon integration and canon disaggregation stances are 
labelled, in the diagram, as “opposed”, which highlights 
their incompatibility; an author could not advocate for both 
positions in the same paper without falling into argumenta-
tional incoherence. The theoretical advance and theoretical 
co-existence stances are labelled as “opposed” for the same 
reason. Another relationship between two of the positions 
is not highlighted directly in the diagram, but is worth 
noting: that there is some similarity between the theoretical 
advance and canon integration positions. In both cases, 
the underlying impetus is to resolve the canonical disputes 
and ‘move forward’. The main difference between the two 
positions, as Figure 1 conveys, concerns whether or not the 
validity of theoretical co-existence is accepted as a basis for 
that resolution.
Of course, not all stances adopted within theory disputes 
in TEL relate, so evidently, to the long-established theoretical 
canon. Such stances are analysed in the subsequent sections, 
with my analysis turning next to consider questions of 
‘interchange’ between theoretical and empirical work in the 
field. 
4.2  Interchange disputes
By interchange disputes, I refer to discussions concerning 
the extent to which the field’s theoretical and empirical 
discourses inform—and, in general, fail to inform—each 
other10.
At minimum, such discussions address the point that 
there does exist a considerable body of theory, on which, 
in principle, empirical research in the field could draw. 
Moreover, it is sometimes noticed, a range of conceptual 
or theoretical papers about TEL can claim a degree of 
popularity with scholarly readers. West (2016), for example, 
conducted an analysis of 20 educational technology journals 
and “consistently found theoretical/literature-based articles 
to be among the most cited in a journal” (p. 44). Is it not the 
case, a devil’s advocate might ask, that such analyses rather 
undermine the whole notion that the TEL field does not 
engage with theory? Those arguments that I refer to as in-
terchange disputes, however, emphasise that the prominence 
of particular theoretical papers does not alter the fact most 
empirical research in the field is under-theorised; instead, 
it furnishes a contention that discussions of theoretical and 
empirical concerns across the field largely occur in parallel 
(Bennett & Oliver, 2011; Jones & Czerniewicz, 2011; West, 
Ertmer and McKenney, 2020). The ‘theoretical’ strand of 
these parallel discussions, although far from inconsequential, 
is smaller in terms of the number of papers published, yet 
some sub-set of those papers goes on to attain an extraordi-
nary level of scholarly citation; while the ‘empirical’ strand 
constitutes that far greater number of papers that continue, 
seemingly regardless, in their orientation towards more 
typical goals, such as ‘best practice’.
In exploring the positions taken in such disputes, there 
is, it should be said, some danger of repeating aspects of 
what has been stated already, in section 3, about the poor 
state more generally, across the TEL field, of theoretical 
engagement. Unsurprisingly, for example, those comments 
that I shall categorise as contributing to these interchange 
disputes are typically preceded in the source material by 
10 Indeed, the extent to which discussion of this topic emphasis a failure 
to inform, in each direction, is such that in an earlier draft of this piece 
the label being used was ‘detachment disputes’.
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statements of regret about those same sorry circumstances. 
Furthermore, one common rhetorical aspect of interchange 
disputes involves rehearsing forms of apprehension about 
the implications, for the wider field, if authors of empirical 
papers persist in failing to engage with theory. When consid-
ering this issue, Jones and Czerniewicz (2011), for example, 
emphasise precisely that “empirical work that fails to engage 
with theory has a very limited ability to develop and inform 
the field” (p. 175). Such points are, in my view, entirely 
valid; but I shall not dwell on them here, since I assume that 
readers who have persevered this far will recognise them 
as a familiar component of discussions pertaining to the 
wider territory. Furthermore, and crucially, such statements 
constitute a common backdrop for, rather than distinct 
positions within, the source materials that underpin my anal-
ysis. In the account that follows I shall, instead, focus more 
narrowly on discerning those positions taken in relation to 
the fact that both theoretical and empirical discourses do 
exist in the field.
I shall distinguish between five such positions, which I 
shall refer to, in turn, using the monikers researcher insulari-
ty, structural disincentive, empirical disengagement, theoretical 
widening, and research-practice theorisation.
4.2.1  Researcher insularity
One position sometimes adopted in relation to these 
disputes might be called researcher insularity: a contention 
that those researchers engaged in empirical work do not 
exhibit sufficient aspiration for theoretical interchange. Such 
a position is advocated, for example, by Bulfin, Henderson 
and Johnson (2013), whose interpretation of the findings 
of their survey of TEL researchers, among other things, is 
that it “highlights a paucity of theoretical engagement (and 
perhaps theoretical ambition) among many respondents” (p. 
344, emphasis added). They go on to unpack this point in 
the following way:
It would appear that many respondents’ notion of what 
constituted useful ‘theory’ often related to specific ideas, 
concepts and frameworks that would not be considered 
to be theoretically grounded or particularly theoretically 
sophisticated. Further thought and discussion need to 
take place regarding the apparent absence of bona fide 
‘theory’ from the field. (ibid., emphasis in original)
Such a stance, of course, is only marginally more specific 
than those discussions of the wider field that I outlined 
previously; indeed, I position it first in my exposition of 
interchange disputes partially because, in lacking dependence 
on other positions in those debates, it is relative simple to 
take as a starting point. Yet adopting a position of researcher 
insularity does pose questions that will recur several times 
subsequently. What are the reasons for this state of affairs? 
And what normative judgements are being implied?
The researcher insularity position, as set forth above 
by Bulfin, Henderson and Johnson (2013), suggests two 
responses to such questions. One involves a transparently 
normative account of theories: with “specific ideas, concepts 
and frameworks” being counterposed to “bona fide ‘theory’” 
on grounds that, while not explicitly stated, certainly imply 
some sort of canonisation of particular theories at the 
expense of others (cf. section 4.1).
Additionally, of course, a position of researcher insularity 
suggests, to some extent, a criticism of those researchers 
contributing to the ‘empirical’ strand of those parallel 
discussions identified at the outset of this section. While 
it might, in the abstract, be argued that the same people 
might contribute to the ‘theoretical’ and ‘empirical’ strands 
at different times (perhaps in different publications), that 
argument is not concretely found in the source materials. 
Instead, as Bulfin, Henderson and Johnson’s text demon-
strates, this position implies a focus on researchers, who 
are thereby implicitly categorised, as ‘empirical-researchers’ 
and ‘theoretical-researchers’, as playing relatively fixed roles 
within the field. Reeves, McKenney and Herrington (2011), 
for example, direct a critique at (empirical) researchers 
directly, by suggesting that most such researchers in the field 
are incapable of substantial theoretical work:
This type of research [oriented towards “theoretical 
goals”] is relatively rare because it requires levels of 
synthesis, generalisation, and theory construction beyond 
the abilities of most researchers. (p. 59)
Yet, as this statement should make clear, from a critique 
of researchers it should not be taken to follow that oppro-
brium is always being directed at individuals; rather, the 
target is more typically empirical-researchers in aggregate, 
a category taken as a substantial sub-set of those active in 
the field (cf. “most researchers”). It also does not mean that 
empirical-researchers are being caricatured as wilfully dif-
ficult; indeed, given that, as Jones and Czerniewicz (2011) 
argue, the field as a whole exhibits a degree of uncertainty 
regarding how theory might be applied to empirical work, 
the empirical insularity of empirical-researchers might be un-
derstood as a rational response to uncertainty and perceived 
risk. Notwithstanding these various caveats, however, this 
empirical insularity stance has two key characteristics: (1) 
it positions ‘theory’ as something that already takes a set of 
legitimate (“bona fide”) forms, and (2) it places the emphasis 
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of critique on empirical researchers as researchers (plural) 
for, on the whole, failing to engage with those legitimate 
forms. Such a stance, therefore, might lead most directly to 
support for those calls for the better education and training 
of researchers which, as I stated in section 3, are already 
reasonably prominent within the field. 
4.2.2  Structural disincentive
Another position evident, in relation to interchange 
disputes, also accepts existing theory as largely legitimate, 
but fixes its locus of critique more widely than researchers 
per se. I shall refer to this stance as a position of structural 
disincentive, by which I intend to convey how it positions 
the lack of theoretical interchange as a consequence of the 
regimes within which TEL research operates. One particu-
larly explicit example of such a position is provided by the 
work of Gunn and Steel (2012), whose arguments derive 
from their content analysis of the articles published in two 
journals, selected for their degree of influence in the field, 
over a period of five years. In relation to theoretical inter-
change, they make the following statement:
Theory development is an organic process of exploration, 
discovery, confirmation (through cycles or iterations) 
and dissemination. The process needs to be theoreti-
cally grounded and support testing over time and in 
different contexts. According to our analysis, timeframe 
in research design remains problematic. Many studies 
continue to take a “snapshot at a point in time” to suit 
researchers’ immediate aims and funding body or other 
external requirements. While these are valid parameters, 
they should not be the only ones. The short-term nature 
of many inquiries meant that few authors explicitly or 
adequately grounded their research in relevant theory 
and then attempted to reflect on or extend that theory 
based on their study findings. (Gunn & Steel, 2012, p. 9, 
emphases added)
Within that statement, of course, there is exhibited some 
evidence of a researcher insularity position (cf. “researchers’ 
immediate aims”). Yet Gunn and Steel also direct a substan-
tial portion of their critique at the wider context: namely, the 
timeframes within which research projects must be carried 
out, and the “external requirements” imposed on those 
projects. The point is that positions of structural disincentive 
might be viewed as building on those of researcher insularity, 
while widening the emphasis of critique.
We might strongly suspect—though, in Gunn and Steel’s 
account, the point remains implicit—that those issues 
conceived using the terms ‘project timeframes’ and ‘external 
requirements’ are related. Project timeframes, for example, 
might, in many cases, be determined by external require-
ments: via mechanisms such as funding periods (whether 
determined by ‘academic’ or ‘policy’ funders), line manage-
ment oversight (for those projects arising within educational 
institutions), and reporting requirements (for both types 
of cases). Thus, we should not overlook that structural 
disincentive positions, even when directly articulating only 
a small number of issues that are, individually, ostensibly 
uncontroversial, actually suggest a rich nexus of overlapping 
influences in relation to interchange disputes.
Yet not all such stances restrict their formulations to 
such granular points. The contention, for example, that 
journal editors prefer to publish empirical papers, discussed 
in section 3 in relation to the field overall, could also be 
wielded as an example of structural disincentive; it could, 
though the point is not formulated in quite this way in the 
source materials, potentially be elaborated that researchers 
are thereby, given the publish-or-perish regimes of contem-
porary academia, discouraged from engaging with theory. 
“Increasingly”, West, Ertmer and McKenney (2020) contend, 
“journal editors appear to privilege empirical work at the 
cost of theoretical and conceptual scholarship” (p. 594). 
Doing so seems a counterintuitive move for journal editors 
to make, since the higher citation counts of theoretical 
papers might well elevate the metrics (and thus the prestige) 
of their publication venues; yet it could be understood as a 
negative but predictable outcome of the prevailing moral 
economy in TEL11 (section 3).
Other instances, of issues whose influence is understood 
as more diffuse and pernicious than ‘project timeframes’, 
however, are considered in the source material. Consider, for 
example, an editorial argument by Jones and Czerniewicz 
(2011), who consider the implications of the fact that the 
TEL field is, increasingly, urged to prioritise the research 
topic of “big data”:
In a world of big data the idea that theory is at best 
irrelevant and at worst counterproductive is extremely 
dangerous. In educational technology the idea of learner 
analytics could easily be developed to suggest that if we 
simply collect enough raw data on students then theory 
11 Given the wider territory of the field, as described earlier, it might 
also be understood as the rearguard action of a particular generation 
of TEL researchers; though for the purposes of the present argument I 
want to retain a focus on relations between scholarships (i.e., bodies 
of knowledge) rather than scholars (i.e., people). I especially wish to 
avoid a focus on individuals, even though it may well be tempting to 
view “journal editors” in that way.
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will become irrelevant. Such a stance in relation to 
theory ignores all the known weakness of numerical data 
and the weaknesses of ‘big data’ in particular (see for 
example boyd and Crawford 2011). In a world in which 
there is a data flood in which new data sources impact 
on all the disciplines that learning technology draws on, 
a renewed engagement with theory will be essential to 
ensure that the data we collect for analysis is not garbage 
so that the answers derived from it are not just as poor. 
(p. 175, emphasis added)
Prima facie, the structural element of the critique 
suggested by such an argument might not be understood as 
directed at the field of TEL per se. Are these points, a devil’s 
advocate might argue, not really about objects of inquiry like 
digital capitalism and Industry 4.0, and, in turn, the wider 
societal ‘forms of consciousness’ that are arising alongside 
developments of that nature? While such points do, in 
themselves, have a degree of legitimacy (their objects of 
critique are compelling), for present purposes the key issue 
does indeed concern the potential for impact on theoretical 
interchange in the TEL field (cf. “could easily be developed 
to suggest”, in the above quotation). If one recalls the the 
historically problematic nature of how relationships between 
TEL research and wider societal developments have been 
characterised—via, as I characterised them in section 3, 
ideological ‘moral imperatives’—it should be readily under-
stood that researchers might encounter a strong disincentive 
to engage in theoretical work where particular topics are set 
up as high priority research objects whose wider conceptu-
alisation within society is already dismissive of theoretical 
concerns. Furthermore, when juxtaposed against those same 
mechanisms we considered above in relation to the more 
granular concerns of timescale and external requirements—
viz.: funding periods, line management oversight, reporting 
requirements—we can see that those disincentives are likely 
to be reinforced in ways that it is entirely legitimate to 
characterise as ‘structural’. 
4.2.3  Empirical disengagement
Hitherto, those stances that I have highlighted within 
these interchange disputes have either left the status of 
theory untroubled, or have served to valorise its current 
forms (cf. the comments, in section 4.2.1, about “bona fide” 
theory). In the subsequent sub-sections, by contrast, I will 
outline several stances whose critique faces, to some extent, 
in the opposite direction: namely, by seeking to position 
problems of theoretical interchange, in different ways, as a 
function of the current state of theory in the TEL field. 
I shall refer to the first of these positions using the label 
empirical disengagement, by which I mean to implicate a 
concern with the utility of current theoretical formulations 
for ‘engaging’ those researchers in the field who carry out 
empirical work.
Positions of empirical disengagement typically start out by 
emphasising that the lack of theoretical interchange in TEL 
research should not be understood one-sidedly; as only the 
fault of those researchers who, while undertaking empirical 
work, fail to engage with theory. Instead, it is suggested, 
we need to grasp the situation from the vantage point of 
those researchers, and thereby register that many theoretical 
discourses surrounding the TEL field are constructed in ways 
that are both (1) difficult for empirically-oriented research-
ers to use, and (2) inadequate for persuading those research-
ers of the benefits of theoretical engagement. Goodyear, Ellis 
and Marmot (2018) suggest that such issues are really about 
“fitness for purpose”: 
The problem has become something of a blind spot. 
We lack theoretical ideas, methods and modes of ex-
planation that are fit for the purpose of constructing a 
research-based understanding of a range of fundamental, 
complex phenomena that are core to education. (p. 226)
Even prima facie, it seems unlikely that hard-pressed TEL 
researchers will incorporate theoretical concepts into their 
practice, unless they see them as useful for their actual re-
search labour and relevant to their actual research objects12. 
Empirical disengagement positions, for this reason, typically 
start out by dwelling on the contention that theory in TEL, to 
a considerable extent, fails these tests of perceived useful-
ness and relevance. West, Ertmer and McKenney (2020), for 
example, set up their argument for such a position in the 
following way:
To advance the field, our theoretical scholarship must 
be more than simply reflective practice or editorializing 
opinions. We must be able to demonstrate how this kind 
of work is sufficiently rigorous to nourish research and 
practice. But what are the qualities of rigorous theoreti-
cal scholarship? (p. 594)
Thus, while the empirical disengagement position shares, 
with those of researcher insularity and structural disincentive, 
12 The fact that researchers might come to use theory to challenge their 
existing research objects, rather than merely pursuing them in slightly 
different ways (cf. Bligh & Flood, 2017), is likely to remain a moot 
point if present circumstances continue. In other words, I see address-
ing the issues described subsequently as a necessary prerequisite for 
such challenge to develop.
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the notion of a mismatch between theory and the field, it 
differs in suggesting that, to some extent, it is theory that 
should be challenged to better match the requirements 
of empirical research in the field. We might, at the risk of 
oversimplification, contrast this position with the previous 
two in the following way: the researcher insularity position is 
concerned with the extent to which researchers are capable 
of meeting the requirements of theory; the structural disin-
centive position is concerned with the extent to which the 
structure of empirical work in the field allows researchers to 
meet the requirements of theory; and this empirical disen-
gagement position is concerned, by contrast, with the extent 
to which theory meets the requirements of researchers and 
the structure of empirical work in the field. For West, Ertmer, 
and McKenney (ibid.), theory that does meet these latter 
requirements can be given the moniker rigorous theoretical 
scholarship (p. 594). The latter is subsequently characterised 
in their argument in the following way:
First, theoretical work must be original; it must contrib-
ute new ideas to the academic discourse by providing 
original synthesis, applications to practice, methodo-
logical development, or wholly new conceptual under-
standings about the variables and influences related to 
teaching and learning. Second, theoretical scholarship 
must be useful, particularly in a discipline such as ours 
in which scholars see themselves as educational design 
researchers, seeking to influence local practice as much 
as create knowledge that can advance the work of others 
(McKenney and Reeves 2019). (ibid., pp. 594-595)
That such statements advocate particular ‘roles’ for 
theory highlights a link between this position and those 
wider points of debate that I shall refer to, in a subsequent 
section, as functions disputes (section 4.3). Yet the more 
pertinent aspects of this position, for present purposes, are 
those related to what I have, above, called the requirements 
of researchers and the structure of empirical work in the 
field. Where this position is put forward concretely, however, 
it would be remiss to caricature it as inadvertently assuming 
that the latter requirements and structure are static (and it 
is for this reason that the preceding paragraphs are, where 
researchers and the field are implicated, littered with caveats 
of the form “to some extent”, “start out by”, and “at the risk 
of oversimplification”). Adopting an empirical disengagement 
position typically indicates, on the contrary, a desire to 
interconnect with empirical researchers and thereby, to 
some extent, to challenge aspects of the wider field. In this 
sense, theoretical fitness positions attempt more than simply 
reversing the polarity of researcher insularity and structural 
disincentive. 
From this desire it follows that, for those critical scholars 
who wish to promote better theoretical interchange, the 
challenge posed by empirical disengagement positions 
involves an element of persuasion, with a particular yard-
stick of success being proffered: namely, the extent to which 
the field comes to treat empirical and theoretical work as 
“integral parts of the same endeavour” (Bennett & Oliver, 
2011, p. 180). In turn, there is a need to suggest means by 
which such a yardstick might be pursued, with West, Ertmer, 
and McKenney (2020) discussing these means of persuasion 
and challenge using the metaphors of provocation and 
guidance, as in the following text:
As Whetten (1989) explained, such scholarship not only 
identifies the variables involved in a research agenda, but 
also explains, contextualizes, and critically analyzes the 
relationships between these variables. We need this kind 
of theoretical work to provoke robust empirical scholarship 
and guide quality design and practice. (p. 594, emphases 
added)
An empirical disengagement stance, then, broadly involves 
addressing the relations between theoretical and empirical 
scholarship. While examples of the position put forward a 
nexus of overlapping points, a consistent object is the refor-
mulation of theoretical scholarship, which needs to ‘provoke’ 
and ‘guide’ empirical forms of work in the field by being 
‘useful’ and ‘original’—with the overarching outcome sought 
being the production of ‘robust’ empirical work and ‘quality’ 
educational design. Presumably, when considering more 
granular issues of process, those goals concerned with theo-
retical scholarship will be pursued, in part, via more specific 
forms of advocacy within theoretical papers themselves; and 
we might be able to judge our success by determining the 
extent to which both empirical and theoretical researchers 
in the field come to treat their respective work as integrated. 
One appropriate object for such advocacy, as evidenced in 
the preceding quotation, appears to be the field’s research 
agendas, which are thereby positioned as a boundary object 
between theoretical and empirical scholarship.
4.2.4  Theoretical widening
We now turn to consider two distinct stances within 
interchange disputes which, in turn, address the different 
practices of ‘researchers’ and ‘practitioners’. I shall refer 
to these positions, respectively, as theoretical widening and 
research-practice theorisation. In common with the theoretical 
fitness stance, advocates of both of these positions suggest 
that we need to understand problems of theoretical inter-
change in TEL as arising, at least in part, from the ways in 
which theory has historically been constituted within the 
Theory disputes and the development of the technology enhanced learning research field
136 Studies in Technology Enhanced Learning, 1(1)
https://doi.org/10.21428/8c225f6e.a85d0cc9
field. By contrast with that position, however, our attention 
is not drawn to a distinction between ‘empirical’ and 
‘theoretical’ research, but rather to the relationship between 
‘research’ and ‘practice’.
At heart, the position of theoretical widening is a claim 
that TEL researchers can, by making use of theoretical ap-
proaches that are more descriptive of actual practice, better 
influence that practice. Theoretical widening, therefore, 
sits in close relation to several other positions considered 
elsewhere in this analysis. On the one hand, in recognising 
that a narrow emphasis on ‘learning’ is negatively con-
straining the influence of research on practice, theoretical 
widening builds on those canon disputes analysed earlier, in 
section 4.1. On the other, in debating whether the attendant 
‘theoretical approaches that are more descriptive of actual 
practice’ should be developed within the field or draw on 
outside influences, theoretical widening positions reproduce 
aspects of those exceptionalism disputes that I shall consider 
in section 4.4. 
A well-known example of work that adopts a position 
of theoretical widening is that of Dillenbourg (e.g., 2013). 
The underlying idea of this argument, developed over 
some time, is called ‘classroom orchestration’; though it has 
sometimes, in turn, come to be generalised by other authors 
and discussed simply as ‘orchestration’13. As we shall unpack 
below, Dillenbourg’s argument, in counterposing learning 
against a range of other counterbalanced issues, corresponds 
to a canon juxtaposition position (cf. section 4.1.5); while, 
in seeking to further the development of theory from 
labour within the field, rather than working from outside 
influences, it corresponds to a phenomenal distinctiveness 
position within the exceptionalism disputes (cf. section 4.4.1). 
Dillenbourg’s work serves as a useful example of theoretical 
widening, since its argument is explicit and contained, and 
because it has been widely influential in the TEL field14. We 
should be clear from the outset, however, that, in relation 
to the canon and exceptionalism disputes, not all positions of 
13 Dillenbourg, in turn, has come to be a critic of the use of the term 
‘orchestration’, and seems to regret choosing that particular label for 
their metaphor, though they continue to propound the underlying 
ideas. In the present analysis, however, it will be sufficient to consider 
Dillenbourg’s own argument in relation to ‘classroom orchestration’, 
since doing so can amply illustrate those theoretical widening positions 
that I seek to emphasise in the section.
14 The EU STELLAR project, which, as I noted above, was pivotal in 
developing the identity of “Technology Enhanced Learning” in Europe, 
positioned orchestration as one of three core concepts for the field, 
alongside connection and context (cf. Sutherland, Joubert, & Eagle, 
2012).
theoretical widening are instantiated in these ways. 
Dillenbourg (2013) commences their argument by setting 
up the importance of research-practice considerations in a 
particular way: namely, by observing that there is, among 
researchers, a common sense of “frustration” about the 
limited extent to which those projects on which they work 
come to influence practice, in broad and sustained ways, 
within institutions. Dillenbourg advocates, in turn, that such 
frustrations should be used to stimulate a conceptual, rather 
than vituperative, response:
Instead of blaming teachers and institutions, it makes 
sense to ask if is there something about the technology 
we develop that discourages its usage? (p. 485)
Dillenbourg’s approach to pursuing this line of inquiry 
involves reflecting on a range of projects, conducted over 
a number of years, and trying to conceptualise those key 
issues that “emerged through frequent interactions with 
teachers while designing activities and from experiments in 
which these activities were, as often as possible, conducted 
by the teachers” (p. 490). In this way, Dillenbourg turns 
the experiences of researchers working with teachers into a 
particular object for analysis by researchers.
Out of this analysis, Dillenbourg proposes that research-
ers typically emphasise the design of “learning scenarios”, 
while teachers have a wider emphasis on what gets termed 
as “classroom life”:
Designing effective learning scenarios is and will remain 
a priority. However, classroom life is populated by 
activities or events that are not part of the scenario, such 
as collecting response sheets. There is indeed a contin-
uum of activities from those intrinsic to the scenario to 
activities extrinsic to learning. (p. 485) 
Dillenbourg’s subsequent argument, as the above quota-
tion already implies, proposes that classroom life needs to be 
conceptualised as encompassing a “continuum of activities” 
(p. 485), which are labelled, in turn: (1) core activities, (2) 
emergent activities, (3) envelope activities, (4) extraneous 
events and (5) infra activities (pp. 485-486). The key point, 
for present purposes, is not so much the precise meanings of 
these terms, but rather that Dillenbourg regards the contin-
uum as moving “from the center to the periphery”. In other 
words, Dillenbourg regards categories 1 and 2 as “intrinsic” 
to learning scenarios, and thereby relatively well understood 
by researchers using predominant conceptualisations from 
the research literature. By contrast, Dillenbourg regards 
categories 3-5 as “extrinsic”; thereby, it suggested, those 
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categories are, typically, not accommodated by TEL research-
ers when producing intervention designs. For Dillenbourg, 
therefore, if their designs are to successfully grapple with 
the wider aspects of classroom life, then researchers need 
access to extra knowledge: over and above that focussed on 
learning scenarios.
Dillenbourg (2013) conceptualises classroom orches-
tration as an intellectual project that aims to “retroactively 
extract [some ‘commonalities’ of the experiences of re-
searchers working with teachers] as design principles” (p. 
490). Those particular design principles highlighted by 
Dillenbourg’s work are concerned, primarily—and perhaps 
unsurprisingly, given the object of analysis from which they 
are derived—with supporting better relationships between 
technology and teachers. Dillenbourg suggests, for example, 
that instructional technologies need to be designed in ways 
which:
• enable teachers to undertake the full continuum of 
activities that constitute classroom life;
• allow teachers to monitor classroom life via the 
provision of “simple indicators”; and
• provide for adaptation of activities in real-time, such 
as by “adding or skipping exercises or examples, 
changing the difficulty level, etc.” (pp. 488-489).
To concretely illustrate their arguments—those con-
cerned with both the continuum of activities and the design 
principles thence derived—Dillenbourg considers a range 
of examples of classroom technology in use. Four of those 
examples (concerning, in turn, ConceptGrid, ArgueGraph, 
Lantern, and TinkerLamp) draw on experiences with the 
classroom deployment of technology designs developed and 
trialled by Dillenbourg and colleagues over preceding years; 
while a fifth, which analyses the use of paper, considers a 
very longstanding classroom technology in widespread use. 
Paper is argued to have ‘affordances’ that are substantially 
different from those of most technologies designed by 
TEL researchers; and the fact that it has been successful 
as a technology—in that it has been in widespread use in 
educational settings over a long period of time—is set up as 
a salutary lesson for TEL researchers.
Dillenbourg concludes their argument by suggesting that 
the design principles, as they are currently constituted, “do 
not yet constitute a theory […]” (p. 491, emphasis added). 
However, it is suggested that the outlines of such a theory, 
which might be constructed in the future, can already be 
discerned from those principles established in the paper. 
Some of the more important contours of that theory, it is 
suggested (p. 491), are that it will likely involve emphasising 
(1) the empowerment of teachers “as drivers of classroom 
activities”, (2) the importance of supporting flows of 
information between different technologies (whether digital 
or otherwise), and (3) the valorisation of digital minimalism 
(wherein particular technologies have “simple effects” rather 
than being “‘intelligent’ in the AI sense”).
There are, of course, a number of peculiarities with 
Dillenbourg’s arguments, over and above those mentioned 
at the outset of this section. That Dillenbourg positions the 
primary work of TEL researchers as ‘technology design’ is 
one such idiosyncrasy—while that emphasis is legitimate, 
it emerges from particular geographical and disciplinary 
traditions within the field, and is not shared by all TEL 
scholars. For present purposes, however, the key point is that 
Dillenbourg’s argument places emphasis mainly on devel-
oping the knowledge of researchers. Indeed, in addition 
to the explicit advocacy for the development of what I am 
calling ‘widened’ theory, that latter emphasis is visible, in 
ways that are telling, across Dillenbourg’s argumentation, 
in at least three places. Firstly, the starting point for con-
ceptualising knowledge, which conceives the ‘continuum 
of activities’ as moving “from the center to the periphery”, 
actually serves to position those aspects of classroom life 
historically emphasised by researchers at the “center”, with 
others (those mainly recognised by teachers) positioned 
at the “periphery”; such an argumentational move seems 
calibrated for its appeal to a researcher audience. Secondly, 
the ‘widened’ analysis of classroom life at the centre of the 
orchestration metaphor is positioned as a task to be carried 
out by researchers. And furthermore, as Dillenbourg’s 
argument makes clear, the ultimate aim of their argument is 
to produce a framework that can be used by researchers, in 
their role as technology designers, to better influence actual 
practice with the designs they produce.
It is this valoriation of research knowledge that differ-
entiates this position of theoretical widening from the next, 
which I shall call research-practice theorisation. 
4.2.5  Research-practice theorisation
The final stance that I wish to consider, in relation to 
interchange disputes, shares with the empirical disengagement 
and theoretical widening positions an emphasis on problema-
tising theoretical knowledge; it also shares, with the latter in 
particular, an emphasis on the distinction between ‘research’ 
and ‘practice’. Yet the position I consider in the present 
section differs, from those preceding stances, in insisting on 
understanding (1) the different practices of ‘researchers’ and 
‘practitioners’, and thus (2) the different forms of knowledge 
that are mobilised in support of those practices. This stance, 
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which I shall refer to as research-practice theorisation, 
thus prioritises the theorisation of these different forms of 
practice15 and knowledge which, it is suggested, is a neces-
sary pre-requisite if they are to come to influence each other. 
To my mind, such views invite the TEL field to belatedly 
valorise what has long been denoted, in other fields, as 
praxis: the generation and refinement of practical-theoretical 
concepts through ongoing attempts to change the world.
One particularly sophisticated example of what I label a 
research-practice theorisation stance is provided by Goodyear 
and colleagues (notably Markauskaite), who, over some 
time, have laboured to problematise these different practices 
by deploying and developing the concepts of ‘actionable 
knowledge’ and ‘knowledgeable action’ (cf. Markauskaite, 
Goodyear, & Sutherland, in press). Goodyear et al. (2018) 
set out the starting point for their stance in the following 
way:
One approach to this conundrum involves becoming 
more sophisticated about the forms of knowledge and 
ways of knowing that are most closely associated with 
the main kinds of practice in the area concerned. […] 
The forms of evidence and reasoning used in resolving 
a design are not identical to those involved in under-
standing students’ learning experiences, or the forces 
shaping them. Many areas of complex practical work 
have well-articulated epistemic architectures: there is a 
working consensus about the kinds of knowledge that are 
most relevant to each major phase in a process. This does 
not rule out innovation or obviate all arguments. But it 
does provide a shared framework on which new ideas 
can be hung and it allows researchers to see how they 
15 I am perfectly aware that asking readers to distinguish between 
the ‘practices of researchers’ and the ‘practices of practitioners’ is an 
awkward formulation of language. The issue arises because identities 
such as ‘researchers’, ‘scholars’, ‘practitioners’ and others are socially 
produced, validated and labelled; and furthermore, because, particu-
larly in some strands of educational research, the term ‘practitioner’ 
has become used quite prominently as a polite synonym for ‘teacher’, 
in the context of a ‘learner-centred’ downplaying of ‘teaching’. Yet 
it is perfectly acceptable, from my vantage point, to observe that 
all are engaged in practice; they are simply engaged in different 
kinds of practice. Such relations are further complicated by the 
social production within the TEL field of “researcher-practitioners”, 
as discussed earlier, and also by the fact that many PhD students in 
TEL are also experienced ‘practitioners’. A PhD student in TEL, for 
example, might often be someone who has an established professional 
career (and thus has a degree of expertise in particular practices), who 
is now is engaged in learning the practices of scholarship within TEL as 
a research field. 
can empower practitioners, should they wish to do so. (p. 
222, emphasis in original).
The emphasis placed, in the above passage, on conceptu-
al working across epistemic architectures diverges, to a con-
siderable extent, from many of those other stances on theory 
in TEL scholarship outlined in the present analysis (cf., for 
example, the obvious prioritisation of researcher knowledge 
even in stances of theoretical widening; section 4.2.4). 
Prima facie, that such points are rarely emphasised might 
be considered surprising. We might recall, for example, that 
how researchers and practitioners sometimes seem obliged 
to communicate—often, as discussed in section 3, via the 
use, within an overarching framework sometimes disparaged 
as folk pedagogy, of what Drumm (2019) calls “clichés” and 
“simplified maxims”—is a key source of frustration for many 
scholars within the field. Might not such communication be 
conceptualised as a nascent attempt to work across epistem-
ic architectures; and then, in turn, problematised as a basis 
for such labour that is somehow inadequate?
In fact, however, Goodyear et al.’s (2018) starting point 
for understanding this inability to communicate focusses not 
so much on scholars’ attempts to simplify inappropriately, 
but instead on their common reluctance to engage in simpli-
fication. Goodyear et al.’s critique, for example, characterise 
the kinds of knowledge that researchers routinely produce in 
the following way (ibid.):
[…] many educational researchers are allergic to the 
formulation of actionable knowledge. They value the 
addition of nuance in the interpretation of what exists 
more highly than they value the paring back of detail 
that is a prerequisite for thoughtful action. Of course, 
we do not mean that this is universally true. But it is 
sufficiently powerful in shaping perceptions of the field 
of educational research that outsiders often struggle to 
find the knowledge they can use. (p. 222)
While several explanations might be offered for this 
particularity of emphasis, those most pertinent for present 
purposes concern the professional and disciplinary heter-
ogeneity of those researchers working in the field, and the 
different nexūs of power relations into which they enter as a 
consequence.
The work of Goodyear and Markauskaite seemingly as-
sumes, in particular, that those researchers being addressed 
are “educational researchers” and implies, moreover, that 
such researchers are either (a) more powerful than or (b) 
have no formalised professional obligation to, those practi-
tioner stakeholders with whom they interact. Such assump-
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tions may well hold in particular circumstances—such as, 
of course, those considered by Markauskaite, Goodyear, & 
Sutherland (in press), in which a group of academic scholars 
works with pre-service teachers, in a project resourced via a 
research council grant, to develop multimodal approaches to 
the teaching of scientific inquiry. Under such circumstances, 
any engagement by researchers in conceptual work across 
epistemic architectures might certainly appear to be an 
intellectual choice: driven by the personal values and 
commitments of the researchers involved. Yet such assump-
tions may be less safe in other contexts, especially since (as 
noted in section 3) many TEL researchers are not located 
disciplinarily as ‘educational researchers’, and especially in 
places where a significant proportion occupy interprofession-
al and interdisciplinary positions of considerable fragility. An 
example of the latter circumstances, of course, is provided 
by the latterly cited work of Drumm (2019), wherein edu-
cational developers work alongside disciplinary academics, 
as ‘practitioner-researchers’, within projects whose mandate 
often comes from institutions, rather than funding councils. 
In such cases, conceptual work across epistemic architec-
tures is quotidian, albeit in highly problematic and policed 
ways, and those overly contemplative forms of knowledge 
production that Goodyear et al. deride are less likely to 
predominate in already-existing practice.
My purpose, in drawing attention to these matters, is not 
to imply that the argument of Goodyear and colleagues is 
invalid. On the contrary, I contend that their work makes a 
distinctive and valuable contribution to what I characterise 
as interchange disputes. Instead, my wish is to draw attention 
to the dangers of TEL researchers ‘idealising’ particular 
forms of knowledge production that exist elsewhere within 
the field. Drumm’s hard-pressed practitioner-researchers, for 
example, might be tempted to look at Goodyear’s “educa-
tional researchers” with considerable envy, imagining them 
as harbingers of a more bona fide strand of TEL research, 
and hence overlooking those attenuated forms of knowledge 
they often generate; while it is also too easy to romanticise 
practitioner-research in ways that overlook its frequent 
concessions to power, conceptual oversimplifications and 
scholarly parochiality. In my view, a successful basis for 
research-practice theorisation needs to differentiate between 
the roles played by different researchers in relation to 
scholarly knowledge objects, just as it also—as Goodyear et 
al.’s argument, as elaborated below, already suggests—needs 
to account for the different roles of a range of other deci-
sion-making and ‘user’ stakeholders. In turn, acknowledging 
these heterogenous starting points implies, if we take 
seriously the notion that changes in practices arise out of 
attempts to overcome those real dilemmas that people face 
in their historically constituted activities, confronting the fact 
that the avenues ‘towards’ what are here being positioned 
as more attractive forms of knowledge production will also 
likely be highly varied. In principle, of course, such obser-
vations could have been wielded in relation to several other 
stances within the interchange disputes considered above; yet 
the reason for raising them here is because it is this stance 
of research-practice theorisation that most directly identifies 
an imperative towards changing the practices of knowledge 
production, which thereby places a particular onus on these 
issues. Those caveats aside, it is worth dwelling in some 
detail on the stance of Goodyear and colleagues, since it 
constitutes perhaps the single most theoretically sophisticat-
ed attempt to deal with those interchange disputes arising in 
the literature on TEL.
Fundamentally, Goodyear et al. (2018) advocates that 
a core departure point, if we are to overcome problems of 
interchange between research and practice, is that we aim to 
construct, in relation to some particular knowledge domain, 
what is termed an “actionable knowledge base” (p. 223). For 
such a construct to be regarded as actionable it must both 
accommodate, and differentiate between, knowledge that 
addresses the following four distinctions (pp. 223-231):
• the roles of those involved: since different stakeholders 
have disparate purposes for relating to the research 
object, it is argued, they also have different knowl-
edge needs; Goodyear et al. distinguish usefully 
between stakeholders such as “designers, managers, 
teacher-users and student-users” (p. 223), though 
of course my preceding frame for this narrative also 
invites supplementary distinctions between those 
“researcher stakeholders” whose purposes and 
knowledge needs might also diverge in important 
ways;
• analysis and design: while analytical knowledge, it 
is argued, emphasises the understanding of existing 
situations, and thereby invites the description, expla-
nation and/or identification of causal relationships 
between entities, within methodologically bounded 
units of analysis, design knowledge, by contrast, 
emphasises the ability to represent what is desirable, 
and to resource choices between different candidate 
solutions; to some extent, this distinction implicates 
what I shall later label functions disputes (section 
4.3), but, for present purposes, the key points are 
that analysis and design are conceived in this account 
as practices which, while depending on each other in 
complex ways, are actually very different, and hence 
it is posited that quite distinct forms of knowledge 
will be useful in relation to each;
• fast and slow cognition: the distinction ‘slow 
cognition’ concerns those deliberative processes, 
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such as reflection, where relatively explicit forms 
of knowledge are likely to be useful, whereas ‘fast 
cognition’ refers to those more routinised forms 
of sense-making that are likely to draw on prior 
experience and tacit knowledge; Goodyear et al. 
emphasise, in particular, that this distinction should 
not be confused with that between analysis and 
design—designing a task specification, for example, 
might deliberately seek to provoke slow cognition 
in students, whereas designing a classroom learning 
space might involve activating forms of fast cognition 
that enable students to make sense of how that 
particular space is supposed to be used;
• ontology and epistemology: Goodyear et al. highlight 
a range of ontological and epistemological issues, 
some of which will be examined in more detail 
below in relation to functions disputes (section 4.3); 
however, for present purposes the most pertinent 
distinctions are concerned with (1) acknowledging 
knowledge constraint and dependency, since making 
commitments to producing certain forms of knowl-
edge serves to constrain, for better or worse, those 
forms of knowledge production that are subse-
quently undertaken, and (2) identifying ‘connecting 
constructs’ that can help to meaningfully combine 
ostensibly very different forms of knowledge; though 
Goodyear et al. do not use the term directly, this 
latter emphasis implicitly disparages those way in 
which different forms of knowledge are often posi-
tioned as entirely ‘incommensurable’ within research 
discourse, suggesting instead a need for actively 
seeking to make connections between different forms 
of knowledge.
It is important to emphasise that the construction of 
‘actionable knowledge bases’, which is positioned as a form 
of epistemological work, is only one part of Goodyear and 
Markauskaite’s response to the challenge of research-practice 
interchange. As I alluded to above, developing the ‘concep-
tual resourcefulness’ of practitioners also forms part of this 
picture, with Markauskaite, Goodyear, & Sutherland (in 
press) providing a worked example of how such resource-
fulness was developed within research collaboration with 
pre-service teachers. Such issues of what might be called 
boundary-crossing, or relational working, have also been 
considered through alternative frameworks, including by 
myself, in ways that could easily be rendered applicable to 
the contours of the detachment dispute. Hasted and Bligh 
(2020), for example, suggest—in a way directly inspired by 
earlier work in the activity theory tradition, and particularly 
by the work of Anne Edwards—that the key problems 
requiring consideration are the extent to which the motives 
of those involved are mediated (via ‘common knowledge’), 
the object of activity is jointly interpreted (via ‘relational 
expertise’), and those involved can succeed in aligning their 
unfolding practices (via ‘relational agency’) (p. 3).
Attempts, of these differing natures, to examine relation-
ships between both the practices and knowledge architec-
tures of researchers and practitioners, and thus to consider 
how to make connections between them, constitute a very 
distinct contribution to interchange disputes in TEL. Among 
other things, stances of research-practice theorisation suggest, 
that in problematising theory, we also problematise our 
knowledge production practices—or, in other words, that 
the field’s ‘theoretical’ and ‘empirical’ work will each need to 
change in tandem.
4.2.6  Synopsis of interchange disputes
A synopsis of interchange disputes is provided in Figure 
2. In many ways, the format of the diagram is the same 
as for the preceding figure: the largest node, “interchange 
disputes”, is located centrally, while the other nodes are posi-
tioned as relative to that central locus. The core question, 
as the analysis, above, has sought to make clear, relates to 
the relationship between theoretical and empirical work in 
the field; and, more especially, to a concern that, at present, 
such work is compartmentalised into relatively separate 
discourses.
The structure of the diagram, once again, represents each 
of those stances that have been discussed in this section. It is 
worth re-iterating the point that the short summaries of each 
position, provided in the diagram, are simplified considera-
bly by comparison with their analysis in the above text. For 
a fuller discussion, the reader should refer to the respective 
sections, above, for a more nuanced analysis of researcher 
insularity (section 4.2.1), structural disincentive (4.2.2), 
empirical disengagement (4.2.3), theoretical widening (4.2.4), 
and research-practice theorisation (4.2.5).
The core purpose of the diagram is to highlight rela-
tionships between the various positions in a way that can 
sometimes be obscured when considering the detail of each 
position in isolation.  One way in which this is accomplished, 
in this case, is by differentiating between those positions 
which primarily concern themselves with problematising 
empirical work and those that, conversely, seek to problem-
atise the theoretical. The labels at the top of Figure 2 are 
intended to indicate that those nodes positioned on the left 
of the diagram (namely, researcher insularity and structural 
disincentive) explore interchange disputes by considering 
why empirical researchers do not make more extensive use 
of theory, while those on the right (empirical disengagement
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Figure 2. Synopsis of interchange disputes  
and theoretical widening) foreground that theory, at least as 
currently constituted, is unsuitable for use within empirical 
research. The stance of research-practice theorisation is 
oriented primarily towards the latter concern, but also high-
lights implications that are intended to destabilise empirical 
knowledge production, and so it is positioned accordingly on 
the diagram.
Three relationships between different pairs of nodes are 
highlighted on the diagram with the label “partially build-
ing”. That label is intended to imply a strong relationship be-
tween those positions, as they are constructed in the source 
materials; it is difficult to find, for example, an example of a 
structural disincentive position that does not invoke research-
er insularity as a precursor, with the latter typically wielded 
to suggest the importance of understanding the former. Yet 
the relationship is not so argumentationally dependent as 
those highlighted in Figure 1. To reprise the same example, 
one could certainly make a coherent argument in favour of a 
structural disincentive position, oriented towards interchange 
disputes, without stating a researcher insularity position. It is 
also worth highlighting that, unlike for Figure 1, there are 
no relationships labelled “opposed” in Figure 2, since none 
of the positions illustrated are mutually exclusive. To make 
the same point in a more general way, while the fact that 
the different stances foreground the problematisation of ‘the 
empirical’ and ‘the theoretical’ certainly indicates a differ-
ence of emphasis, those imperatives are not incompatible. 
One could argue, perfectly coherently, for example, in favour 
of both researcher insularity and empirical disengagement 
stances in the same piece of writing, and draw out how each 
relates to the other.
Considering the relationship between ‘empirical’ and 
‘theoretical’ discourses in this way does, of course, pose 
questions about the roles that theory might play within 
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research. How particular theories might mediate between 
these discourses is the issue to which I turn in the next 
section.
4.3  Functions disputes
By functions disputes, I refer to those discussions which 
concur that better use of theory is desirable—highlighting, 
for example, that better use can serve to develop the field 
(de Laat & Lally, 2004) and forge links with other proximate 
fields (Bennett & Oliver, 2011)—yet which project different 
conceptions of what that “better use” might entail. Functions 
disputes thus encompass discussions of the ‘roles’ that theory 
plays (and might play) in research, as well as attempts to 
differentiate between different ‘forms’ of theory, which are 
positioned as having different relationships with (and roles 
within) research practice.
While there do exist occasional statements within the 
literature about the relative importance of different roles 
(such as ‘prediction’) as necessary prerequisites for defining 
something as a theory, such points mostly end up briefly 
rehearsing long ossified debates from across the social 
sciences; indeed, they usually take the form of throwaway 
sentences backed up by one or more citations to papers from 
outside the field. Where such instances occur, I shall not 
dwell on them in the analysis that follows, for a number of 
reasons. In particular, such reasons include that those points 
are positioned marginally within the debates themselves; 
that the attendant debates have been described perfectly 
adequately elsewhere (e.g., by Maxwell & Mittapalli, 2008); 
and that I have already subjected to analysis, under the 
heading of canon disputes, those more substantial debates 
about the constructs that are actually taken as theories with-
in the field. Instead, issues of theory definition will only be 
raised where they are underlined centrally within the source 
material, and where they are positioned as consequential for 
research practice in TEL.
In the account that follows, I wish to emphasise the 
co-existence of three clusters of narratives whose content 
bears more direct relevance to research practice in the 
TEL field, yet whose objects have rather different levels of 
granularity. Such stances foreground, in turn, the functions 
of theory within particular research projects; the different 
forms that theory takes in such projects; the notion that 
researchers’ choice of theory can make the field seem more 
relevant to its stakeholders; and the roles of theory in 
advancing the research field, or particular sub-fields within 
it. I shall refer to those positions, in turn, using the labels 
role strengthening, mode distinguishing, field pertinence, and 
field development.
4.3.1  Role strengthening
The first cluster of stances that I shall consider seeks, 
firstly, to problematise the roles that theory plays within par-
ticular research projects (or, sometimes, articles arising from 
projects) and, secondly, to advocate that, when working on 
particular projects and articles, researchers should acknowl-
edge and reflect the importance of a wider range of those 
roles. In the present analysis, I shall refer to such positions 
as role strengthening. Such stances, in substance, resonate to 
a considerable extent with discussions of a topic which, in 
other fields, is often referred to as ‘theory-method relations’ 
(cf. Ashwin & Case, 2012).
Much useful critique has focussed on problematising the 
roles of theory within the TEL field. For example, Jones and 
Czerniewicz (2011), drawing on earlier work by the realist 
scholar Andrew Sayer, highlight that “theory” is often taken 
as relating “the empirical and the conceptual” via three 
“dimensions”—concerned, respectively, with (1) ordering, 
(2) conceptualisation, and (3) hypothesis or explanation (p. 
174).
That ‘theory’ is here projected as a singular category, 
rather than being pluralised and thus particularised, I 
regard, in this case, as an idiosyncrasy of expression rather 
than a core matter of argument; and I also shall not dwell, in 
this instance, on the structure of Sayer’s underlying categori-
sation, wherein “hypothesis” and “explanation” are regarded 
as part of the same theoretical “dimension”. It is certainly 
possible to conceive the particular functions of theory in 
empirical work in alternative ways. Indeed, I have presented 
such an alternate categorisation schema myself (Bligh 
& Flood, 2017), in which I draw on the ideas of Martyn 
Hammersley to suggest that theory can play the following 
roles (outlined, with examples, on pp. 132-133):
• Abstracting: Categorising phenomena by highlighting 
and/or discarding particular detail;
• Explanatory: Providing names for concepts taken to 
underpin some phenomenon;
• Contextualising: Positioning phenomena within some 
wider spatio-temporal totality;
• Paradigmatic: Establishing a paradigm for investiga-
tion;
• Hypothetical: Providing speculative idealisation 
whose validity is to be tested;
• Normative: Ascribing value to, or indicating ideal, 
forms of phenomena;
• Predictive: Asserting causality or forecasting out-
comes.
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These caveats aside, the argument of Jones and Czernie-
wicz (2011) does encompass both elements that I regard 
as the core indicators of a role strengthening stance. First, 
some attempt is made to distinguish between the different 
functions of theory, in this case via the metaphor, outlined 
above, of “dimensions”. That move to distinguish between 
different roles is seen as important in itself, but it also serves 
a broader purpose: to set up the stance’s second element. 
That second element, in turn, is an argument that focussing 
too narrowly on particular theoretical roles, to the neglect 
of others, has negative consequences for research projects. 
Jones and Czerniewicz (ibid.), once again drawing on the 
work of Sayer, instantiate their version of that point in the 
following way:
Sayer criticises the ordering framework (1) and hy-
pothesis and explanatory views of theory (3) for their 
failure to deal with the indirect nature of our knowledge 
of the world. In his view conceptualisation lies at the 
heart of observation, a point of contact made famous in 
Einstein’s comment that it is theory that decides what we 
observe. Data is not neutral, its very selection indicates 
a theoretical perspective. Data does not produce facts 
that are direct reflections of the world, rather facts about 
the world, like theory, are constructs of human cultural 
engagement with the world and are never direct. In our 
view theory can generalise across a variety of contexts 
and across time and at its best can compress experience 
into robust, considered and usable forms. (pp. 174-175)
The above argument, among other things, highlights 
how focussing on only particular roles (in this case, the first 
and third of Sayer’s “dimensions”) leads to an inability to 
interrogate the nature of data. On the contrary, we are led 
to take data for granted. That is an important point, and 
one commonly made, albeit in different ways, where role 
strengthening stances are deployed16. Indeed, other examples 
of role strengthening stances seem to construct their entire 
argument around highlighting that theory must be con-
cerned with more than data analysis.
The work of Antonenko (2015) furnishes one such 
example. In adopting what they call an “instrumental view” 
of theory, by which is meant a thought system based on the 
work of John Dewey, Antonenko seems to accept a world-
view broadly compatible, for present purposes, with the 
‘realism’ underpinning the argument of Jones and Czernie-
wicz. Yet Antonenko’s narrative elaborates a considerably 
16 Indeed, something like role strengthening beyond data would be a 
good descriptor for this category of argumentation, which I avoid only 
because I find it too unwieldy for repeated use as a signifier.
more complex structure, the purpose of which seems to be 
to define for researchers the use of ‘theory’—by suggesting 
an alternate construct that is not seen as related to “data”, 
but instead to “enquiry”. To do so, in a move which, to a 
large extent, reflects those mode distinguishing positions I 
shall outline below, Antonenko first works to differentiate 
“theories” from “conceptual frameworks”, and suggests that 
research projects and papers are conceived more properly 
in relation to the latter. Next, and importantly, Antonenko 
provides a definition for “conceptual framework”: as “a 
process and a product for organizing and aligning all aspects 
of empirical enquiry” (pp. 54-55, emphasis in original).
By formulating the definition of conceptual framework 
in that way, of course, Antonkenko has set themselves the 
task, among other things, of elaborating further the notion 
of “aspects of empirical enquiry”. On that basis, Antonenko 
(2015) concludes that conceptual frameworks have five key 
functions:
to justify the significance of the problem, define relevant 
concepts, establish theoretical and empirical rationale, 
guide selection of appropriate of the methods, and 
scaffold data analysis and interpretation (p. 57)
Such arguments dovetail, in part, with some of my own 
prior work, where I came to argue that it was important to 
consider how “theory might frame research design rather 
than simply data analysis” (Bligh & Flood, 2017, p. 125). In 
the latter paper, the direct emphasis of critique was not so 
much on problematising the nature of data as on concep-
tualising the research object. I highlighted how a particular 
theory—activity theory—was often, in a data set of empirical 
papers, being used to contextualise some given research 
object and to highlight some particularly important aspects; 
yet that it was seldom used to challenge the research 
object itself. In different ways, therefore, the various role 
strengthening stances discussed in this section all position 
the function of conceptualisation as a particularly important 
role that researchers cannot afford to neglect.
4.3.2  Mode distinguishing
Antonenko’s (2015) distinction between “theories” and 
“conceptual frameworks”, outlined in the preceding section, 
also hints at another position within what I characterise as 
functions disputes: the argument that, if researchers are to 
make sense of those different roles that might be played by 
theory, then different conceptions of ‘theory’ itself need to be 
disaggregated. I shall refer to this stance as one of mode dis-
tinguishing, by which I mean to express the idea that ‘theory’ 
occurs in a range of disparate forms, each of which we must 
Theory disputes and the development of the technology enhanced learning research field
144 Studies in Technology Enhanced Learning, 1(1)
https://doi.org/10.21428/8c225f6e.a85d0cc9
understand as relating differently to research practices.
The emphasis placed by Antonenko (2015) on the 
importance of different theoretical ‘modes’ can be grasped 
by expanding, very slightly, the bounds used to demarcate 
a quotation already reproduced once before (in relation 
to role strengthening), so that the definition of “conceptual 
framework” becomes rendered as follows:
a theory-based and evidence-driven argument that is 
developed to justify the significance of the problem, define 
relevant concepts, establish theoretical and empirical 
rationale, guide selection of appropriate of the methods, 
and scaffold data analysis and interpretation (p. 57, 
emphasis added)
In this way, Antonenko places a particular emphasis on 
how researchers within particular projects actively frame 
particular problems; indeed, they regard the very distinction 
between ‘theoretical frameworks’ and ‘conceptual frame-
works’ as one in which the former references constructs that 
“have emerged from prior empirical work” while the latter 
points towards those that are “custom designed by research-
ers” (ibid.). While I take issue with Antonenko’s concrete 
statement that theoretical frameworks must always have 
“emerged from” work regarded as, in particular, as empiri-
cal—a formulation that, in my view, concedes too much to 
narrow empiricism, thereby undervaluing that ‘conceptual-
ising’ dimension of theory whose importance, emphasised 
by Jones and Czerniewicz, was discussed in the preceding 
section—the notion that we need to distinguish between 
theory as something inherited from previous projects and 
constructed within present ones highlights, nonetheless, a 
fundamentally important point. Indeed, elsewhere I have 
previously argued in favour of a similar distinction: sketch-
ing, for an audience of early career researchers, the urgent 
need to construct specific instantiations of theory, within 
the context of a particular research project, from within 
that broader tapestry of stances to which those researchers 
engaged in the project are committed (cf. Bligh, 2020).
That my narrative raises, on that occasion, the impor-
tant distinction as one between “theories” (labelling the 
inherited) and “theoretical frameworks” (the presently 
constructed) is, of course, inconsistent with Antonenko’s 
terminology. My argumentation highlights not so much a 
distinction between conceptual and theoretical frameworks, 
but rather one between ‘theories’ and ‘frameworks’. More 
specifically, I place emphasis, in that resource (Bligh, 2020), 
on thinking of the word “framework” by analogy with those 
literal painting frames—usually grids built out of wood and 
wire—used to support the introduction of perspective into 
art several centuries ago; the purpose of doing so being to 
emphasise that frameworks, while arising within a wider 
conceptual constellation, are specific tools that must be 
simple enough to use, and also that they are used con-
sciously, with consequences both positive and negative. That 
the terminology of Antonenko and myself is inconsistent 
is a phenomenon reflected, more broadly, across the field. 
Crook and Sutherland (2017), for example, also make an 
analogous distinction, in their own a specific way, between 
labels for constructs intended to highlight quite different 
granularities of thinking: in their case, the contrast drawn 
is one between “conceptual frameworks” (as “umbrellas”) 
and “theories” (which fall under conceptual frameworks, yet 
which have a more “principled construction”) (p. 18). The 
key point, for present purposes, is that while the distinctions 
being invoked are important, the associated use of terms is 
not standardised. Instead, the onus is currently on research-
ers to be clear about the different modes of theory used in 
their projects, using whatever terminology they prefer, and 
to chronicle, diligently and meaningfully, the attendant 
distinctions when reporting their research to others.
It is noteworthy that each example of a mode distinguish-
ing position that I have considered hitherto has distinguished 
between theoretical modes for a particular purpose: to 
foreground one in particular. Thus, Antonenko (2015), 
having presented a definition of conceptual frameworks, 
takes using the latter as the main focus of their subsequent 
narrative (the content of which has already been elaborated 
in section 4.3.1). A similar point could be made about my 
own contribution (Bligh, 2020), where, having demarcated 
a meaning for the term, “theoretical frameworks”, much of 
the discussion explores how to use them. This observation 
highlights a somewhat dependent relationship between 
mode distinguishing and role strengthening stances: in 
particular, while not all positions that I would characterise 
as role strengthening make reference to mode distinguishing, 
many mode distinguishing stances do explicitly, albeit in 
quite disparate ways, gesture towards some variant of role 
strengthening. Yet not all mode distinguishing contributions 
to what I label functions disputes have such a singular goal, 
and in some cases the attendant argument does encapsulate 
some more comparative consideration of the purposes and 
merits, in relation to research practice, of different theoreti-
cal modes. 
One useful example of a more comparative argument 
is put forward by Passey (2019)17, who advocates that 
17 While revising this paper, I became aware that Passey would expand 
on these points further in the present special issue. The present 
comments concern the formulations of Passey’s arguments in their 
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TEL researchers should more clearly discriminate between 
‘models’, ‘conceptual frameworks’, ‘theoretical frameworks’ 
and ‘theories’ (p. 979). Each of these four categories, Passey 
suggests, are “forms” of a more generalised consideration, 
which he labels “background underpinnings”; the distinc-
tions between them, while numerous, broadly hinge on the 
different extents to which each strives to be explicit, exhaus-
tive, and detailed, and also on their temporal relationships 
to research practices (with some constructs, for example, 
positioned as inputs or outputs from the vantage point of 
particular projects).
While Passey, presumably for reasons of space, does not 
elaborate systematically on all possible permutations of the 
factors they express, several examples are provided that 
highlight some key contours of their thinking. One such 
example is the distinction between the terms ‘model’ and 
‘framework’, which is discussed in the following way:
[…] a model is concerned with summarising findings 
in a visual way. It might then be used as a model for 
exploring practice or further research, but it should be 
recognised that its specific context and summarisation of 
factors or features might not be exhaustive. A framework, 
on the other hand, tends to be more flexible and descrip-
tive, as it usually identifies factors or criteria that have 
influence on a particular field (whereas a model might 
not do this in such a detailed way). Such a framework 
can be used as a means to underpin a research study, 
and may be used as a starting point, since it can offer 
a thematic view for creating research instruments or 
methods. (p. 979)
That Passey here distinguishes a model as something 
represented “in a visual way” draws attention,  very usefully, 
to the idea that ‘theories’, in a range of different forms, have 
a communicative function; which implies, in turn, a practical 
need to express them in some way. More generally, we 
might come to understand theories as artefacts that mediate 
research activities: like all artefacts, therefore, they get 
designed, refined, reinterpreted, discarded and supplanted 
within and across successive research projects. The various 
graphical representations I use throughout the present 
paper, of course, constitute ‘models’ in precisely the sense 
designated by Passey. They are intended to summarise the 
findings I express within particular sections, thereby helping 
the reader to keep track of my argument; to demonstrate 
how my narrative cumulatively builds towards the more 
overarching conclusions suggested in the paper’s latter 
stages; and to provide readers with a summary of key points 
2019 paper only. 
that they might retain, and return to, in their own future 
work. On the other hand, those diagrams can hardly present 
a “summarisation of factors” that is “exhaustive”—even of 
those various issues and nuances that are discussed, in the 
section text, in each case, let alone those my present analysis 
might inadvertently overlook—without jeopardising their 
communicative usefulness. Such observations reinforce the 
point, briefly outlined earlier, that actively constructing 
instantiations of theory often requires a degree of simplifica-
tion: such that the artefact is “simple enough to be used”. 
Subsequently, Passey (2019) distinguishes between ‘theo-
retical’ and ‘conceptual’ frameworks in the following way:
A theoretical framework, however, arises from outcomes 
beyond a single study, based on one or more theories, 
which might be social constructivism, constructionism, 
behaviourism, social learning, discovery learning, experi-
ential learning, etc. A conceptual framework, by contrast, 
is different, in that it selects concepts that are used to 
frame or provide background for a research study. It does 
not need to be based on a theory, although it certainly 
might take theory or theoretical elements into considera-
tion as a part of the background concept(s). (ibid.)
In this instance, Passey’s discussion discloses two further 
aspects of mode distinguishing stances that are useful for 
thinking about theoretical functions disputes in TEL research: 
each concerned, in different ways, with the source material 
recruited where frameworks are generated within particular 
projects. Passey emphasises, on the one hand, that con-
structing conceptual frameworks does not necessarily entail 
selecting some sub-set of notions already pre-packaged with-
in some inherited theory; on the contrary, concepts might be 
selected from more than one underpinning framework. On 
the other, it is acknowledged that conceptual frameworks 
might not only get derived from theoretical frameworks; 
they might, instead, borrow notions derived from reviews of 
empirical literature, and even derive concepts from reflec-
tion on professional practice or personal experience. That 
concepts might be selected from such varied underpinnings 
in these ways underlines the active process that framework 
construction entails. Such active conceptual labour, in turn, 
places an onus on researchers both to ensure that their 
concepts can reasonably be used together—that they do, in 
fact, form a framework—and to explicitly argue the case for 
such coherence to their audiences. Such issues resonate with 
the issue of commensurability, which, as I discussed before 
(section 4.2.5) is also raised within interchange disputes.
At the risk of labouring the point, I find such distinctions 
useful where they render explicit a necessary but often 
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underappreciated aspect of actual research practice: the 
need to construct specific instantiations of theory, for 
the context of a particular research project, from within 
the broader underpinnings to which the researchers are 
committed (cf. Bligh, 2020). In my analysis of theory use in 
empirical papers (Bligh & Flood, 2017, which has been cited 
previously), for example, in activity theory papers it was 
nearly always the “activity system” diagram and its constitu-
ent elements that were used in relation to the “abstracting” 
function of theory (Bligh & Flood, 2017, p. 133). It seems 
likely, therefore, that that diagram is being instantiated as a 
particular ‘form of underpinnings’ within those papers, yet 
the evidence for that having arisen from a process of explicit 
reflection was vanishingly small. The implication is that the 
construction of a conceptual framework for some given 
project can benefit from reflection and explicit argumenta-
tion even where those underpinnings being recruited have 
already been, ostensibly, suitably packaged by others into 
forms suitable for wholesale importation. 
That Passey’s elucidation of these points invokes the  
familiar categories from the standard theoretical “canon” 
(i.e., those discussed and problematised throughout section 
4.1) indicates, however, that, in this account, the very  
broadest theoretical modes are being taken as relatively 
static. 
What remains to be problematised, therefore, is how 
these different constructs are transformed and developed 
over time—including how they mutually influence, or even 
develop into, each other within research practice—across 
the range of theorical modes that are being distinguished. 
Presumably, such development could also be traced for the 
‘roles’ of theory; one might examine, for example, how 
instances of using theory for ‘abstracting’ leads to particular 
kinds of ‘explanation’. Yet the issue seems more pressing 
in relation to those stances that I refer to as mode distin-
guishing, precisely because Passey’s and Antonenko’s labels 
for what Passey calls ‘underpinnings’ seem explicitly less 
permeable and implicitly more hierarchical. In my view, that 
accords a developmental resonance to questions about how 
contiguous forms of underpinnings influence each other. 
According to this view, for example, can the efforts of those 
empirical researchers using a specific ‘model’ ever hope 
to contribute, perhaps cumulatively, towards developing 
a given ‘theoretical framework’? That sense of hard-won 
cumulative progress is often viewed as important when 
progress in the field is described—for example, it is precisely 
what Bennett and Oliver (2011) value when examining the 
decades of work by Richard Mayer and others on multimedia 
learning (p. 183). There certainly seems a danger, when 
differentiating between different ‘forms of underpinnings’, 
that conceptual transfer might come to be viewed direc-
tionally within the hierarchies of underpinnings that are set 
up, thereby stunting this kind of potential for theory to be 
developed dialectically within, and longitudinally across, 
empirical work.
Passey’s (2019) discussion hints at this problem; for 
example, where they argue that “originating authors of 
these forms of underpinnings often state which form they 
are proposing or using” and that it is “clearly important that 
researchers using these background underpinnings respect 
these originating forms, for good reasons” (p. 979). Certain-
ly, I concur that it is important, when appropriating a given 
form of background underpinning from elsewhere, that 
researchers strive for awareness of the authorial intentions 
behind the construct (cf. “respect” as having due regard); 
and I would also advocate them being explicit about the 
relations between those intentions and their own (cf. “for 
good reasons”). Indeed, not doing so can have deleterious 
consequences, such as where—to reprise the example I 
mentioned above—in the empirical papers I studied (Bligh 
& Flood, 2017), the activity system model was (a) used 
as a stand-in for the entirety of activity theory and (b) 
deployed to produce labelled models lacking precisely the 
sense of dynamism the original model strived to illustrate 
(cf. Engeström, 1987/2015, Ch. 2). Yet “respect” need not 
constitute obedience or replication, and it thus seems urgent 
to understand what might constitute “good reasons” for 
choosing whether or not to vary from what was intended 
elsewhere. It is at this point, in my view, that we need to 
confront how focussing on the roles and identity of theory 
in particular research projects, conceived narrowly, leaves 
unproblematised an important issue: how ‘better’ use of 
theory might cumulatively serve to advance and develop TEL 
as a research field.
4.3.3  Field pertinence
The third and fourth positions that I shall consider, 
in relation to functions disputes, are primarily concerned 
with suggesting that the object of benefit, where theory 
is used more effectively, might be the TEL field (or some 
sub-field of scholarship within it). By contrast with the 
varied discussions, outlined above, of role strengthening and 
mode distinguishing, these subsequent arguments have a 
broader scope and degree of granularity. Indeed, by analogy 
with how I invoked the notion of ‘theory-method relations’ 
in relation to role strengthening stances, the focus of the 
present arguments might be thought of as concerned with 
‘theory-domain relations’18.
18 I am instinctively unhappy with that formulation since it immedi-
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To label the first such stance, I shall use the term field 
pertinence. By contrast with many of the other labels I 
proffer throughout the analysis in this paper, this term might 
seem generic: concerned as it is with issues of ‘what’, rather 
than, as for other examples, such as role strengthening and 
mode distinguishing, with issues of ‘how’. That discrepancy 
is no mere accident. Instead, it reflects the extent to which 
the underlying arguments themselves are often aspirational 
rather than concrete. Indeed, with notable exceptions, 
they are often deployed, as elaborated below, as rhetorical 
devices for bolstering other arguments, in instances where it 
is the latter that seem more central to the particular focus of 
some given author. Nonetheless, field pertinence positions do 
indicate a genuine locus of discussion in relation to functions 
disputes—suggesting, in particular, that where we consider 
what the “better use” of theory entails, our purpose in doing 
so should be, in some way, the furtherance of the field. 
Let us begin our analysis of field pertinence stances, then, 
by considering how such stances often serve in auxiliary 
positions within larger arguments. The reader may recall 
how I previously invoked the work of Harasim (2012), in 
relation to canon disputes, as an example of what I called a 
theoretical advance position; the purpose of which is to argue 
that the field’s predominating standard canon of theoretical 
categories can be understood as a trajectory of progression, 
on which Harasim’s own theory of Online Collaborative 
Learning (OCL) builds. For present purposes, it is worth 
examining, in more detail, how that underlying theoretical 
trajectory is conceived in relation to the research field. Har-
asim, drawing on the work of Thomas Kuhn, conceptualises 
research as a collection of “knowledge communities”, which 
they elaborate in the following way:
Knowledge communities are scientists or leading thinkers 
gathered or clustered around a theory and represent the 
state of the art in that discipline. A particular knowledge 
community represents the theory of the discipline, how 
it is defined and articulated in practice, and how it is 
substantiated. (p. 9)
ately suggests a new dichotomy: between (research) projects and 
(research) domains. My own preferred solution would likely involve 
re-conceptualising research projects in ways that better appreciate 
how they encompass their relations with other projects, allowing us to 
conceive a given research domain as an aggregate of research projects 
with relevant objects. However, given that I find little evidence of such 
thinking in the TEL literature, and also given that such conceptions 
are deeply antagonistic to how I think most TEL researchers currently 
conceive of research projects, I shall defer that argument to future 
papers. Here, I opt to make use of a distinction that labels those actual 
discussions, evident in the field, that are relevant to the topic. 
Starting from such a formulation, which asks us to 
picture knowledge communities of researchers “clustered 
around” a theory, Harasim makes it apparent that develop-
ments in theory are, in their view, both reflective of, and to  
some extent driving, shifts in their attendant knowledge 
communities. Perhaps unsurprisingly—given that I have, 
above, characterised Harasim as adopting a theoretical ad-
vance position in relation to canon disputes—Harasim draws 
out the implications of their position in a way that emphasis 
the necessity of such “advances”: 
The four major learning theories discussed here represent 
the state of the art as articulated by particular knowledge 
communities, which flourished at particular points in 
time. Theories exist in context, and both reflect and illu-
minate that context. Theories change and improve over 
time. Knowledge in a field does not merely accumulate, 
it advances. (ibid.)
What we see foregrounded in Harasim’s position, 
therefore, is a desire to see the research field (or particular 
knowledge communities—presumably those intersecting 
with TEL concerns) “flourish” in relation to some particular 
“context”, and a recognition that, in order to do so, those 
communities will need to be “gathered or clustered around” 
some theory that can “reflect and illuminate” that context. 
The implications are that particular knowledge communities 
must develop, and that particular researchers must select 
for use in their projects, theories that can substantiate the 
relevance and importance of those communities in the 
wider context. If they neglect to do so, it is purported, then 
the consequences, for the flourishing of their community, 
will be deleterious. Furthermore, it is highlighted, via the 
contention that knowledge “does not merely accumulate, it 
advances”, that such knowledge development will, sporadi-
cally, require ruptural change in those theories that are being 
developed and selected. That Harasim promotes their own 
theory of OCL, of course, indicates a desire to position OCL 
theory as the latest product of such ruptural change—one 
well suited to the present “context”. And it is, to reprise 
our notion that these field pertinence positions are typically 
deployed in a role auxiliary to other purposes, towards 
documenting OCL theory itself that Harasim devotes the 
bulk of their narrative.
Not all examples of that ‘auxiliary’ deployment of field 
pertinence stances, of course, carry forward Harasim’s 
explicit commitment to what I term theoretical advance (in 
the sense previously described in section 4.1.1). Yet what 
does seem fairly common is a desire that, by developing and 
using particular theoretical stances, the research field might 
‘reflect’ those developments occurring ‘outside’ it—thereby 
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attaining greater relevance or influence. For example, the 
work of Dillenbourg (2013), on classroom orchestration, 
previously described in section 4.2.4, declares a desire to 
better reflect that tacit knowledge which teachers develop 
within their routine practice; while the work of Mayes and 
de Freitas (2013), previously described in section 4.1.3, 
seems motivated, to undertake the work of canon integra-
tion, by a desire to accommodate recent developments in 
what is taken as an adjacent research field (i.e., learning 
sciences). While the particular instantiation of “knowledge 
community” and “context” highlighted, in each case, differs, 
what is present throughout is the notion that the research 
community’s theory should reflect its wider context, thereby 
bolstering the relevance and influence of the former in the 
latter. 
One work that takes such formulations to their logical 
conclusion is that by Passey (2019), whose paper is an 
outlier, by comparison with most others considered in the 
present section, in the sense that the field pertinence argu-
ment is positioned as primary rather than auxiliary. Passey’s 
narrative takes, as a starting point, earlier work, such as 
that by Garnett and Ecclesfield, which suggests that the 
developing possibilities associated with digital technologies 
are “affecting the boundaries of the key areas of scholarship” 
associated with the phenomena being studied (p. 973). The 
latter formulation, of course, seems a reasonable approxima-
tion for the prior terminology of ‘knowledge communities’, 
while the former might be understood as an instantiation 
of the wider ‘context’. Passey subsequently provides a 
conspectus of a range of ways in which, by contrast with the 
historical focus of the TEL field, contemporary attempts to 
study educational technology in use are forcing what they 
call “a wide expansion of scope” (p. 976). In turn, Passey 
suggests that “a delineation is fundamentally important 
from the perspective of theoretical underpinnings” (p. 978, 
emphasis added).
The core point that Passey wishes to make, if reinter-
preted through the quasi-Kuhnian prism introduced above, 
is seemingly that the TEL field, as a knowledge community, 
is attempting to position itself in relation not to one wider 
‘context’, but to several wider ‘contexts’, whose stark dispar-
ities pose particular challenges for developing and selecting 
those theories that the community might become clustered 
around. Passey’s response to that situation, therefore, is to 
advocate the “delineation” of separate knowledge commu-
nities, each of which might be clustered around different 
theories. In particular, Passey (2019) suggests that we need 
to consider delineating six such communities, for which 
they propose the labels, in turn, of “Technology-Enhanced 
Education (TEE)”, “Technology-Enhanced Management 
of Education (TEME)”, “Technology-Enhanced Teaching 
(TET)”, “Technology-Enhanced Management of Teaching 
(TEMT)”, “Technology-Enhanced Learning (TEL)”, and 
“Technology-Enhanced Management of Learning (TEML)” 
(p. 979). Passey makes it explicit that, in their view, it is 
differences in theoretical background which lie at the heart 
of this delineation:
The importance for separating these aspects of concern 
and study focus becomes clear when theoretical under-
pinnings are considered in each case. (ibid.).
Passey subsequently goes on to suggest possible candi-
dates whose purpose is to “exemplify how the delineation 
of specific research inquiries of TEL can critically affect the 
choices that are possible” (p. 980). For example, since Passey 
takes Technology-Enhanced Education (TEE) as concerned 
with technology provision in institutional and systemic 
contexts, they propose that suitable underpinnings might 
include Rogers’ theory of diffusion of innovations, or Hooper 
and Rieber’s model of step-wise implementation in organ-
isations (p. 980). In each case, of course, the purpose is to 
ensure that the theory used is relevant to the wider context, 
or, as Passey puts it:
Any specific context being researched needs to be 
delineated carefully, so that areas where technology 
enhancement might arise can be more clearly understood 
and defined. As a consequence of delineation, application 
of theoretical underpinnings can be more pertinently 
appropriated. (p. 982)
4.3.4  Field development
Like that of field pertinence, the final position that I shall 
consider, in relation to functions disputes, is concerned with 
those prospects offered by the better use of theory for the 
field of TEL, whether in whole or in part. Yet, by contrast 
with those former positions, which typically suggest that 
the field should seek to develop, and then use, particular 
theories on the grounds of their relevance to some wider 
context, the arguments I consider in the present section are 
more centrally concerned with how the field might come 
to develop its own distinctive stances. Given that such a 
position fundamentally concerns the TEL field’s development 
and sense of identity, I shall use the label field development 
to denote it.
Perhaps the most obvious characteristic shared by both 
the field development and field pertinence stances, as they are 
evident in the source materials, is unfortunate: both former 
and latter are often manifest in ways that seem auxiliary 
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to some other concern. That observation should not be 
misunderstood as a criticism of those works that I shall cite 
below; on the contrary, I would suggest that their authors 
have correctly drawn attention to an important issue that 
is, elsewhere, too often neglected. It would, however, seem 
fair to say that the TEL field, as a whole, has inadequately 
conceptualised, at least explicitly, the use-value of theory for 
field development.
Conversely, one particularly obvious characteristic which 
delineates field development from field pertinence lies in how 
they problematise, quite differently, that wider context in 
which research occurs. While field pertinence stances often, 
as I discussed in section 4.3.3, consider relations between 
scholarship and context using metaphors like ‘reflection’, 
such ideas are not reproduced where field development stanc-
es are stated. Instead, the core aspiration, where the wider 
context is considered, might better be characterised as one 
of ‘reconceptualisation’ or even ‘challenge’. That distinction 
is reflective, to some extent, of those broader interchange 
disputes that have been considered more extensively in 
section 4.2. Indeed, one instantiation of that aspiration 
for ‘reconceptualisation’ and ‘challenge’ can be found in a 
statement already considered in relation to those interchange 
disputes; albeit here I wish to focus on a different aspect 
of the text. In relation to the phenomenon of big data, as 
previously elaborated, Jones and Czerniewicz (2011) make 
the following claim:
In a world of big data the idea that theory is at best 
irrelevant and at worst counterproductive is extremely 
dangerous. In educational technology the idea of learner 
analytics could easily be developed to suggest that if we 
simply collect enough raw data on students then theory 
will become irrelevant. […] In a world in which there is 
a data flood in which new data sources impact on all the 
disciplines that learning technology draws on, a renewed 
engagement with theory will be essential to ensure that 
the data we collect for analysis is not garbage so that the 
answers derived from it are not just as poor. (p. 175)
From my overview in section 4.3.1, the reader may recall 
how Jones and Czerniewicz, drawing on previous work by 
Sayer, position “conceptualisation” as a key “dimension” 
of theory (alongside others, such as “ordering” and “ex-
planation”). By considering that dimension in relation to 
the statement above, we can see how particular aspects 
of theory might come to be be regarded as central to field 
development. The key point, for present purposes, is that 
Jones and Czerniewicz’ argument serves to position “theory” 
as a key locus of “conceptualisation”; noting, on this basis, 
that we will need a “renewed engagement” with such theory 
if we are to withstand predominant discourses from that 
wider context in which TEL research operates. One corollary 
of the argument, of course, is that we will also need to 
actively avoid any temptation to disparage theory ourselves, 
as researchers—especially where those other stakeholders, 
with whom we work, might encourage us to do so (in the 
example given, by promoting some variant of a ‘data-driven’ 
agenda). Arguments of this nature that serve to demarcate, 
most starkly, field development positions from those of field 
pertinence.
Subsequently, Jones and Czerniewicz go on to argue that, 
if we are to respond to challenges such as those identified in 
the above quotation, then there will be an attendant need to 
“demonstrate how theory can locate discussion and research 
in a broader academic and scholarly discourse” (p. 176). 
That ‘locative’ question is an important issue: it lies at the 
heart of field development positions, and, for that reason, 
it is worth exploring how TEL theory serves to locate work 
within scholarly discourse.
One analysis that is highly instructive, in this regard, is 
that provided by Bennett & Oliver (2011). Their paper—one 
of the few to position the issue of field development, in the 
sense I define it here, relatively centrally—furnishes three 
accounts, which collectively examine the extent to which 
theoretical work can “advance knowledge” in the TEL field. 
One of those accounts, as I briefly alluded to above when 
discussing mode distinguishing positions, concerns that 
extensive body of work on ‘multimedia learning’ most often 
associated with the theories of Richard Mayer. Such work, in 
Bennett and Oliver’s telling, certainly has numerous limita-
tions: not least of which is its emphasis, to the detriment of 
sociocultural considerations, on the design of instructional 
content. Yet it also has, it is suggested, a number of distinct 
strengths: most notably, a strong emphasis on theory 
development across a trajectory of empirical work, rather 
than, as is more common, using empirical work to ‘apply’ 
or ‘exemplify’ some theory positioned, whether more or less 
explicitly, as established or fixed. Bennett and Oliver (ibid.) 
conclude that: 
Mayer’s work thus has something important to offer a 
discussion of the role of theory in learning technology 
research. Mayer has achieved a coherent, interconnected 
body of work that is informed in every way by the theory 
in which it is located, from its conception (building 
directly from unanswered questions raised by past 
research and under-developed theory), to execution 
(the methodologies used), and to interpretation (what it 
means in relation to the questions asked, earlier findings 
and future research). […] In sum, Mayer’s work demon-
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strates how theory can inspire, frame and guide research 
that cumulatively builds knowledge in a highly focused 
area. (p. 183)
The sense in which Mayer’s work is, here, lauded for 
its coherence, interconnection, posing of questions, and 
interpretation, all within a body of work that conveys a 
strong ethos of cumulative progress, is important: indeed, it 
is central to how field development is usually conceptualised. 
West, Ertmer and McKenney (2020), for example, make a 
broadly congruous argument (though with one important 
difference, as elaborated below) where they position “rich, 
critical, and thought-provoking scholarship” as that which 
“not only identifies the variables involves in a research 
agenda, but also explains, contextualizes, and critically 
analyses the relationships between these variables” (p. 594). 
The sense that theory might get embedded in a “research 
agenda”, in this account, is also an important consideration 
for field development stances; and, once again, the work of 
Mayer and colleagues can serve as an object lesson for how 
such embedding might work in practice.
Yet there is an important sense in which the historical 
example of Mayer’s ‘multimedia learning’ theory is not a 
good example of field development, at least in the way that 
contemporary narratives indicate a desire to promulgate the 
idea. That sense can be found in the very limited extent to 
which the associated body of work engages with the wider 
context of the phenomenon it studies; in other words, it does 
not, to reprise the terminology of West, Ertmer and McK-
enney (2020), above, have a strong ‘contextualising’ com-
ponent. That the lack of “relevance to real classrooms” has 
become, by now, the standard critique of this body of work 
itself serves to illustrate the point (Bennett & Oliver, 2011, 
p. 183), and acknowledgement of this limitation seemingly 
lies behind Bennet and Oliver’s use of the formulation, in 
the quotation reproduced above, of “in a highly focused 
area”. Mayer’s work is certainly not, then, an example of the 
“reflecting” approach to the wider context that characterises 
field pertinence positions. Yet it also does not seek directly 
to challenge that wider context; arguably, we might char-
acterise the relation between ‘knowledge community’ and 
‘wider context’, in this case, as one of studied neutrality (or 
disinterest).
Having offered their own critique of this work, Bennett 
and Oliver subsequently go on to examine other examples of 
theoretical work in TEL that do seek to engage with wider 
contexts. One such example is the work of Chen (cf. ibid., 
pp. 185-186), where it is theory that is seen as helping relate 
the findings of the study to the broader context, thereby—by 
highlighting that they implicate a nexus of issues whose im-
port is much wider than the research site—rendering those 
findings relevant to a broader audience. Bennett and Oliver’s 
analysis goes on to suggest, in part, that it is the borrowing 
of the theories in question (in this particular case, from both 
psychology and sociology), which gives Chen’s study its 
explanatory power; an observation that resonates with the 
kinds of issues I shall further consider, below, in relation to 
exceptionalism disputes (section 4.4). For present purposes, 
the important point is simply that particular roles of theory, 
as they are used in a particular study (cf. section 4.3.1), are 
being highlighted as important in serving a ‘locative’ goal in 
relation to field development.
Let us take stock. My analysis, thus far, of field develop-
ment positions has, among other things, highlighted argu-
ments that we need to problematise our relationships, as 
researchers, with those broader ‘contexts’ in which our work 
gets situated; that we need, if we are to do so successfully, 
to avoid the temptation (very real in some cases) to neglect 
theory; that some of those distinct roles that theory serves 
within particular research projects have, more than others, 
considerable importance for advancing knowledge in the 
field; that theory needs to become embedded within cumu-
lative processes of knowledge production (perhaps ‘research 
agendas’), if we are to realise, to the fullest possible extent, 
those opportunities for knowledge production arising 
from theory use in particular, bounded projects; that the 
theory we use itself needs to be seen as developing, with its 
categories problematised dynamically, rather than deployed 
statically, within such research agendas; and that theory can 
serve a useful role, under certain conditions, in communicat-
ing and amplifying the importance of findings, which might 
otherwise be taken as having a relatively parochial set of 
implications. Furthermore, while it is certainly possible to 
highlight particular strands of work in the field as exempli-
fying some of these beneficial practices, most such examples 
are lacking—sometimes abjectly so—in other such respects.
These are, in my view, important points. Yet they are, 
when compared against many of the arguments I have 
analysed previously, remarkably silent about theory itself. 
With the obvious exception of the (valuable) argument that 
theoretical categories must be viewed dynamically, many of 
these contentions either recapitulate, reframe, or synthesise 
points already made in relation to other stances. Doing so 
is, in my view, useful to a certain extent. For example, if I 
were interested in addressing the question what should we be 
doing with theory if we want to better develop the field? then 
the preceding paragraph might offer some useful answers. 
Yet there are limits to such stances. If I were to take seriously 
the above points and pose, in turn, a question like in what 
roles might theory serve to develop the research field, or a 
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given ‘research agenda’ within it, rather than some particular 
research project? then I might find that answers are less 
forthcoming. This suggests, in my view, a reluctance, across 
the TEL field, to think (or at least write) about theory in 
terms of broad trajectories of research (‘research agendas’) 
rather than granular projects; the former, instead, get posi-
tioned, perhaps unintentionally, as corollaries of the latter.
To understand better the limitations of this situation, it is 
worth considering one paper—an outlier in the source ma-
terials—that does discuss a concrete research agenda. That 
paper is a book chapter by de Laat and Lally (2004), which 
discusses their trajectory of research on the topic of ‘tutoring’ 
in higher education networked learning communities: 
and placing a particular emphasis on understanding how 
tutors might support individual and collaborative learning 
within such communities. For present purposes, I wish 
to downplay the relationship between this work and the 
‘networked learning’ knowledge community in particular; 
while the paper does explicitly position the work within that 
community, no argument is put forward that the experiences 
described are idiosyncratic to that field, by comparison with, 
for example, ‘TEL’. Instead, I wish to emphasise, primarily, 
that the account successfully highlights how theories can 
play significant roles in developing research agendas (and, 
secondarily, that, in order to do so, the narrative draws 
extensively on examples of thinking from outside the TEL 
field).
The starting point for the trajectory of research discussed 
by de Laat and Lally is consideration of a Masters-level 
programme in E-Learning, delivered in an ‘online workshop’ 
format to part-time students who are working professionals. 
The aim of the programme, via the establishment of an 
online ‘research learning community’, is taken as fostering 
“an action research approach to professional development” 
(ibid., p. 19). A body of research centred on this programme 
increasingly sought to problematise, in particular, the 
integration of learning and tutoring, and the attendant shifts 
in the role of the ‘teacher’; processes of tutoring, it was being 
recognised, were being undertaken by a range of course 
participants, with interesting implications for the roles of the 
‘designated tutor’. At the outset, a mainstay of the research 
involved constructing coding schemes, based on existing 
models of ‘tutoring’, to interrogate, using a content analysis 
approach, the extent of ‘knowledge construction’ manifest 
in selected online workshops (pp. 20-22). While de Laat and 
Lally’s narrative draws out a range of interesting issues, I 
shall focus, for present purpose, on their analysis of the roles 
of theory in this developing research agenda.
De Laat and Lally (2004) commence their paper by 
highlighting their “concerns about the complexity of the 
interactions of theory and praxis” (p. 12). That a range of 
‘theoretical models’ are currently being used by researchers 
and practitioners in relation to similar objects; that many 
such models are regarded as useful; and that each has 
different methodological implications, are each taken as 
characteristics of that complexity (pp 12-14). What is posed 
for researchers, under such circumstances (which are, of 
course, far from unique), de Laat and Lally suggest, is the 
challenge of apprehending the “fundamental differences 
between these models in terms of focus and power” (p. 12).
To apprehend such fundamental differences, de Laat 
and Lally (2004) draw on prior work by Halverson (2002), 
which, de Laat and Lally suggest, “has cogently articulated 
four ways in which theory might contribute to this conver-
sation” (p. 12). Halverson’s work, it should be noted, is not 
a contribution to theoretical debates in TEL, but instead is 
located within the field of Computer Supported Coopera-
tive Work (CSCW). The latter—another interdisciplinary 
research field, whose scholars are, most typically, affiliated 
to academic departments of organisational studies, engineer-
ing, and computer science—has, since the 1980s, examined 
how workplace computer systems can co-ordinate and 
support aspirations for people to labour more collaborative-
ly19. Halverson’s paper has a slightly different focus to that 
of de Laat and Lally: while the latter discuss one ongoing 
research agenda in a way that usefully highlights the roles of 
theory, the former explicitly compares two theories—activity 
theory and distributed cognition—and seeks to consider 
their use-value across their research field (their abstract, p. 
243, poses the question as concerning “what each can do for 
CSCW”). Given the close pertinence, for present purposes, 
of Halverson’s emphasis, I shall use their formulations as 
a supplement, below, to those of de Laat and Lally; not-
withstanding that their ‘workplace’ orientation might seem 
unfamiliar to many TEL readers.
De Laat and Lally (2004) and Halverson (2002), then, 
suggest that theories should have four “attributes” if they 
are to be useful in making sense of what Halverson calls a 
“domain” (p. 243). Those attributes are as follows:
• Descriptive power: “providing a conceptual frame-
work that helps us to make sense of and describe the 
phenomena we are engaged in” (de Laat and Lally, 
2004, p. 12); Halverson’s original formulation also 
emphasises that this attribute of theory “includes 
describing a work setting as well as critiquing an 
19 Jones (2015) notes that CSCW has historically had “little overlap” 
with those research domains more usually considered part of the TEL 
tradition (p. 60).
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implementation of technology in that setting” (p. 
245);
• Rhetorical power: “helping us to talk about these 
phenomena and speculate about ways in which 
the theoretical ideas ‘map’ onto our experience of 
them” (de Laat and Lally, 2004, p. 12); Halverson 
additionally emphasises the naming of a “conceptual 
structure”, and that the attribute is directed towards 
“both how we describe things to ourselves and how 
we communicate about it to others” (p. 245);
• Inferential power: “providing us with ways of ad-
vancing our understanding by helping us to ask new 
questions and intervene in creative ways, as educa-
tors, in the contexts that we are investigating and 
in which we are participating” (de Laat and Lally, 
2004, p. 12); Halverson additionally emphasises the 
attribute as encompassing the property of helping us 
realise that “we have not yet understood sufficiently 
to know where or how to look” (p. 245);
• Applicatory power: “informing the ways in which we 
design and engage in pedagogy to support learning” 
(de Laat and Lally, 2004, p. 12); from their different 
disciplinary perspective, Halverson renders this 
attribute as being concerned with being able to “de-
scribe and understand the world at the right level of 
analysis in order to bridge the gap from description 
to design” (p. 245, emphasis added).
By analysing their own trajectory of work, longitudinally, 
using such attributes, de Laat and Lally (2004) notice, 
among other things, that their trajectory of research has 
involved repeatedly re-evaluating their theoretical frames; 
having spent several pages (pp. 15-19) describing the dif-
ferent “perspectives” that influenced their work at different 
times—clustering them under the headings “Constructivism, 
situativity and group learning” and “Socio-cultural theory”, 
where it is made clear that each contains a wealth of 
quite different stances—they conclude that this “complex 
collection” of ideas is “necessary to take account of the real 
complexities of individual and group processes” their work 
wishes to examine (p. 18). In turn, this process of repeatedly 
engaging with, and critically evaluating, theories, led, in 
their account, to repeated struggles with methodology. 
If theory is to support a “conversation” within a field or 
research agenda, it is suggested, then methodology needs 
to be viewed as the “syntax” (p. 14, emphasis in original); 
in other words, the principles governing the structure of 
knowledge production within that conversation. Developing 
some new theoretical perspective, within some trajectory 
of research, will challenge those methodologies that have 
previously become established there; while attempts to 
derive a specific methodological syntax from that new 
perspective will, in turn, present challenges that ought to be 
harnessed as key resources for reflection by those involved in 
the knowledge community. Finally, de Laat and Lally notice 
that the core focus of their research agenda also developed 
over time: from the beginnings described above, the work 
developed to encompass a more expansive focus on agency 
in online communities of professionals.
The points raised by such a discussion constitute a 
valuable, albeit less frequently articulated, accompaniment 
to those preceding discussions of field development positions. 
They demonstrate the real value that can be added by 
stepping back to reflect on how theory can be evaluated as 
contributing to the development of wider research trajecto-
ries within the field.
4.3.5  Synopsis of functions disputes
A synopsis of functions disputes is provided in Figure 3. 
Given that the format is the same as for the preceding two 
figures, I shall assume that readers will readily recognise 
the basic intention: to position the “functions disputes” 
node as the central locus of discussion, and the others as 
distinct stances taken in relation to that locus. Once again, 
the textual summary in the diagram is a simplified summary 
of the preceding discussion, and readers are directed to the 
relevant sub-sections, above, for more nuanced analysis, 
respectively, of role strengthening (section 4.3.1), mode 
distinguishing (4.3.2), field pertinence (4.3.3), and field 
development (4.3.4) stances.
In the case of functions disputes, the set of relationships 
highlighted within the diagram, between the different 
positions, is relatively simple. There is often a relatively 
direct sense in which positions of field development build on 
arguments about role strengthening: i.e., by highlighting that 
some of those roles that theories might play in research pro-
jects have, in turn, a particular import for how those projects 
contribute to developing distinctive positions and agendas. 
Yet the label “partially building” is intended, in the same 
way it was used in Figure 2, to convey that the relationship 
between the two positions is not one of total dependence; 
role strengthening positions are not taken as a prerequisite 
for field development stances in all cases. Indeed, section 
4.3.4 considered examples of scholarship wherein the roles 
played by theories in constructing research agendas and 
developing the field was conceived rather differently from 
those put forward, within discussions of role strengthening, 
in relation to research projects.
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Figure 3. Synopsis of functions disputes
One aspect of the diagram that is worth highlighting is 
the absence of explicit connections, in some cases, between 
positions that would appear, prima facie, to be closely relat-
ed. That field development positions do not get labelled as 
building on mode distinguishing stances, for example, might 
be considered surprising, since it would seem plausible that 
the various theoretical ‘modes’ might contribute quite differ-
ently to the development of the field. Yet extant examples 
of what I would characterise as field development stances do 
not foreground such a point; and, so, the absence of such a 
connection in Figure 3 represents, in this case, a lacuna in 
the source materials. Those source materials also, moreover, 
under-problematise the relationship between what I call field 
pertinence and field development: in other words, the extent 
to which initiatives to make the field theoretically more ‘rele-
vant’ to stakeholders, on the one hand, and those concerned 
with developing the field’s distinctive positions, on the other, 
might be mutually supportive or in tension with each other.
Several of these positions do, however, implicate the 
need to make distinctions between different theories; 
thereby suggesting, in turn, a need to consider what our 
priorities might be when developing new theories or bor-
rowing existing ones from elsewhere. Those questions are 
considered more fully by the analysis in the next section.
4.4  Exceptionalism disputes
By exceptionalism disputes, I refer to discussions con-
cerning the sources of the theories that should be used in 
TEL research. Those disputes are, as I shall elaborate below, 
often framed by a concern with the extent to which the field 
should “borrow” from other sources, and also by a concern 
about the nature of the sources themselves. The use of the 
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terms like “should”, in those preceding sentences, is quite 
deliberate; it indicates that exceptionalism disputes have, by 
and large, an aspirational, future-oriented, and normative 
character.
The historical situation, with regard to the source of 
those theories to which the field has usually paid hom-
age—the formulation indicates some scepticism about the 
extent to which those theories were, in some cases, really 
used—is, of course, relatively clear. As discussed, and 
problematised extensively, in section 4.1, the TEL field has 
long referred extensively to a definite “canon” of theoretical 
categories: derived from a particular reading of paradigmatic 
developments, within Western academic psychology, con-
cerned with conceptualising the phenomenon of ‘learning’. 
Those categories, it should be emphasised, continue to be 
extensively referenced in the field; indeed, that section 4.1 
provided such an extensive overview of disputes related to 
that canon of “grand theories” is itself indicative of the grav-
itational pull they continue to exert on discourse in TEL. Yet 
a range of tensions—for example, concerns about the limited 
interchange that has resulted from a reliance on theories of 
‘learning’ (cf. section 4.2), and a desire to render the field 
relevant to more disparate stakeholders (cf. 4.3.3)—has 
been manifest, in some cases, via an impulse to break away 
from these canonical theoretical categories.
In short, any examination of that body of literature 
which takes ‘theory’, in TEL, as its object of enquiry will 
quickly discern that there is a strong impetus to move away 
from disciplinary psychology as the sole fount of conceptual 
inspiration. That impetus leads, in turn, to significant 
questions: most immediately, about what sources might be 
drawn upon in its stead. Sometimes, such questions are 
addressed by scrambling for disciplinary alternatives. Jones 
and Czerniewicz (2011), for example, whose article serves 
as the introduction to a previous journal Special Issue on 
theory in the field, put forward the following observation:
It is interesting that the call for papers for this special 
issue on theory in learning technology drew few papers 
with an emphasis on learning theory and that there 
is little evidence of a strong psychological, computer 
science or educational research influence. […] There is 
a sociological bent indicative of what we perceive as a 
general shift to the socio-cultural context of learning. 
(pp. 175-176)
In my view, Jones and Czerniewicz usefully highlight an 
important aspect of theoretical disputes in TEL; which is that 
certain disciplines get promoted as suitable sources of influ-
ence for TEL scholarship, while others are (often implicitly) 
disparaged. Indeed, it can occasionally seem as if advocates 
for a variety of academic fields are jostling to best occupy 
what they identify as a nascent power vacuum. Yet not all 
writers concerned with this topic demonstrate a specifically 
“sociological” inclination and, where particular disciplines 
are put forward as suitable substitutes for the established 
order, that is usually done in the pursuit of promulgating 
some specific theory from within that discipline.
In my view, therefore, when considering theoretical dis-
putes in general, we need to examine a set of exceptionalism 
disputes whose fulcrum is the concept of “borrowing” from 
outside the discipline. The core question might be phrased 
as follows: if preceding generations of TEL researchers have 
largely borrowed from the academic discipline of psychology, 
and if we are no longer content with that state of affairs, 
then to what extent should we be looking to borrow from 
elsewhere instead?
It is towards such issues that the analysis below is 
oriented. In what follows, I shall demarcate three positions, 
evident in the source materials, that I shall characterise 
using the labels phenomenal distinctiveness, horizon broaden-
ing, and conceptual imbrication.
4.4.1  Phenomenal distinctiveness
One stance sometimes taken, in relation to exceptionalism 
disputes, invokes a notion that TEL’s research objects are, in 
important respects, quite unlike those of the other domains 
from which the field has often sought to borrow. As a 
consequence, it is suggested, we need to develop our own 
theoretical approaches. I shall refer to such stances using the 
moniker phenomenal distinctiveness.
The reason for emphasising the word “phenomenal”, in 
naming this stance, derives from the fact that such positions 
usually start out by orienting themselves towards what the 
field is studying, rather than the field per se. When consider-
ing the territory of the TEL field (in section 3), I previously 
considered claims that the TEL field is, in the words of West, 
Ertmer and McKenney (2020), “unique among academic 
disciplines”—for example, because it sits at complex inter-
disciplinary and interprofessional nexūs. Yet the claims from 
which phenomenal distinctiveness positions proceed have, 
typically, a rather different character. For example, Hay-
thornthwaite and Andrews (2011), whose work constitutes 
a usefully explicit instance of this kind of position, start out 
by suggesting that “conventional learning and scholarship” 
is fundamentally delineated by hierarchical relationships 
of engagement between learners and knowledge, in which 
teachers are positioned as powerful mediators, whereas 
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“e-learning”, by contrast, constitutes a quite distinct object of 
research:
We suggest that engagement in e-learning makes for a 
different kind of learning. In conventional learning and 
scholarship, there is an authoritative, hierarchical power 
system at work. The teacher acts as mediator for the 
student between the body of knowledge, as enshrined 
in books, journals and other forms of print. ‘Knowledge’ 
is seen to exist, to be ‘added to’ by research, and to 
be guarded by editors of journals who, among others, 
protect and preserve the discourses of induction into 
that community. The student voice is always subservient 
to the authoritative power, unless, through debate and 
discussion, a critical stand is taken and then committed 
to print. By engaging with print, the authoritative voice 
of knowledge is taken on in its own terms (e.g. in book 
reviews, in replies to journal articles, in letters, in books 
that provide a counter-argument). No amount of talk or 
blogging will dent what appears to be a hegemony of 
knowledge that is reified in print. (pp. 57-58)
One core aspect of Haythornthwaite and Andrews’ claim, 
then, is that bona fide “e-learning” constitutes a phenomenon 
of study which is distinct from conventional learning, not-
withstanding that the latter might have incorporated various 
technological means over the recent period (cf. “No amount 
of […] blogging will dent…”). Existing theories of learning 
have, in this telling, been developed to study a different 
phenomenon; for which reason they are inextricably accom-
modated to the hierarchies of conventional learning. That 
accommodation, in turn, raises “epistemological concerns” 
(p. 57) for scholarship in the TEL field, since the phenome-
non of “e-learning” has quite different characteristics:
In e-learning, however, the canonical texts are them-
selves committed to digital format and thus become 
at once more malleable, more open to critique that is 
actioned on the same level as the original text. A digital 
electronic text can more easily be broken up, annotated, 
re-aligned, and incorporated as part of a dialectic or at 
least dialogical exchange. The ‘voice(s)’ of the original 
author can be placed alongside the student voice or 
voices. The learning process becomes more like speech, is 
more democratic, and is less hierarchical than one based 
conventionally on print. (p. 58)
A number of peripheral observations could be made 
about the above argument. That the introduction of digital 
technologies into human practices constitutes a fundamental 
‘rupture’, for example, is a much-contested point. Further-
more, a desire to relate the categories of ‘learning’ and 
‘knowledge’ in different ways does not lead inexorably to 
such an epistemological critique (cf. the work of Scardamalia 
and Bereiter, as discussed in section 4.1.5).  
Yet, for present purposes, the more important point is 
that, for Andrews and Haythornthwaite (2011), bases of this 
nature are taken to suggest that “new theory” is needed. As 
the quotation below makes clear, that is not a decision that 
these writers have arrived at quickly:
In the Introduction to The Sage Handbook of E-learning 
Research (Andrews and Haythornthwaite, 2007), while 
charting some of the constituent elements and factors 
in building a theory of e-learning, we backed off on 
whether a ‘grand theory’ of e-learning was needed. At 
the time, we felt that the field was not in a sufficiently 
mature state for such theorizing. However, we now say in 
our ‘answer’ to the question posed by the present section, 
yes, new theory is needed, and e-learning as an activity 
and as a way of learning requires its own theoretical 
treatment. (p. 56, emphasis in original)
It should be emphasised that, in suggesting that a “new 
theory” be developed, on the basis of what I am calling 
phenomenal distinctiveness, Andrews and Haythornthwaite 
are not advocating that a hermetic seal be placed around the 
work of the field. On the contrary, they provide a lengthy 
conspectus of those theoretical underpinnings from which 
any new theory might seek to derive inspiration (pp. 47-55). 
“New theory”, therefore, seems to imply, in this instance, 
that some synthesis of prior positions be undertaken, as a 
pre-requisite for developing some distinctive new formula-
tion. Nonetheless, in this view, that eventual formulation will 
be distinctive to the field; and, moreover, it will constitute 
what is referred to in the quotation, above, as “a ‘grand 
theory’”.
Andrews and Haythornthwaite are quick to concede that 
their new theory has yet to be formulated in a mature fash-
ion. Yet they do provide a sequence of indicative questions; 
addressing which, it is suggested, will help in demarcating 
the contours of this future “new theory”. Nine such questions 
are presented: in two clusters, related, in turn, to ‘digitally 
mediated communities’ and ‘the social control of learning’. 
For Andrews and Haythornthwaite, a “new theory” is 
certainly required and is already being “brought about” 
(p. 62): they are confident that, when that theory is more 
fully developed, it will emphasise that TEL scholars should 
approach the phenomena they study, distinctively, as “(a) a 
psycho-social construct, (b) an epistemologically informed 
entity, and (c) a multimodal process” (ibid.).
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4.4.2  Horizon broadening
Another position taken, in relation to exceptionalism 
disputes, has almost diametrically opposite implications. 
Rather than seeking, as advocated by phenomenal distinctive-
ness stances, to break away from the theoretical inheritance 
offered by other research fields, this position involves advo-
cating that we should seek to embed our work more deeply 
into those theoretical constellations being proffered from 
elsewhere. As elaborated below, such stances often position 
endogenous TEL concepts as narrow and intellectually my-
opic, and argue that the field would benefit from drawing, 
instead, on critical theorising from more established fields.
At the risk of labouring a point already registered above, 
at the outset of this discussion of exceptionalism disputes 
(section 4.4), it should be stated that anyone making a list 
of those “more established fields” being advocated would 
notice a significant omission. Absent from the source 
materials, in other words, are any examples that advocate 
embedding our work more deeply into the framework 
of what I have, above, repeatedly referred to as ‘Western 
academic psychology’. Instead, it is typically advocated that 
we should become more aware of theorising in other fields. 
Such advocacy, of course, typically serve as a precursor to 
making more specific recommendations, which accord with 
the preferences of some given author. For this reason, I shall 
refer to such stances as concerned with horizon broadening. 
One example of such a horizon broadening position is put 
forward by Selwyn (2010), who suggests that the field needs 
to engage in “what can be termed the critical study of edu-
cational technology” (p. 66, emphasis in original). Selwyn 
encapsulates their argument in a way that (1) chronicles a 
retreat from a previously narrow emphasis on ‘learning’, and 
(2) suggests that we broaden our emphasis along what is 
termed “social scientific lines”, as follows:
[…] the academic study of educational technology has 
grown to be dominated by an (often abstracted) interest 
in the processes of how people can learn with digital 
technology. While issues relating to the design, develop-
ment and implementation of ‘effective’ learning technolo-
gies will continue to be of central importance to the field, 
it is reasoned that greater attention now needs to be paid 
to how digital technologies are actually being used—for 
better and worse—in ‘real-world’ educational settings. 
In this sense, it is contended that the academic study of 
educational technology needs to be pursued more vigor-
ously along social scientific lines, with researchers and 
writers showing a keener interest in the social, political, 
economic, cultural and historical contexts within which 
educational technology use (and non-use) is located. (p. 
66, emphasis in original)
Substantially the same points are made by Johri (2011), 
and by Howard and Maton (2011). In each case, the concept 
of ‘learning’ is negatively problematised: by Johri (2011) as 
emphasising tasks and outcomes, to the detriment of an em-
phasis on “everyday aspects of life” (p. 209); and by Howard 
and Maton (2011) as “limit[ing] the range of positions” seen 
as legitimate for research, thereby artificially ventilating 
research agendas that are blind to important issues outside 
those limits.
Advocates of what I call horizon broadening often bolster 
their stance by reference to conjunctural observations: they 
put forward reasons why the field, as it has been historically 
constituted, is no longer able to address the challenges it 
faces. Selwyn (2010), for example, addresses this issue 
by suggesting, in a way that will surely serve to flatter the 
egos of those TEL researchers who constitute their core 
readership, that the phenomena studied by the field have 
increasing “societal significance”:
Put bluntly, as technology-based education and ‘e-learn-
ing’ continue to grow in societal significance, then it 
follows that the use of technology in education needs 
to be understood in societal terms. For instance, this 
includes acknowledging the clear linkages between 
educational technology use and ‘macro’ elements of the 
social structure of society such as global economics, 
labour markets, and political and cultural institutions. 
Similarly, at the ‘micro’ level of the individual, the act of 
technology-based learning also needs to be understood 
as being entwined with many other dimensions of social 
life. (p. 68)
Thus, the core suggestion here is that those phenomena 
studied by TEL researchers are increasingly societally 
‘significant’, and that their investigation should, consequen-
tially, become more entwined into research discourses more 
often associated with ‘societal’ phenomena. That narrative 
presents, of course, a very different emphasis on the object 
of study from that put forward in relation to phenomenal 
distinctiveness positions: where TEL is seen as studying 
something that is, in important ways, unique. It is perhaps 
unsurprising, therefore, that the course of action being 
suggested, in relation to theory, also differs.
The actual solutions preferred to this state of affairs, 
within those papers that I consider as countenancing a 
horizon broadening stance, are somewhat disparate. Johri 
(2011), for example, elaborates the advantages of “so-
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cio-material bricolage”, drawn from the traditions of practice 
theory, as an analytical framework (pp. 212-215), while 
Howard and Maton (2011) advocate that TEL researchers 
adopt “Legitimation Code Theory”, which they position as 
“a central conceptual framework of social realism, a broad 
‘school of thought’ that offers a means of moving beyond 
social constructionism” (p. 195).
The common thread is a rejection of scientism (the 
privileging of forms of knowledge and investigation on the 
basis that they are ‘scientific’), with the field encouraged, 
instead, to more fully embrace what might be called bona 
fide ‘social science’. Selwyn (2010), for example, makes this 
point in the following way:
The study of educational technology should therefore 
be seen in profoundly social scientific terms—moving 
beyond making sense of the ‘science’ of learning, and 
pursuing what can be termed the critical study of 
technology-based social action and social life within the 
social world of education. (p. 68, emphasis in original)
In relation to exceptionalism disputes, therefore, what 
horizon broadening stances present is a view that funda-
mentally downplays the ‘exceptional’ nature of TEL. Yet such 
suggestions are not meant to suggest that TEL is become 
less important. On the contrary, the use of technology 
for educational purposes is positioned as an increasingly 
noteworthy aspect of societal life, and, on that very basis, it 
is suggested that TEL research becomes more integrated into 
those branches of scholarly endeavour that already study 
that life. To a considerable degree, such integration seems to 
position the TEL field, at least at the present juncture, as a 
knowledge ‘taker’, rather than an active contributor to wider 
fields of enquiry.
4.4.3  Conceptual imbrication
The final position that I wish to consider, in relation 
to exceptionalism disputes, proceeds by acknowledging the 
validity of those initial premises deployed by proponents 
of both preceding positions. In other words, it is suggested 
that the phenomena studied by TEL researchers really are 
societally embedded and significant, but also posited that 
our research objects are, in certain respects, distinctive. 
Conversely, where this stance differs from both of those posi-
tions is in denying that it is desirable for the field to adopt a 
single framework for investigation or understanding. Where 
advocates of what I term phenomenal distinctiveness might 
pursue the objective of constructing what Haythornthwaite 
and Andrews (2011) call a “theory of e-learning”, and where 
those advocating horizon broadening often propose specific 
disciplinary sources from which the field might borrow in 
broad swaths, for proponents of this final position the key 
point is that the search for grand theories is illusory. Instead, 
it is advocated that TEL researchers recognise that they have 
a range of distinct interests and study disparate phenomena, 
and, on this basis, (1) actively appropriate aspects of theo-
ries from elsewhere and (2) work to combine and arrange 
them in new ways. I shall refer to this position as conceptual 
imbrication, where I intend the word ‘imbrication’ to draw 
attention, by analogy with processes of construction in built 
environment professions, to both the materials from else-
where that are being appropriated and to their arrangement 
in adjacent or overlapping configurations20. 
One particularly explicit example of what I consider to 
be a stance of conceptual imbrication is a chapter, in a book 
by Jones (2015) on Networked Learning, called “Theories of 
Learning in a Digital Age”. Jones commences their account 
with a narrative, reminiscent of those already considered in 
the preceding section, which sets out the societal implica-
tions of the “rise of digital networks” (p. 47). In particular, 
Jones highlights that learning, in the digitally networked 
society they describe, is heavily influenced by those forms of 
labour upon which the economy places value. That reality, in 
turn, has consequences for the social forms taken by learn-
ing, which track those forms of labour over time: 
A starting point for this chapter is the term learning and 
the way digital and networked technologies intertwine 
with social forms in contemporary universities, corporate 
training and continuing professional development. Dig-
ital and networked technologies play a part in forming 
and reforming work, social life and higher education. It 
is this complex and dynamic mix of work, social life and 
the higher education system that we need to understand 
alongside the different theories of education and learn-
ing. (p. 47)
Prima facie, the formulation “alongside” in the above 
quotation resonates, to some extent, with those canon jux-
taposition positions (section 4.1.5): which posit, in relation 
to canon disputes, that some accepted body of knowledge on 
‘learning’ needs to be counterposed against other, similarly 
mature, bodies of knowledge concerned with other pertinent 
topics. Yet this is not the substance of the argument that 
Jones wishes to make. Instead, Jones highlights that the 
particular field of enquiry they are interested in—Net-
worked Learning—has been influenced, for some time, by 
20 An alternative metaphor might have been bricolage, but I avoid this 
term here because it has become widely used already, in the field, to 
refer to particular methodological approaches to research projects. 
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conceptions of learning arising from outside the “Accepted 
Canon” (p. 49). The reason, Jones suggests, is that, over a 
considerable period, networked learning scholars have been 
engaging in work that foregrounds a particular educational 
sector (university-level and other post-compulsory settings, 
rather than learning in and around schools); a particular 
scale (from tens to thousands of students, not individuals 
or small groups); and a particular emphasis on technology 
(the appropriation of everyday technologies, rather than 
the design and use of ‘the novel’). Doing so has, in Jones 
telling, long served to demonstrate not only the entwining 
of education and society, but also the inadequacy of the 
historical theoretical canon:
[…] learning at the post compulsory level is concerned 
with more than the transfer, transmission or internalisa-
tion of knowledge that is already in circulation in society. 
(p. 47, emphasis added)
As I mentioned in section 2, Jones’ text is, by contrast 
with most other source materials I analyse in the present pa-
per, an outlier. Jones explicitly relates their argument about 
theory to a particular knowledge community (Networked 
Learning), whose formulations are considered preferable 
to others, such as “educational technology” and, indeed, 
‘TEL’. For Jones, the particular focus of networked learning, 
and the attendant recognition of the stark limitations of 
established theoretical underpinnings, has long encouraged 
a way of thinking that Jones characterises using the term 
“flexibility”:
[…] one of the strengths of networked learning is its 
flexibility in allowing for different ways of thinking about 
learning. (p. 48)
For Jones, that principle of “flexibility” should also be 
applied when thinking through that broader range of issues 
highlighted in the preceding section—those concerned with 
what was referred to there as “wider societal life”. Jones 
wishes to discourage researchers from believing that they 
can simply ‘import’ theoretical frameworks from elsewhere, 
since both the precise phenomena they study, and their 
own research purposes, are likely to differ, in important 
ways, from those of scholars working in other fields. Such 
a position leads Jones, in turn, to directly address the 
notion of exceptionalism; in relation to which they continue 
to advocate the benefits of ‘flexible’ thinking. In another 
instance of argumentation whose character is unusual by the 
standards of the source materials—in this case, for the way 
it explicitly draws distinctions with a position advocated by 
another scholar working in the field—Jones considers the 
work of Haythornthwaite and Andrews (2011). The  
argument of those latter authors, of course, furnished my 
own key example, in section 4.4.1, of a phenomenal distinc-
tiveness position. Jones (2015) explicitly notices that their 
respective stances differ, and emphasises the core distinc-
tions in the following way:
My conclusion differs to that of Haythornthwaite and 
Andrews because I do not think that networked learning 
requires a new ‘grand theory’ but I do concur that there 
are new elements to learning that uses information 
and communication technologies and that these new 
elements may require new theories. My disagreement is 
in terms of an encompassing theory of e-learning or net-
worked learning. My view is that learning is too slippery 
and complex a term to have a single theoretical solution 
and the addition of networked and digital technologies 
only adds to that complexity. (p. 67)
Jones text provides a lengthy excursus of different 
theories that might be used as the basis for understand 
Networked Learning; indeed, at least 150 pages within 
their book consider, in varying ways, the range of different 
theories from which network learning scholar might derive 
particular aspects of their own frameworks. Those theories 
are disparate: ranging across topics such as learning, human 
practice, networks, institutions, infrastructures, and knowl-
edge production in higher education. I shall not attempt to 
provide a conspectus of those discussions here. For present 
purposes, the core point is not so much the particular 
theories that Jones highlights, but rather the active and 
relational way in which Jones advocates that scholars of 
networked learning engage in their appropriation.
The fundamental point, in terms of what I characterise 
as exceptionalism disputes, is that researchers are urged to 
characterise their research objects as comprising multiple, 
overlapping “elements”—many of which are already studied 
productively in other disciplines—and to commit to actively 
appropriating aspects of theories from elsewhere in ways 
that they deem to provide insight into those elements; all 
the time recognising that the precise ways in which they 
imbricate the concepts they borrow will be, in some sense, 
exceptional.
Jones, having differentiated networked learning from 
other traditions, such as TEL, early in their book (pp. 3-11), 
does not explicitly relate their stance back to those other 
traditions; instead, Jones’ project is substantially oriented 
towards formulating a future research agenda for networked 
learning scholars in particular. Yet it seems reasonable to 
infer that, in Jones view, scholars of TEL would benefit, just 
as much as those networked learning researchers who they 
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address in their work more directly, from what I refer to as 
conceptual imbrication.
4.4.4  Synopsis of exceptionalism disputes
Figure 4 provides a synopsis of exceptionalism disputes 
in what should, by now, be a familiar format. The node 
“exceptionalism disputes” is presented as the central locus 
of discussion, and the other nodes, representing the three 
distinct positions outlined above, should be understood 
as relating to that locus. Once again, the textual summary 
in the diagram is a simplified summary of the preceding 
discussion; readers are directed to the relevant sub-sections, 
above, for a more nuanced analysis, in turn, of phenomenal 
distinctiveness (section 4.4.1), horizon broadening (4.4.2), 
and conceptual imbrication (4.4.3).
In the case of exceptionalism disputes, the set of relation-
ships highlighted in the diagram is simple. The two positions 
of phenomenal distinctiveness and horizon broadening express 
a very different logic, with the latter highlighting what TEL 
scholarship has in common with other disciplines and the 
former emphasising what is distinct about research in the 
field. Those two stances are not labelled as being “opposed” 
in Figure 4, as was done for some stances taken in relation 
to other points of dispute, however, on the grounds that 
neither position explicitly disavows the other and that 
phenomenal distinctiveness positions do usually involve 
taking some existing theory as a starting point for some 
process of building or variation. That decision was not easy 
to make, and indeed an earlier draft of this analysis did in-
volve labelling the relationship as one of opposition. That it 
would, in principle, be conceivable to construct an argument 
encompassing both positions was, in the end, crucial to the 
decision to construct the present version of the diagram. The
Figure 4. Synopsis of exceptionalism disputes
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latter might be accomplished, for example, by first 
suggesting that we borrow more extensively from some 
given discipline, such as anthropology, before going on to 
acknowledge, for the purposes of appreciating some TEL 
phenomenon more fully, the need to develop some distinct 
variant of a given theory proffered by that discipline.  Doing 
so would not be argumentationally incoherent.
The stance of conceptual imbrication is, of course, 
positioned as “partially building” on both other categories. 
In concert with how that label was used in the preceding 
diagrams, the intention is to convey that conceptual im-
brication positions do, in practice, typically accept some of 
the premises of those other two positions—and wield them 
in support of their argument—but without being logically 
dependent on them. Furthermore, and importantly, the 
position of conceptual imbrication projects, on the grounds 
that their arguments are inappropriately totalising, an ex-
plicit rejection of aspects of both phenomenal distinctiveness 
and horizon broadening stances. As section 4.4.3 explains in 
more detail, at the heart of a conceptual imbrication position 
are the notions that our research objects are composed of 
distinct “elements”, in relation to which we need to concep-
tualise with an appropriate degree of “flexibility”.
This emphasis on ‘exceptionalism’ constitutes the fourth 
and final point of dispute that I wish to analyse. In the next 
section, I will pivot to consider, in turn, how the four points 
relate to each other, and the implications of this analysis for 
the ‘territory’ of technology enhanced learning.
5. Discussion
Two of the core goals of a ‘discussion’ section, within a 
scholarly paper, are (1) to bring together the main findings 
and (2) to consider the relationships between those findings 
and that body of literature within which the authors intend 
to situate their work. Each of those goals is, in turn, sub-
ordinate to a broader, overarching objective for the paper: 
which is to demonstrate that the work contributes something 
distinctive to one or more named areas of academic scholar-
ship.
The present work, of course, is a narrative literature 
review; it aims, as I stated in section 2, to synthesise and 
systematise those debates occurring, in the scholarship 
associated with what might be broadly termed ‘the TEL 
field’, about theory application. For that reason, the body 
of knowledge, to which I aim to contribute, corresponds, 
in many ways, with the ‘data set’ that was analysed in the 
paper. That has implications for the present section, in which 
I wish to discuss my findings, because, with reference to the 
two goals mentioned above, the main “relationship” between 
my findings and the underlying body of literature is that the 
former is a systematised representation of the latter. In what 
follows, therefore, I position the act of bringing together 
my main findings as a contribution, in itself, to the body of 
knowledge I have analysed in the paper.
I attempt to demonstrate that contribution, primarily, 
by drawing together the four points of dispute I analysed in 
section 4, and by highlighting some moments of commonal-
ity and difference between them. Throughout my exposition 
of those commonalities and differences, I shall reprise my 
account of how the state of the field (the “territory” of the 
argument, as described in section 3) is represented in this 
body of knowledge, and consider the implications of my 
analysis for its development. While doing so, I shall attempt 
to keep in mind the two audiences I addressed at the outset 
of the paper. On the one hand, to address those (relatively 
inexperienced) researchers who might wish to further 
engage with theoretical issues in their work, I shall provide 
some reflective comments: the purpose of which is to draw 
out some of the implications of my analysis for their own 
practice. On the other, to address those scholars interested in 
the topic of theory in technology enhanced learning research 
as a research object in its own right, I shall attempt to high-
light where my analysis has highlighted points of tension, or 
issues that appear to have received insufficient attention, in 
the underlying the source materials.
A synopsis of the various theory disputes, which have 
been emphasised in the preceding analysis, is provided in 
Figure 5. Though the graphical format of the diagram varies 
slightly from the previous four figures, its benefits and 
limitations, in respect of its source material, are similar.
What the diagram aims to provide, most fundamentally, 
is an overview of the four points of dispute and of the various 
stances associated with each of those points. The diagram 
positions the four points of dispute as being concerned, 
respectively, with issues of ‘canon’, ‘interchange’, ‘functions’ 
and ‘exceptionalism’. The various stances, arranged around 
the periphery of the diagram, are deliberately connected to 
those points of dispute; the reason being to underline that 
the meaning I intend to convey can, in each case, only be 
properly grasped by considering the stance in relation to 
the respective point of dispute. The sense of relationality 
and connection, across all four points of dispute in Figure 
5, differentiates the diagram from the preceding narrative, 
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Conversely, the diagram has some core limitations. 
Unavoidably, the structure of the diagram is somewhat 
simplified, and, by comparison with the preceding narrative, 
some considerable nuance of meaning has been lost. That 
the diagram encompasses four points of dispute and 18 
stances, positioned in relation to those four points, already 
qualifies Figure 5 as a complex graphical representation, 
and yet a considerable degree of abstraction has already 
been introduced to reduce the complexity of the over-
view even to that degree. In particular, the relationships 
between the various stances within each point of dispute 
have been abstracted away. Those relationships have, of 
course, previously been discussed in earlier sections and 
represented graphically in earlier figures; a fact that might, 
to some extent, compensate for how they are obscured here. 
Nonetheless, the reader is reminded that the relationships 
between the various positions and their respective points of 
dispute have been discussed previously: for canon disputes in 
section 4.1.7, interchange disputes in section 4.2.6, functions 
disputes in section 4.3.5, and exceptionalism disputes in 
section 4.4.4. The present comments, which will primarily 
focus on emphasising points of resonance between different 
points of dispute—whether in terms of commonality or 
distinction—should be understood in conjunction with those 
made earlier in these other sections, which consider, in more 
detail, the relationships between different positions at each 
loci of discussion. 
The first relationship that I wish to consider is that 
between the canon and exceptionalism disputes. Prima facie, 
these two points of dispute are closely related, and, indeed, 
absent a consideration of the wider context, the distinction 
between them might appear puzzling. That the points of 
dispute are separated in my analysis, however, reflects that 
they are, in the underlying source materials, discussed and 
debated in rather different ways. The reason for that, of 
course, is largely to do with the history of research in the 
topic area. Dominant trends within TEL, as a research field, 
have, for a long time, looked for inspiration towards to what 
I have, above, repeatedly referred to as a particular reading 
of ‘Western academic psychology’. Doing so has led the field 
to experience a variety of problems, which have become 
increasingly visible and have prompted a range of reactions. 
Among other things, over a long period there has gestated a 
sense that ‘theory’ (conceived in these very particular ways), 
while perhaps serving some purpose when studying some 
very particular problems, is nonetheless both (1) impotent as 
a tool wielded in pursuit of “application-oriented” research 
and (2) an obstacle to effective communication with stake-
holders. Given that both of those latter objectives have long 
dominated the moral economy of the field, it is unsurprising 
that TEL is, in some quarters, a relatively anti-theoretical 
pursuit. The core implication that I wish to draw out, on this 
occasion, is the relationship between theory development 
and the identity of TEL research—whether expressed via 
the research identities of particular researchers, or via the 
relations between the field and its disciplinary neighbours.
The core distinction between canon and exceptionalism 
disputes, in this regard, is a difference in orientation towards 
the relationship between TEL research and that (previously 
dominant) particular reading of ‘Western academic psychol-
ogy’. The former emphasises, in relative terms, the canon as 
a basis (howsoever problematic) for moving forward, and 
the latter, more or less explicitly, denies that basis. (There 
is, it should be noted, a telling absence of any position that 
seeks to defend the established canon as it stands). While 
the stances of canon juxtaposition and canon expansion, 
attempt to reconcile, in different ways, sources of knowledge 
external to the canon, though without discarding it entirely, 
an evident undertone within all exceptionalism dispute 
positions is, seemingly, a desire to escape from the prison of 
disciplinary psychology.
In other ways, of course, there are several points of 
resonance, evident across the two points of dispute. The 
positions of theoretical advance and phenomenal distinctive-
ness, for example, each share the urge to take only what is 
deemed necessary from whatever theoretical antecedents 
are being considered, before urging the field to strike out 
on its own in a distinct (yet, typically, univocal) direction; 
horizon broadening shares with both theoretical co-existence 
and canon integration a desire to locate the research of 
TEL within some greater intellectual enterprise; and canon 
disaggregation and conceptual imbrication each display 
reservations about the transfer of broad categories between 
different research endeavours.
Overall, in my view, these points reflect a three-way 
tension: between a desire to forge more throughgoing links 
between TEL and other, presumably more fully established, 
academic disciplines; an aspiration to support the develop-
ment of TEL as a bona fide discipline in its own right; and a 
compulsion, whether from conviction or necessity, to develop 
better relations with those others who might be considered 
the field’s ‘stakeholders’. The observant reader will notice 
that there is, in turn, some discernible resonance between 
these tensions and the field pertinence and field development 
stances sometimes taken in respect of functions disputes. At 
this moment in the discussion, however, I wish to remain 
focussed on canon and exceptionalism disputes—since it is 
my contention that researchers might more usefully reflect 
on which of these functions theory might play, in their 
own research, once they have decided what they want that 
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research to express about their disciplinary identity.
From the vantage point of those empirical, and perhaps 
relatively inexperienced, researchers who might want to 
engage with theory more extensively, it is difficult to avoid 
the conclusion that important stimuli for reflection are dual 
questions concerning not only what they can contribute to the 
development of TEL research, but also (and I am aware that 
this is a slightly awkward formulation) what researching TEL 
phenomena can contribute to the development of themselves 
as researchers. In other words, researchers should consider, 
in a multifaceted way, how their theoretical choices reflect 
the research identity they are striving to construct for their 
future. As I outlined in section 3, TEL researchers are em-
ployed disparately: even those engaged within universities 
are located across a broad swath of disciplinary departments 
and service units, with different mandated job priorities 
and levels of employment security. That TEL is not, in most 
places, anything like an established academic discipline, 
means that relationships between theoretical development 
and disciplinary identity need to be engaged with urgently, 
as matters of practical import rather than merely as matters 
of disinterested contemplation.
If, as Bulfin, Henderson and Johnson’s (2013) work 
suggests, it is those in “non-promoted” career positions who 
demonstrate most enthusiasm for the use of theory in TEL 
research, then it is important to consider how such enthusi-
asm might best be harnessed in pursuit of explicit objectives. 
Such objectives, to reprise the tensions I gestured towards 
above, might include (a) developing the TEL field, (b) 
communicating with stakeholders, and (c) developing the 
researcher’s own scholarly identity. It is quite possible that, 
under particular circumstances, those objectives might be in 
an acute state of tension. Those TEL researchers employed 
in “non-promoted” positions in disciplinary healthcare or 
engineering, for example, might well be researching issues 
that most directly contribute to the literature on education 
in that discipline area just as much as to the scholarship on 
TEL; they might be well advised, accordingly, to reflect on 
their disciplinary choices when engaging with theory in 
TEL. Their choice to select and develop particular theories 
ought to reflect their considered choice to align with some 
disciplinary heritage, to emphasise the distinctiveness of 
TEL research, or to prioritise engagement with particular 
stakeholders; considerations which, in turn, might plausibly 
depend on their intended career trajectory at least as much 
as on their personal commitments to underlying theoretical 
paradigms. Those employed in other settings—academic 
social sciences departments, ‘information technology’ or ‘li-
brary services’ support units, and so on—will confront many 
of the same dilemmas, but might reasonably be expected 
to make different particular choices in response. Of course, 
choosing to prioritise the furtherance of TEL, as a bona 
fide research field in its own right, is a perfectly legitimate 
response to such dilemmas, but it is not the only legitimate 
response, and its implications for researcher identity and 
career trajectory need to be carefully considered.
From the vantage point of those researchers taking the 
topic of theory in technology enhanced learning research as, 
in itself, a research object, the core question must concern 
what we want to field of TEL to develop into. Evidently, the 
field is moving (or has moved) away from a self-conception 
as an appendage of ‘Western academic psychology’; the 
latter being viewed as an unsuitable basis for, among other 
things, understanding technological practice in context, 
pursuing imperatives for design and change (whether 
in respect of technological tools or infrastructures, or of 
technology equipped practices), or engaging with stakehold-
ers. Academic psychology, it seems, operates at a different 
analytical level of granularity than TEL, and, furthermore, is 
not, itself, static. Indeed, ‘Western academic psychology’ is 
currently developing in disciplinary directions which might 
increasingly emphasise concerns, such as those of ‘neurosci-
ence’, increasingly distant from those of TEL scholars (for a 
disciplinary critique of psychology, see Parker, 2007).
While the above comments might seem good reasons, 
among others, for problematising the existing canon, they do 
not, in themselves, proffer a definite direction for the future 
development of the field. Instead, it seems incumbent on 
those researchers considering this issue to reflect on the con-
sequences of the field’s decades-long disciplinary dalliance, 
and how those negative consequences might be ameliorated 
in future. Such a framing seems, at present, alarmingly rare; 
where Jones and Czerniewicz (2011), for example, correctly 
highlight, within the field, a trend towards what they refer 
to as a “sociological bent” (as discussed in section 4.4), 
advocates of that trend seldom seem to consider how posi-
tioning the field as an appendage of sociology might avoid 
some of those problems that are motivating the slow divorce 
from psychology. How, for example, might sociology offer 
a better theoretical basis for understanding local practices 
(sociologists, for example, are routinely criticised by cultural 
anthropologists for taking actual humans as static), technol-
ogy design (not a core seam of expertise for sociologists), 
or engagement with stakeholders? How might sociological 
theorising overcome the problems of ‘interchange’ between 
empirical and theoretical work that have so bedevilled 
the field hitherto? Advocates of more “eclectic” positions, 
by contrast, must grapple with the reality that, precisely 
because its predominant underpinnings have been long 
recognised as irrelevant in many cases, much of the field has 
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actually been working eclectically, sometimes sub rosa, for 
a considerable amount of time; with deleterious effects for 
cumulative knowledge building, the field’s internal coher-
ence, and its esteem in the eyes of its stakeholders. None of 
these dilemmas has easy answers, to be sure, but we should 
at least be grappling with questions of these kinds.
The second relationship that I wish to consider is that 
between the functions and interchange disputes. The core 
point of commonality between these points of dispute is ex-
ceedingly obvious and reflects one of the very starting points 
for this paper: namely, that the use of theories within the 
empirical work occurring in the field is highly attenuated, as 
is, increasingly, the degree of influence of those theories on 
the development of the field as a whole.
Each of these points of dispute aims to problematise that 
situation, and to extend, in distinct ways, the attendant dis-
cussions in the research literature. Once again, the various 
stances taken, in relation to each point of dispute, to some 
extent mirror each other. Role strengthening, for example, 
mirrors researcher insularity where it invokes the notion that 
many researchers underappreciate how they already, and 
inexorably, engage with the world in theoretical ways; mode 
distinguishing and empirical disengagement converge where 
they highlight the necessity of considering those affordances 
and constraints stemming from what our theories actually 
‘look like’; field pertinence reflects theoretical widening, in 
that each expresses a desire to make research narratives 
better reflect the vantage points of key stakeholders; and so 
on.  On the other hand, the relationships between the overall 
points of dispute are many, complex and nuanced—especial-
ly since each operates across multiple levels of granularity 
in different ways. In particular, while interchange disputes 
are set up in a way that directly addresses broad swaths of 
the field as a whole, that is done in a way that deliberately 
emphasises the need to overcome one particular shortcom-
ing; functions disputes, by contrast, sometimes emphasise 
more granular issues (such as theory application in research 
projects), but do so in a relatively open-ended way.
One core point of tension that is evident from the rela-
tionship between functions and interchange disputes concerns 
the extent to which the core issue of theoretical ‘interchange’ 
can be addressed by reflecting more extensively upon 
those roles that theory plays in research. As section 4.2 has 
made clear, not all stances taken in relation to interchange 
disputes directly attribute blame in the same direction, and 
so we should not overgeneralise this point. However, it does 
seem incumbent on those active in researching TEL, as they 
proceed through their work, not only to think about this 
issue, but also to talk and write about it.
From the vantage point of those researchers wishing 
to engage more extensively with theory, the core points to 
reflect on might encompass, most immediately, the relation-
ships between their ‘empirical’ and ‘theoretical’ priorities. In 
many cases, doing so will necessitate explicitly problematis-
ing what they mean by ‘empirical’ and ‘theoretical’, and how 
their conceptions relate to what others mean by those same 
terms. When engaging with ‘theory’, for example, it must 
be consciously appreciated that this term can, for better or 
worse, sometime be wrongly assumed to have meanings that 
are either deceptively narrow or debilitatingly intimidating; 
while, when engaging with the ‘empirical’, it will be worth 
unpicking how those “future priorities” being advocated 
(whether within scholarship, institutionalised practice, or 
policy imperatives) already come embedded with theoret-
ical assumptions that might usefully be either built on or 
challenged. Subsequently, it will be worth reflecting, on an 
ongoing basis, on how theory is influencing the ‘unfolding’ of 
empirical work, both within particular research projects and 
between different projects undertaken either concurrently or 
in sequence (the latter formulation of course, hints at what 
has occasionally been positioned in the preceding analysis 
as a ‘research agenda’). Doing so might involve integrating 
theoretical observations into research logbooks: an aspect 
of reflective practice which is often advocated, already, in 
relation to empirical aspects of research, but which is not so 
often emphasised in relation to theoretical development21. 
Furthermore, researchers might productively engage more in 
expressing to others, in their project reportage, the contribu-
tions made by theories to their empirical research. Doing so 
would have the dual aims, optimistically, of both enriching 
their own research practice and of stimulating a virtuous cy-
cle of research communication across the scholarly domains 
in which they work. 
From the vantage point of researchers engaging directly 
with the topic of theory in technology enhanced learning re-
search, core questions must also be concerned with scholarly 
reflection and communication, albeit at a different scale of 
analytical granularity. In terms of particular research pro-
jects, it must be recognised that, with particular exceptions, 
the field’s journals enforce writing formats that restrict, 
very considerably, the extent to which theoretical contribu-
tions can be considered within empirical research reports. 
Rigid guidelines, which sometimes even include heading 
templates; stringent wordcount restrictions; an editorial 
21 One instantiation of this idea might involve playing the “Theory Ro-
bot” game, which I advocate for early career researchers in an online 
video discussing “the ‘theoretical framework’ question” (Bligh, 2020, 
starting at 01:15:08). The word ‘game’ here is, it must be quickly 
admitted, being stretched to the limits of its common meaning.
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aversion to the “salami slicing” of research reportage—each 
can contribute, in different ways, to restricting the scope for 
representing theoretical reflection when empirical reports 
are published. Furthermore, the TEL research field seldom 
engages in explicit scholarly discussion in relation to research 
agendas in a way that would encourage and foster extended 
bouts of theoretical debates and development (cf. Fischer 
et al., 2014). Each of these are open questions which, of 
course, fundamentally problematise scholarly communica-
tion in the field22.
The third and final relationship that I wish to consider 
relates, in many ways, to the two paired points of dispute 
that I have considered, in turn, above: namely, canon and 
exceptionalism disputes, on the one hand, and functions and 
interchange disputes, on the other. While these four points of 
dispute encompass a wide range of differences (and the bulk 
of the paper constitutes an exposition of those differences!), 
one point of their commonality is that they each address, 
in different ways, the positioning of theory as something 
forbidding, even alien. If we consider the history of the field, 
and, in particular, the repercussions of that history as ex-
pressed via the canon disputes, then it is easy to understand 
how such a position has been reached; but, even now, this 
aspect of theory goes largely unquestioned. In my view, and 
notwithstanding that the difficulties will be considerable, 
that perception of theory must be challenged.
That, as discussed in section 3, “non-promoted” scholars 
are typically the most enthusiastic about theory is one indica-
tor, among many, that those interested in research careers do 
not arrive already jaded about theory. That other disciplines 
and fields sustain active theoretical debates over extended 
periods—the interrogation of scientific models, the jockeying 
for position of different social-scientific schools of thought, 
and so—is, moreover, an indicator that those knowledge 
communities that can make theory seem relevant are also 
more successful at making it seem interesting. My own 
fascination with theory was initially animated, for example, 
by a concrete examination of how the ‘same phenomena’23 
might be analysed via different theoretical lenses; the 
particular chapter I encountered, at a formative moment for 
22 The present journal, Studies in Technology Enhanced Learning, of 
course, is a new initiative that does explicitly aim to allow for more 
‘varied’ forms of research reportage in the field. 
23 The scare quotes here indicate that, when we view a given phenome-
non through a theoretical lens, one outcome may well be to challenge 
the conceptual boundaries we have intuitively placed around that 
phenomenon. In turn, we may come to understand it as a different 
phenomenon entirely. While completely true, I do not think that 
caveat invalidates the point I am making at this moment.
my own intellectual development, appears within a book 
by Kaptelinin and Nardi (2006), though I have since en-
countered more extended examples: such as those provided 
by Engeström (2008, Chapter 6) and Nicolini (2012, in a 
rolling case study that runs across several chapters). Such 
examples—which are, it should be emphasised, taken from 
across the fields of human-computer interaction and organ-
isational studies, rather than from TEL—serve to brilliantly 
illustrate not only how different theories highlight different 
aspects of important problems, but also how those theories 
highlight important aspects that might otherwise have been 
missed. Where stances taken in relation to particular points 
of dispute seek to formalise or place precise bounds around 
our theoretical work, I view that as useful to the extent 
that doing so can serve as a locus of reflection and genuine 
curiosity, and detrimental to the extent that it serves to 
reinforce theory as a ‘regime’ to which all researchers must 
be subjected. The canon disputes are a stark reminder of the 
eventual outcomes of such regimes, in which researchers feel 
compelled to pledge allegiance to an edifice whose relevance 
they do not fully understand, and which fails to reflect their 
own curiosities and interests. Where we seek to develop, in 
tandem, both the field and its (new) theories in new ways, it 
seems imperative to strive to avoid recapitulating the same 
errors.
6. Concluding comments
The present paper, as outlined in the Introduction, 
proceeded from two departure points: the fragmentary 
nature of that scholarship which critiques theory application 
in TEL research, and a widely acknowledged sense that the 
actual use of theory in the field continues to be problematic. 
The current work was, on those bases, conceived as contrib-
uting to a project of synthesising and systematising those 
materials already extent within the field. Doing so would, 
it was hoped, help to both (1) move forward the debates 
themselves and (2) provide suggestions for those undertak-
ing empirical work who might desire to engage ‘better’ with 
theory.
My initial analysis, whose exposition can be found in 
section 3, sought to convey the sense that theory application 
in TEL was not, in the critical scholarship, being positioned 
as a research object of interest for its own sake. Instead, the 
issue was being conceived in ways fundamentally entwined 
with a wider concern: to develop the identity of the field, 
as a bona fide scholarly enterprise. The analysis presented 
in that section, of what I refer to, following Andrews, as 
the “territory” of the argument, is necessarily one-sided. It 
sketches how the TEL field is conceived in papers whose core 
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concern is theory application, with the corollaries that (1) 
doing so likely places a greater emphasis on the importance 
of theory than a different summary, drawing on more varied 
source materials, might have done, and (2) the account has 
a necessarily “incomplete” and “slippery” quality, since it 
analyses aspects of narratives that are quite often treated as 
auxiliary in the source materials themselves. Nonetheless, 
the narrative in that section is important to the overall argu-
ment developed in the paper, since it says something about 
the basic motives and concerns of those who take the time to 
write about theoretical issues—in other words, it elaborates 
what is taken to be at stake when theory application in TEL 
is discussed. Moreover, most authors do seemingly agree, 
albeit sometimes briefly, that a great deal is at stake. It 
would, of course, have been possible to produce an analysis 
that considered only the points of dispute emphasised in the 
extant materials. Yet doing so would, in my view, have been 
undesirable: since it is only in relation to the various lenses 
set up in section 3—the priorities that are emphasised of, 
for example, field development, escaping prior constraints, 
and nurturing an ‘academic’ identity for the field and its 
attendant profession—that the points of dispute considered 
subsequently can be fully understood.
Inevitably, however, the section comprising the bulk of 
the paper was that concerned with the four particular points 
of dispute that are evident in the underlying source mate-
rials. Section 4 positioned those points of dispute as being 
concerned, respectively, with issues of ‘canon’, ‘interchange’, 
‘functions’ and ‘exceptionalism’. Eighteen distinct stances 
were considered in relation to those different points of 
dispute; each is a distinct position, with a different argumen-
tational goal, but each should be understood as subordinate 
to that wider point of dispute to which it is addressed. The 
form taken by my analysis, therefore, in presenting those 
debates within a particular structure, attends to my initial 
motivation for “synthesising and systematising” the various 
debates occurring in the field. The points of dispute, it is 
suggested, can only be understood against the backdrop 
of field development, and, in turn, the various stances that 
are elaborated can only be understood in relation to those 
points of dispute. The various diagrams offered throughout 
the paper, and the references to other sections highlighted 
within the exposition, are provided for the purposes of 
making those dependencies clear. That mapping, it is 
claimed, is a distinct contribution to the debates themselves, 
and hence to the development of the field. Among other 
things, my analysis suggests, as has been argued in section 5, 
a number of new avenues of exploration and investigation; 
avenues addressed both to individual researchers looking to 
engage more with ‘theory’, and to those scholars engaged in 
debating the issue. By addressing the fragmentary discussion 
of theory application in TEL research, it is hoped, we can, in 
turn, better intervene in shaping the future of TEL research 
as an emerging field of scholarship.
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